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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF A REDEMPTIVE FORM OF 
CRITIQUE 
 
 To my knowledge, there is but a single text that brings together the names of 
Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin, and Stanley Cavell.  This essay, entitled “Remains to 
be Seen,” is written by Cavell himself and he undertakes, in its four pages, a curiously 
intense yet elliptical engagement with the Walter Benjamin of the Arcades Project on the 
occasion of that text’s English translation and publication.  In this piece, Cavell manages 
to surpass the indirection that characterizes even his most comprehensive pieces.  His 
citational tendencies—his predilection for the epigrammatic—emerge in full-force, 
perhaps in homage, perhaps simply aroused by this assignation with the Arcades, the 
ambition of which was “to develop to the highest degree the art of citing without 
quotation marks…its theory intimately related to that of montage.”1  And it is in this 
mode of abridgement and referentiality that Cavell links his own particular activity of 
philosophizing to that of Freud and Benjamin.  He writes: 
I should not forbear seeking, or questioning, another of my nows in the 
antitheological Freud…when early in the Introductory Lectures, Freud confesses: 
‘The material for [the] observations [of psychoanalysis] is usually provided by the 
inconsiderable events which have been put aside by the other sciences as being 
too unimportant—the dregs of the world of phenomena.’ This picks up Benjamin.  
‘Method of this project:…I shall purloin no valuables…But the rags, the refuse—
these I will…allow in the only way possible to come into their own: by making 
use of them.’ Freud’s dregs and Benjamin’s refuse are each interpretable with 
Wittgenstein’s ordinary; the differences are where I come in.2 
                                                        
1
 AP, 458; N1, 10 
2
 “Remains to be Seen,” 261-2 
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Where Freud, concerned with the suffering of private persons, made the abortive attempts 
of individual expression (obsessive behaviors, parapraxes, dreams, etc.) the fundamental 
stuff of psychoanalysis and Benjamin, for his part, found, in the detritus of capitalism, the 
essential material for his critique of culture, Cavell’s efforts have been largely devoted to 
the rescue of pieces of intellectual inheritance dismissed by American academe as being 
below the level of philosophic regard.  As he comments of his work in Pitch of 
Philosophy, “[The essay Must we Mean What We Say?] is explicitly a defense of the 
work of my teacher Austin against an attack that in effect dismissed that work as 
unscientific, denied it as a contender in the ranks of philosophy at all.  (Since a response 
to some denial was part of my cue in taking up Thoreau and Emerson, even in thinking 
about Shakespeare and then about film, there is the sense of a pattern here, perhaps of 
further interest).”3 
Such is the interest of the following pages, which seeks to bring into focus the 
pattern writ large in the work of Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell.  While it was already some 
months into this project when I encountered Cavell’s telegraphic piece in which he forms, 
in and under the sign of redemption, an indefinite constellation between his work and that 
of Benjamin and Freud, the central preoccupation of my research was already, 
unbeknownst to me, dedicated to the decoding and concretization of this claim that 
remains, in Cavell’s essay, a mere suggestion, constrained to these eight lines of text.  
This dissertation offers a sustained investigation of the insight glimpsed in and by Cavell 
that, between his critical hermeneutics and that of Freud and Benjamin, there is an 
essential isomorphism and that, further, in his uptake of ordinary language philosophy, 
                                                        
3
 Ibid, 9 
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Cavell renders thematic the differences between his two predecessors, Freud the critic of 
private life and Benjamin the critic of the public.   
Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell are all, one could say, episodic or occasional 
thinkers in the sense that their work is always devoted to some particular object or text.  
This characteristic preoccupation with the particular—with that which defies easy 
subsumption under and by a ready concept and thus has the potential to contest our 
concepts as they stand—has left Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell largely unclassifiable in 
terms of extant philosophical categories.
4
  While Freud is one of the seminal thinkers of 
the 20
th
 century and the writings of Benjamin have, in recent years, earned him a small 
but fervent following, and Cavell, for his part, has had what is undeniably a successful 
career within academic philosophy, these three remain nonetheless without a proper 
philosophic home, unassimilated to any particular school of academic thought.  The 
predominant view, within philosophical circles at least, is that there is something deeply 
unsystematic—philosophically irredeemable—about the work of all three of these 
thinkers.  This dissertation, however, examines this resistance to easy incorporation in 
and by the discipline as part of the philosophic work that they seek to accomplish to 
argue that their texts, rather than being failed instances of intelligibility, systematically 
chart the limits of reason and, in so doing, expose a limit internal to philosophy itself.   
In other words: Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell undertake philosophy for the sake of 
putting philosophy in its proper place.  As Cavell remarks, offering an interpretation of 
his philosophers of the ordinary alongside whom, as he asserts in “Remains to be Seen,” 
                                                        
4
 It is unclear to me that there is “a psychoanalysis,” i.e., a monolithic tradition, of which to speak.  
Benjamin, for his part, was and remains, but a satellite of the Frankfurt school, his work an ideological 
battleground in death as in life.  Cavell, for his part, has a motley pedigree, descended as his thinking is 
from Austin, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Spinoza, Kant, Freud, to name those influences most immediately 
evident in his work. 
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Benjamin and Freud are interpretable, the interest of this work is to advance a “new claim 
to philosophy’s old authority, one whose power…reside(s) in a certain systematic 
abdication of that authority.”5  As I see it and as is suggested in Cavell’s use of the 
ethico-political concept of authority, this place is not narrowly determined in 
epistemological terms, but rather is derived historico-politically.  While it is unsurprising, 
perhaps even redundant, to invoke historical and political consciousness in Benjamin’s 
name, I take it that this is, in the cases of Freud and Cavell, a rather bewildering 
assertion.  For Freud’s restrictive focus on private life is commonly regarded as a form of 
myopia that bespeaks and engenders a blindness to the socio-historic determinates of 
individual existence and Cavell’s commitment to the ordinary—to what we all say and 
do—is taken as evidence of the deeply a-historic and a-political bent of his thinking.  Yet 
my claim is that what is systematic within and systematic between these three can be seen 
in the recessed philosophy of history that undergirds and is fulfilled within their 
respective hermeneutic operations.  In speaking of a “philosophy of history,” I mean to 
invoke both the implicit theory of modernity that dictates their redemptive efforts as well 
as the philosophy of history that determines the form of their texts.  I hear in Cavell’s 
reference to his “now” this dual sense of history and this dual impetus, making meaning 
in light of the ethico-political limits that define the modern moment and for the sake of 
re-casting those limits, giving us new access to the present. 
 As the normative impulse of redemptive criticism arises in light of this theory of 
modernity, I will begin with a discussion of the “now” in this sense.  On my reading, the 
homologous interpretive practices of Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell obtain in light of their 
shared response to the problem and promise of secular democracy.  Democratic 
                                                        
5
 Pitch of Philosophy, 9-10 
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community is marked, at its very heart, by an insoluble paradox.  Unlike absolutist or 
authoritarian societies in which community is created and sustained through a leader or 
leading ideal, democracy is defined in and by the very absence of a sovereign person or 
principle.  Specific to this form of life, in which authority has been secularized, in the 
sense that authority has no warrant beyond legitimation in the here-and-now, and social 
relations democratized, in the sense that nothing beyond the relations legitimizes them, is 
the fact that there is no one who can claim to have more or better knowledge of the nature 
of the good and just life and, correlatively, no authoritative interpretation of the formative 
ideals of freedom and equality.  But this means that the very thing that makes democracy 
possible simultaneously exists as the innermost point of its irremediable instability.  A 
genuinely democratic community must deny itself precisely the kind of authoritative 
grounding narrative around which community could coalesce and through which it could 
be assured.  No authority can be taken on faith alone and this includes the authority of the 
democratic form itself as well as any of its particular historical instantiations.  Shorn of 
the divine veneer that clothed previous political forms, democracy discovers itself 
endlessly exposed to a legitimation problem.  It is in this that the democratic paradox 
obtains, democracy calling for an authority that it cannot tolerate, and from whence the 
leading question of my dissertation: what form of solidarity, if any, can take root in the 
absence of the unifying force of a sovereign individual or ideal and so is compatible with 
the structural “non-closure” of democratic space?  What kind of culture could support 
such fractious togetherness? 
My thesis is that the proper apprehension of the work of Freud, Benjamin, and 
Cavell requires the foregoing theoretical supplement—the excavation of the implicit 
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theory of secularity that undergirds their hermeneutics—and further that an examination 
of their texts alongside of and in terms of one another can yield just such a model of 
democratic solidarity.  My redemptive critics offer something that exceeds the limits and 
capacities of formal political theory but without which there can be no adequate 
apprehension of the vicissitudes of secularized social space: a theory of the affective 
constitution of the post-absolutist collective that can account for both its pathologies and 
its prospects.  As Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell see it, the affective straits upon which 
democratic, secular modernity are founded are essentially—incurably—ambivalent.  The 
absence of final authority is equally the source of existential and political liberty and a 
condition of isolation or anonymity: an anarchic state in which there exists nothing to 
ethically bind individuals to one another.  The secularization of politics represents both 
an emancipatory gain and a grievous loss, the ungrounded-ness of democratic life 
simultaneously a condition of hope and of anxiety.  The structural undecidability upon 
which this ambivalence is garnered cannot be resolved insofar as democracy obtains only 
in this non-closure, but this means that democracy requires something more than reason 
can supply: namely, the individual and collective hope that the realization of a 
community of truly free and equal persons is already underway.  Such a hope, while not 
liable to ultimate vindication, cannot be sustained in light of nothing.  Rather, it requires 
practical nourishment.  It requires—in a word—solidarity. 
At this juncture, I would like to re-state, clarify and foreground, three points made 
in the preceding pages.  First, this dissertation is not concerned to advance a theory of the 
democratic state.  In using the term “democracy,” I mean an emancipatory politics that is 
radically secular and egalitarian.  “Democracy” is here regarded as an ideal the aspiration 
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to which is inseparable from its achievement.  It thus serves as a placeholder of sorts.  
That said, a key assumption of this work is that democracy obtains in more than 
institutions: that a genuine democracy requires an active commitment on the part of the 
individual to interrogate the conditions of shared social life and so to engage with those 
others to whom one is joined, willingly or not, in political community.  I do not aim to 
offer here a normative theory of the status apparatus, but I do offer something equally 
important to understanding secular democracy: a model of solidarity, a theorization of 
democratic culture. 
This brings me to my second point: while my concept of democracy remains 
“thin,” the concept of secularity that I advance is essential to the legibility of the 
normative impulse at play in democracies.  My dissertation is, it could be said, a 
phenomenology of secularism in the Hegelian sense of the unfolding of its inner life.  It is 
a commonplace of mainstream political theory, of both the foundationalist and 
proceduralist varieties, that democracy is necessarily secular and that a commitment to 
secularity only obtains in the progressive rationalization of the world.  Such a thesis is not 
simply the product of speculative philosophy, but captures a historical process in which 
scientific advancement was bound up with the disenchantment of traditional forms of 
authority through which democratic conceptions of authority then announced themselves 
as a kind of answer.  Viewed in terms of this history, democracy seems to have as its 
prerequisite or correlate, a process of disillusionment, its ideal trajectory aiming at an era 
in which reason alone would reign.  In other words, according to this narrative, 
democracy, achieved through a process of secularization, where secularization is treated 
 8 
solely as an epistemic achievement, is intrinsically opposed to myth and mythic 
worldviews.  
Against such a view, however, Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell understand secularity 
not as the era of myth’s slow demise, but rather as the land where myth goes to thrive.  
For, lacking transcendent authority, the only good authority on which we have to go is 
that of everyday experience; nothing more than commonsense.  Yet, the pre-reflective 
power of commonsense is a power accumulated over time, established in repetition and 
realized in and as habit.  Commonsense is the repository of interrogated history and the 
everyday world to which it corresponds seems self-evident, being beyond or before 
explanation.  To find oneself before a de facto authority such as this is to confront one 
wholly anathematic to secular politics in which no authority can be taken for granted, i.e., 
on faith alone.  The everyday is thus oddly powerful and yet entirely fragile.  For while it 
is already absolutely authoritative in appearing as unquestionable, i.e., not appearing at 
all, when it does emerge from its pre-reflective oblivion, its power, being no-account, 
comes to appear as but a matter of conventional; wholly arbitrary.  This indistinction 
between the categories proper to commonsense—between the necessary and the 
contingent, the natural and the social—renders the scene of the everyday intrinsically 
unstable, constituting what my three thinkers know as the surrealism of the habitual.   
  The condition of the secular collective is such that we have no greater authority to 
which to appeal other than that of the everyday and yet, for the claim of the quotidian to 
be rightly heard, it must first be subject to radical re-casting.  It is in the awareness of the 
need for the perpetual transfiguration of the mundane—the need for secularized 
redemption—that Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell turn their attention towards that which 
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appears, within the field of typical experience, as senseless or insignificant.  For this 
element heterogeneous to the everyday has the power to disrupt its field.  These are the 
conditions under which, as per my three redemptive critics, philosophy is to be inherited.  
A truly secular philosophy must, in this sense, be critique, yet not only critique.  To speak 
again with Cavell, it is not enough to “accept a therapy of disillusion (or dismantling),” 
but to do so “without succumbing to disillusionment…as an attitude, something between 
discouragement and cynicism.”6  By contrast to ideology critique, which regards re-
mythification in modernity as having a particular source and specifies the conditions of 
its overcoming, redemptive criticism sees this pathology—this madness—as endemic to 
the secular condition, the contestation with and over commonsense unceasing. 
This brings me to my third point: redemptive criticism neither establishes itself in 
direct relation to the political—say, aiming at revolution—nor is it reconciliatory.  For 
while democracy would seem to abide in the overcoming of this anarchic condition in 
which we lack the rational principle by which to assure our relations in and to the 
everyday, this anarchism cannot be overcome nor can the ambivalence that it engenders.  
As opposed to philosophies of reconciliation, redemptive criticism sets as its goal the 
restoration of an awareness of what it is that secularity, of its own concept, demands and 
attempts to render bearable the indefeasible indeterminacy of life lived unsponsored by 
absolute authority, redeeming ambivalence itself as the engine of a form of myth-making 
adequate to the project of life lived in freedom and equality with others.   
Part of my aim in reading Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell as constituting a unique 
hermeneutical tradition has been to work toward an account of what such a democratic, 
self-critical tradition might look like.  Tradition, insofar as it names the sanctification of 
                                                        
6
 “The Politics of Interpretation (As Opposed to What?),” 59 
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convention—its authority as Kultur—would seem to be anathematic to secular or 
democratic conceptions of authority.  Yet democracy must consist in more than 
institutions.  Because modern democracies emerge from out of a history of violence and 
carry that violence within them, they can be sustained only by a culture that consists in an 
on-going conversation with and about this past.  There can be no justice without such an 
interrogation.  To ask after the rights and roles of the past in the present is to invoke the 
question of tradition: how to inherit, individually and collectively, this world that is not of 
our making, but for which we are nevertheless responsible.  This is the formative 
question of Walter Benjamin’s work.  For that matter, reformulated strictly in terms of 
the individual, it is, as well, the formative question of Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
views the project of self-authorization in terms of the ability to acknowledge what of the 
past still claims us in the present.  My thesis, then, prefigured in the works of Freud and 
Benjamin but which I find fulfilled in the philosophy of Cavell, is that democracy, too, 
requires tradition, but a tradition that paradoxically abides in its own critical self-
overcoming.  The culture adequate to democracy must exist in the condition of aesthetic 
modernism, which is not the rejection of tradition, but the permanent, radicalized 
interrogation of the material conventions that constitute a tradition (or practice or genre).  
Democratic culture must become philosophy.  I might make this point from the opposite 
direction instead: in gathering these outliers together under the umbrella concept of 
redemptive criticism, I have attempted to provide them with the make-shift philosophic 
home that they have thus far been lacking.  But redemptive criticism is not much of a 
home.  For, as we shall see, this “tradition” does not designate a strict methodological 
procedure or a philosophic school so much as a mode of attunement. 
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We thus arrive at the “now” in its second, interrelated sense as the telos of 
redemptive criticism and hence that which determines the shape of its discursive 
productions.  Given the diagnosis of what ails the secular collective, it should come as no 
surprise that it is a philosophy of history that serves as the theoretic basis of these texts 
that have a redemptive aim.  It is Walter Benjamin who, in the concept of 
Naturgeschichte (natural history), offers the most direct means by which to apprehend 
this common hermeneutic perspective and the deconstructive/constructive principle of 
allegoresis to which it gives rise.  While Naturgeschichte is the principle concept of 
Marx’s social ontology, Benjamin had actually already, prior to his confrontation with 
Marxist theory, developed and crucially deployed this concept in his 1925 study of the 
Trauerspiel.  Where Benjamin’s contemporaries and predecessors had dismissed German 
Baroque allegory as an aesthetic failure, Benjamin, through the concept of natural 
history, accessed the Trauerspiel and its curious allegorical form as a reflection of the 
historico-political crises of its day.  As Adorno emphasizes in his 1932 lecture, “The Idea 
of Natural-History,” natural history designates a critical perspective, i.e., a particular way 
of being attuned, rather than a method.  In his lecture, Adorno reads this hermeneutic 
viewpoint as originating in the work of Lukács, articulated therein through the concept of 
second nature, and finding its dialectical fulfillment in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study and 
further presents natural history in terms of the dilemma of secularity that I have just 
outlined. 
This world is a second nature; like the first—“first nature” for Lukács is likewise 
alienated nature, nature in the sense of the natural sciences—“it can only be 
defined as the embodiment of well-known yet meaningless necessities and 
therefore it is ungraspable and unknowable in its actual substance.”  A world of 
 12 
convention as it is historically produced, this world of estranged things that 
cannot be decoded but encounters us as ciphers, is the starting point of the 
question with which I am concerned here.  From the perspective of the philosophy 
of history the problem of natural-history presents itself in the first place as the 
question of how it is possible to know and interpret this alienated, reified, dead 
world.  Lukács already perceived this problem as foreign to us and a puzzle to us.  
If I should succeed at giving you a notion of the idea of natural-history you would 
first of all have to experience something of the shock that this question portends.  
Natural-history is not a synthesis of the natural and historical methods, but a 
change of perspective.
7
 
We see here a reprisal of the dialectic of the everyday in which uninterrogated history, 
i.e., convention, takes on the false appearance of pregiven being—of inarguable nature—
yet, in its authoritative self-evidence, remains nevertheless senseless: both wholly typical 
and entirely mysterious.  How then to produce the shock such that the obviousness of the 
obvious, as Althusser would say, crumbles?  And, further, how to gain critical traction?  
As Benjamin sees it—and as do Freud and Cavell—nature and history must come to 
serve as the instruments of one another’s demythification.  The interpretive procedures of 
Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell supply the vantage-point from which “the natural can be 
read as a sign for history and history, where it seems to be the most historical, appears as 
a sign for nature.”8 
Such allegorical signification is possible in that, at a certain critical juncture, the 
concepts of nature and history open onto one another.  While nature names eternally pre-
given being, the concept of time is nonetheless at play within it.  For nature is transitory.  
As Benjamin writes in the Trauerspiel, “if nature has always been subject to the power of 
                                                        
7
 “The Idea of Natural-History,”118 
8
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death, it is also true that it has always been allegorical.”9  Nature as subject to 
transformation (registered here as fatedness to death) is itself “historical,” hence it means 
its opposite as well.  Conversely, while history betokens the self-consciously undertaken 
transformation of social conditions, i.e., progress, it is, at the same time, the substance of 
the conventions through which we find ourselves living.  The neediness that drives 
history is also the neediness that leads to the static reproduction of social formations.  
History congeals in and as habit, becoming a second nature. 
The demonstration of the natural in the historical and vice versa is a critical 
moment in that it undermines the absoluteness of the categories constitutive of (even 
philosophic) commonsense.  When the everyday comes to appear as nature, the 
disclosure of its historicality serves to undo the illusion of its inarguable necessity.  
Conversely, when history comes to appear as a “universal idea,” i.e., as ineluctable 
rational progress, the disclosure of the neediness or “first nature” that drives it—the 
primitive that is recurrent within it—breaks up the false appearance of history as a 
salvific Geist.  As Susan Buck-Morss elegantly makes this point: “Whenever theory 
posited ‘nature’ or ‘history’ as an ontological first principle, this double character of the 
concepts of was lost, and with it the potential for critical negativity: either social 
conditions were affirmed as ‘natural’ without regard for their historical becoming, or the 
actual historical process was affirmed as essential; hence the irrational material suffering 
of which history was composed was either dismissed as mere contingency (Hegel) or 
ontologized as essential in itself (Heidegger).  In both cases, the result was the ideological 
justification of the given social order.”10 
                                                        
9
 OGT, 166 
10
 Origin of Negative Dialectics, 54 
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For Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell, natural history provides the critical perspective 
par excellence.  It has its deepest implication in the “eddy in the stream of becoming” 
that Benjamin referred to as the “dialectical image.”  In the dialectical image, the 
antinomies that drive the dialectic are not reconciled, but rather come to a zero-point of 
arrest; the tension between nature and history concretized in graphic form.
11
  This 
dialectical construction was meant to provide the shock by which Benjamin’s reader 
could be awoken to the Jetztzeit, abbreviated by Cavell in “Remains to be Seen” as the 
“now,” but which is better rendered as the “here-and-now.”  In Freud’s work, this 
dialectical sensibility receives its most direct elaboration in the concept of 
Nachträglichkeit (deferred action) in which the repressed, i.e., infantile desire (nature), is 
anachronistically constituted in and through a crisis within the present field of meaning.  
In the re-emergence of the repressed, history is revealed, not as progress—or, I should 
say, maturation—but rather as the repetition of the primitive past.  Yet, inasmuch as this 
inconquerable archaic element only emerges in and through a moment of historical 
rupture, nature, too, is treated as historical.  For the repressed only gains substance as 
some thing in and through its penetration of this historical moment.  It gains its meaning 
historically, which is to say, retrospectively.  Surprisingly, this same conceptual structure 
finds its figuration in the seemingly ahistorical Cavell and does so in his conception of 
the ordinary, in which the common world appears only in and through the skepticism that 
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 As Benjamin states in the XVII thesis: “Materialist historiography…is based on a constructive principle.  
Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts but their arrest as well.  Where thinking suddenly 
comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by which 
thinking is crystallized as a monad.  The historical materialist approaches a historical object only where it 
confronts him as a monad.  In this structure, he recognizes the sign of a messianic arrest of happening, or 
(to put it differently) a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past,” (Selected Writings: Vol 4, 
396). 
 15 
would deny it—and so as too late: as already lost.  As Cavell writes in the lecture, “The 
Uncanniness of the Ordinary:”  
The return of what we accept as the world will then present itself as a return of the 
familiar, which is to say, exactly under the concept of what Freud names the 
uncanny.  That the familiar is a product of a sense of the unfamiliar and of the 
sense of a return means that what returns after skepticism is never (just) the same.  
(A tempting picture here could be expressed by the feeling that ‘there is no way 
back.’  Does this imply that there is a way ahead?  Perhaps there are some 
“back’s” or “once’s” or pasts the presence to which requires no “way.”  Then that 
might mean that we have not found the way away, have not departed, have not 
entered history.12   
The thought that history is but a catastrophic failure—nothing more than the recycling of 
the ever selfsame—is a cause for despair, but it is, as my three redemptive critics see it, 
also a source of hope.  For, in its uncanny disclosure, the ordinary is exposed not as the 
ineluctable ground of our activity, but rather as a goal to be attained.  Only in the 
repetition of catastrophe—the re-emergence of the repressed (Freud) or the oppressed 
past (Benjamin)—does there abide the possibility of the redemption of what in history 
has been untimely, sorrowful, and denied and thus the ability to, as Benjamin would put 
it, “read what was never written.”13  
Clearly there is no method by which such a divination could occur.  The 
impositions of theoretical subjectivity upon historical material results only in the 
dismissal, silencing, or assimilation of the heterogeneous and unruly elements within it.  
The perspective of natural history, in which the everyday comes to appear, fantastically, 
as a field of ciphers, yields instead to a practice of “physiognomic reading” or allegoresis.  
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 In Quest of the Ordinary, 166 
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 Quoting Hofmannsthal in the “Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of History,’” (Selected Writings: Vol. 4, 
405). 
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In speaking of allegoresis as opposed to allegory, I mean to designate a mode of 
understanding rather than a technique of textual production or a literary genre.  In this 
hermeneutic mode, the surface meaning of a “text” is regarded as a dissimulation that 
both conceals and expresses another deeper message.  It thus takes up the practice of 
reading as an activity of decoding or decipherment in which the text is to be divested of 
its veneer of easy intelligibility.  It seeks out those moments in which a text is at odds 
with itself, not so that they can be reconciled and a greater unity of meaning produced, 
but so that this tension or ambiguity can be intensified into paradox, the text’s coherence 
disrupted.  This critical hermeneutics reads the whole from the perspective of its 
fragment; in terms of that which cannot be fully incorporated into its overarching 
structure of meaning and which, accordingly, has the power to re-configure, around itself, 
the meaning of the whole. 
 Each one of my redemptive critics realizes this undertaking in different ways and 
one of the fundamental labors of this dissertation has been to pronounce these differences 
against the backdrop of their affinity.  It is this aim that accounts for the structure of my 
argument as a whole.  I begin with Freud, not simply because of his chronological 
priority, but, moreover, because his work establishes the historico-political horizon of 
redemptive criticism.  While the Interpretation of Dreams is the Ur-text of secular 
allegoresis, it is Totem and Taboo’s critical redemption of anthropology that establishes 
psychoanalysis in its crucial bearing on democratic theory.  As I see it, Freud’s primal 
horde myth is legible as a critical allegorization of the two fundamental origin stories of 
the secular collective: the myths of contract and the French Revolution.  Inasmuch as the 
latter names an actual event that designates the cataclysmic break with a prior world-
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order, it is both a piece of history and, at the same time, a myth.  Freud re-assembles, 
from the perspective of the defunct ethico-political ideal of fraternity, the elements basic 
to these founding narratives and, in so doing, recovers the affective dimension of the 
post-absolutist collective.  Freud argues that the cohesiveness of secularized social space 
depends upon a commitment in excess of what can be justified, legislated, or otherwise 
institutionalized.  It depends, in a word, on solidarity.  Yet, as Freud sees it, the affective 
straits upon which modernity is founded are essentially—incurably—ambivalent; the 
band of brothers haunted by the principle of patriarchy that it would abjure.   
For Freud, self-authorization is not a presupposition of secularity, but rather the 
troubled promise of the modern form of life.  Freud argues that this melancholic 
attachment to the delegitimized authority of the past occurs both at the level of the 
historical life of the collective, which longs for an absolute authority in which it cannot 
believe and which it cannot condone, and at the level of the private individual.  For, while 
patriarchy is overcome as a political principle, it nonetheless finds refuge in and as the 
arche of the private sphere. Freud accordingly makes the private sphere legible in its 
materialist, sociological dimension and, what’s more, treats this privatization of 
patriarchy as the source of madness in modernity.  For, while patriarchy remains the 
universal form of secularized social life, the relation to this authority is individualized, 
the passage through the crucible of the Oedipus complex is privately undertaken.  Private 
life is conditioned by and conditions the reproduction of the structural totality from which 
it is nonetheless disarticulated. 
In treating the (failed) struggle against patriarchy as a primitive phenomenon and 
simultaneously registering that its modern reprise gives rise to a genuinely new historical 
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order, Freud’s myth of the primal horde performs the double action that characterizes 
natural-history, discovering the archaic in what purports to be the most modern and the 
historical in what presents itself as the most natural.  Yet even as he is able to gain critical 
traction in the myths constitutive of modern political thought and provide redemptive 
criticism with its essential problematic, his tale nonetheless lacks normative grip.  
Committed to the project of individual self-authorization, Freud attempts to de-theologize 
the concept of redemption so as to redeem it for secularized social space.  Yet the 
redemption that he undertakes in and for the sake of the private individual cannot be 
accomplished or sustained as a project outside the solidarity that he forswears.  Freud’s 
primal horde narrative poses the question of secular community, but suspends the 
question of justice.  What is inconceivable to Freud is a form of meaning-making that is 
shared yet nonetheless non-coercive.  Hence, in Civilization and its Discontents, he issues 
a ban on the cultural psychoanalysis that would seem, on his own accounting, to be in 
order. 
Benjamin, conversely, regards the essential issue of modernity in terms of the 
identification and cultivation of a form of tradition consonant with secularized 
conceptions of authority, i.e., a material collective form of remembrance in which the 
critical reception and transmission of the shared past is at stake.  For there can be no 
justice for those who cease to mourn the violence of their shared past.  Benjamin shares 
Freud’s understanding of secularized social space as essentially unstable, split as it is 
between the private and the public spheres.  In Totem and Taboo, Freud presents this 
instability in terms of its potential regression in either of two directions: anarchic 
disaggregation or fascistic totalization.  However, Benjamin, who views the problem of 
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modernity not in terms of the persistence of patriarchy, but rather from the perspective of 
the new economic form of domination, identifies disaggregation and totalization as 
concomitant realities of the modern collective, in fealty as it is to capital, rather than as 
opposed possibilities.  Both the project of individual liberation and the pursuit of genuine 
community are blocked within the capitalist form of life in which we are abandoned to 
the privatized experience of cultural history in the anonymous form of the commodity; it 
is from this isolated condition that arises the madness of modernity, what Benjamin refers 
to as phantasmagoria.  Hence it is the attitude of consumption that must be undone if a 
new collective, self-critical form of tradition is to be achieved and secularized social 
space redeemed in and as an emancipatory politics.  Indeed, in consuming culture as a 
commodity precisely what is forgotten is the labor of the dead. 
The aim of Benjamin’s cultural psychoanalysis is thus to liberate desire from 
exchange-value and it is to this end that he undertakes allegoresis in and as the essential 
constructive principle of his Arcades Project.  Benjamin reads the Paris of the nineteenth 
century as the prehistory of twentieth century consumer culture.  He takes up its cultural 
treasures and pieces of kitsch from the perspective of natural history, discovering in these 
obsolescent commodities, the denied utopian desires of the collective.  In other words, he 
finds nature hiding in the failed matter of history and, shows, at the same time, that our 
own era is not the fulfillment of the promises of this past, but merely its repetition. 
While Benjamin’s work, devoted as it is to the critical redemption of history, 
provides the setting for the sustained elaboration of the theoretical basis of this 
hermeneutic tradition, his cultural psychoanalysis nonetheless falls short of the concept of 
redemptive criticism that it seeks to articulate.  Benjamin sees that redemptive criticism 
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cannot have a purely private character, but rather that it finds its proper home as a 
practice of solidarity.  Yet, even as his weak messianism conceives of redemptive 
criticism as a cultural practice and accordingly secures the normative dimension that 
Freud could not get in hand, there is still something about private experience and its 
significance for emancipatory politics that remains uncomprehended in Benjamin’s work.  
For while Benjamin uses the tools of private experience, he does so in service to its 
overcoming, mistakenly treating privacy as the antithesis of community and shared 
experience.  Ultimately Benjamin holds an insufficiently dialectical conception of 
solidarity, which is to say, an insufficiently democratic conception of it.  For privacy is 
not to be overcome, but rather secured as the ground of mutuality. 
This dissertation thus finds its summation in the work of Stanley Cavell.  Cavell’s 
uptake of ordinary language philosophy represents the dialectical marriage of the 
respective redemptive criticisms of Freud and Benjamin, dedicated as it is to navigating 
the indistinctions of the private and public dimensions of speech.  Fundamental to 
Cavell’s activity of philosophizing is his redemptive re-casting of modern skepticism.  
This is to say that skepticism plays the same central structuring role for Cavell that 
dream-life does in the work of Freud and the Trauerspiel does in the work of Benjamin.  
In his transcription of the skeptical/anti-skeptical debate beyond the exclusively 
epistemological terms in which it is commonly read, Cavell makes the polarization of the 
private and public dimensions of language legible as a mythic reflection of the material 
conditions of secularized social space, constituted as it is in the disarticulation between 
the public and private spheres.  In so doing, Cavell demonstrates that mutual 
intelligibility is, at its base, not an epistemic achievement, but rather depends, on the one 
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hand, on solidarity or what he terms acknowledgment and, on the other, on self-
authorization or what he treats in terms of voice and exemplarity.  As Cavell sees it, 
intelligibility is not a function of the conformity of one’s speech to a neutral, pre-existent 
and exhaustive set of linguistic criteria, but rather a solidaristic practice that has, at its 
base, our willingness and desire for conversation—to understand and to make ourselves 
understood.  In speaking for myself, I am necessarily speaking for others because I must 
present myself as (and take myself to be) representative of our shared linguistic 
constitution.  Thus I am, in my willingness to speak, at the same time allowing others to 
speak for me, asking for their consent to my usage hence for acknowledgment as a 
member of this linguistic community.   
 As Cavell sees it, communication comes in the form of appeal and acceptance 
and depends therefore upon a form of accord.  Yet, there is no fact of the matter in virtue 
of which mutual understanding obtains; nothing that undergirds the harmony of our 
collective practices—nothing deeper than this harmony itself or, what Cavell terms, the 
ordinary.  The issue of the ground or, more precisely, the groundlessness of our mutuality 
only even comes into question, appearing as some thing, in the breakdown of the 
intersubjective weave of the everyday.  The ordinary is anachronistically produced, 
constituted as it is through specific semantic crises.  From this, I draw two conclusions.  
First, that in his non-foundationalist account of the necessity at play in our linguistic 
conventions, Cavell reveals himself to be a dialectical materialist in the sense in which 
this project understands the term, i.e., in the sense of a natural historian.  For Cavell 
presents linguistic conventions as a form of second nature, as an historical precipitate that 
radically predates my own acceptance of a native tongue, but for which I am nevertheless 
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responsible.  Second, in this understanding of mutual intelligibility as resting upon a form 
of agreement that is prehistoric in nature, Cavell’s uptake of ordinary language 
philosophy offers itself to be read as a critical allegorization of the myth of contract. 
If Cavell’s realization of the ordinary language tradition represents the critical 
allegorization of the myth of contract, it is in his treatment of the movies that this critico-
redemptive reading finds its fulfillment.  Cavell generates, in his treatment of the 
cinematic audience, a mythic image of democratic solidarity in which privacy is not 
overcome, but rather transformed from a condition of isolation and anonymity into the 
basis for a renewed search for community.  Cavell sees the movies as a place where we 
live the madness of secularized social space and discover it as not only tolerable, but 
livable with others.  The movies, for Cavell, represent the secularized realization of myth, 
i.e., myth stripped of religion, and hence the promise of a solidaristic practice of 
collective meaning-making adequate to democratic community.  Before the silverscreen, 
the public gathers together to view the disembodied fragments of history.  Cavell redeems 
the audience of the movies, the mass culture commodity par excellence, as a democratic 
community the promise of which is yet fulfilled but which has all the material it needs 
before it.  It is thus through Cavell that I am able to demonstrate that redemptive criticism 
has democracy as its proper setting.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE MYTH OF THE PRIMAL HORDE AND THE FATE OF POST-
REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS: FREUD’S CRITICAL REDEMPTION OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
In this essay, I will offer a reading of Totem and Taboo as a text that is, if not 
itself a piece of democratic theory, one that nonetheless bears crucially upon it.  
Specifically, my topic is the “scientific myth,” as Freud called it, by which Totem and 
Taboo finds its denouement and which would recur in subsequent publications, not just as 
a persistent theme, but instead as a fundamental touchstone of psychoanalytic thinking.  
Totem and Taboo, largely an analysis of the conventions and religious rituals of the 
aboriginal tribes of Australia, constitutes a pivotal moment in the development of 
psychoanalytic thinking.  It is, accordingly, my sense that, while Totem and Taboo is 
most often read in terms of what Freud imposed upon Australia—as if its analyses 
amounted to but a form of hermeneutical muscle-flexing, Australia an occasion to prove 
psychoanalysis’ power to conceptually colonize even the cultures most remote from the 
Viennese scene of its development—the text is better read (more productively; more 
provocatively; more psychoanalytically), as Jacqueline Rose has suggested, in terms of 
what “Australia forced Freud to do with his thought.”14  Freud describes these aboriginal 
tribes simultaneously as “the most primitive and conservative races,” i.e., ahistorical 
cultures, and as “ancient races (that) have a long past history behind them during which 
their original conditions of life have been subject to much development and distortion.”15  
As is evident from this dialectical description, Freud felt himself to have discovered the 
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 “Freud in the ‘Tropics,’” 51.  As Rose’s fascinating article develops this pivotal moment in terms of 
race/culture and the enactment of racial/cultural difference between Freud and Jung, a topic ancillary to the 
concern of this dissertation, I do not engage her directly. 
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unconscious in a concrete social form and thus a new medium by which to examine the 
non-historicist imbrications of historicality, one of the central themes of psychoanalysis.  
But more than this, in totemism, Freud encountered the social form of, what he had 
already, in his 1907 essay “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices,” identified as the 
private religion of neurosis and thus a means by which to understand neurosis as an effect 
of privatization, i.e., the splitting off of the private and the public spheres, and thus of 
secularization itself.  Thus, my reading of Totem and Taboo in terms of democratic 
theory will serve to show not just the socio-political salience of psychoanalytic thinking 
in general, but as well its “modernist” interest. 
A bit of background: in his “Just-So Story,”16 Freud offers a mythological 
explanation of the symbolism and social function of the ritual totem meal in which the 
tribe is collectively allowed what is individually forbidden: the killing and consumption 
of the sacred totem animal.  Freud accounts for this practice and the tribal social form in 
which it is inscribed by means of an origin story, adopting a Darwinian supposition as his 
own.  Freud posits that the earliest form of social organization from out of which 
tribalism arose is that of a horde in which a mass is ruled over by a single violent and 
despotic male, the primal father.  The primal father embodies all prerogative, sexual and 
aggressive, and expels from the horde any males that challenge his dominium.  As Freud 
tells it, archaic sociality is brought to an end when the exiles enact a cannibalistic coup.  
Yet, after the literal assimilation of the tyrannical patriarch’s flesh and the figurative 
assumption of his power, the rebellious males nonetheless repudiate their murderous 
deed.  In this act of deferred obedience to the dead father’s law abides the essence of the 
social contract, or so Freud maintains.  The brothers thus institute the two fundamental 
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taboos of civilization: the law against killing, which originally held only for the totem 
animal in its capacity as a substitute for the dead father, and that against sexual congress 
with the women of the tribe, i.e., the law of exogamy or the prohibition on marriage 
within the tribal family.   
Thus we can see that Freud’s myth is a myth of contract. For that, it has not, to 
my knowledge, been treated as a member of the contractarian genre alongside of the 
classic texts of Locke, Rousseau, Rawls, and so forth, i.e., those political philosophies 
that take as the starting-point of their accounts of the legitimation of political authority an 
anarchic condition relative to which the strictures of society are justified.  On this 
contractarian account, what is primal is the atomistic, egoistic individual, hence the 
problem and promise of politics is that of binding together these disparate individuals 
and, what’s more, achieving this unification through precisely the self-interested, 
calculative rationality that would seem to render mutuality impossible.  Perhaps no one 
has treated Freud’s Totem and Taboo on these terms because his concern is not with the 
problem of the legitimacy of the social order.  Indeed, Freud is quite clear in all of his 
texts (save for Future of an Illusion, an exception of which I will treat), that there is no 
such thing as social space without unjustified authority.  By contrast with this possible 
but undeveloped contractarian reading of Freud’s text, it is common to read Freud’s claim 
to the attribution of “scientificity” to his myth as a reference to the social scientific 
material, and more specifically, the anthropological material through which he generates 
his tale.  On this view, Freud’s engagement with the foremost anthropological research of 
his day is seen as instrumental, the ethnography, which is now regarded as no more than a 
pseudo-scientific dalliance in primitivism, a means by which to legitimize 
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psychoanalysis’ fantastic musings.17  On this interpretation, Freud’s gesture towards 
prehistory is but a naïve reiteration and affirmation of an undialectical distinction 
between nature and culture.  Furthermore, his analysis of tribal ritual in terms of 
childhood fantasy and neurotic obsession is seen as evidence that Freud endorsed and 
erected psychoanalysis upon the theoretical basis of enlightenment history in which the 
West is the site of progressive Geist, hence taken as confirmation of psychoanalysis’ 
ideological envelopment within the racist colonial imaginary.  Viewed this way, we could 
say, despite its not being obvious that Freud has questions of the legitimation of authority 
in mind, that his conjectural history still represents a myth of contract of sorts insofar as it 
has decidedly normative implications.  Freud qua alleged anthropologist would, even in 
the avowal of prehistory as a fabrication, maintain that his imaginative projection 
captures that which is essential to human being hence what is necessary to or for social 
organization to obtain. 
It seems to me that this too quickly resolves the question of Freud’s intentions in 
constructing a myth for modernity and does so without any real engagement with the text.  
In what follows, I will argue that, while Freud’s myth is not contractarian, it should be 
read alongside of the myth of contract as a critical re-working of that myth.  As Rose 
summarizes the yield of Totem and Taboo: “we can see sketched out here, if not a 
critique of liberalism, certainly what could be read as a form of advanced impatience with 
any politics seeking…to wipe the worst violences of its own history from the collective, 
national, mind.  For Freud, collective identity is unavoidably violent.”18  The essential 
insight emblematized in and by Freud’s myth of the primal horde, an insight that is 
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obscured by the commonsense “anthropological” reading, is that society requires, for its 
grounding, authority in excess of what can be justified, hence that its grounding remains 
shaky at best.  This insight into the paradoxical structure of the law in which it embodies 
and exercises precisely the violence that it forbids pertains equally to Western European 
society and its politics of consent as it does to Australian tribal culture as documented by 
Frazer, et.al.
19
   For “though expressed in a negative form and directed toward another 
subject-matter, (taboos) do not differ in their psychological nature from Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative,’ which operates in a compulsive fashion and rejects any 
conscious motives.”20  In his psychoanalytic examination of the totemic social form, 
Freud discovered the barbarism and ineradicable violence that lay, not at the heart of 
Australian tribalism, but at the heart of civilization itself. 
I take it that Rose is right to invoke only to deny the idea that Totem and Taboo 
offers a direct or sustained critique of liberalism.  Yet, it is my aim, in this essay, to offer 
a hermeneutic approach to Totem and Taboo such that its subtextual critique of Western 
political modernity becomes explicit.  In what follows, I will argue that the “scientificity” 
of Freud’s myth is not to be understood in terms of the realist commitments of the social 
scientific research that constitutes its essential matter, but rather in terms of the critical 
standpoint of natural history, in which Freud achieves the disclosure of the archaic in that 
which purports to be the most modern, the historical in that which appears as the most 
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intractable and primitive.
21
  In his myth of the primal killing and the subsequent 
establishment of the fraternal social form, Freud offers a myth for modernity, one that 
proceeds from and engenders a critical attunement in and to our present, insofar as our 
present is that of liberal democracy.  So, while it is the case that ethnography constitutes 
the material upon which Totem and Taboo performs its labors, the text does not itself 
attain to membership in that genre.  Freud’s foray into the ethnographic literature is just a 
step on the dialectical pathway to his own interpretation in which what is offered is not 
the solution to a problem native to the terrain of social science, but rather the posing of a 
dilemma that lies beyond its purview: that of the Oedipus Complex in which modern 
individuality and the polis constituted by the plurality of such individuals is undercut by 
the very thing that makes it possible.
 22
  Freud’s allegorization of the founding myth of 
the liberal-democratic order restores the patriarchal past through which atomistic 
individuality emerges and, in so doing, throws into relief what is obviated in and by 
formal political theory, which means it is also a critical allegorization.  By restoring the 
primacy of patriarchal absolutism and reconstructing the myth of contract from the 
perspective of the ethico-political ideal of fraternity, Freud shows that the cohesiveness 
of the democratic social fabric is to be discovered in its intrinsically affective texture, 
hence also that the restrictive focus on political institutions is insufficient to both the 
reality and ideality (the normative structure) of the post-absolutist constitution and its 
vicissitudes.  For the private sphere is not safely beyond, before, or outside the political, 
but dialectically bound up with it and, as Freud points out in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego, if we are to understand the principle by which anonymous 
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individuals are joined together in community (or not), we must first apprehend authority 
as it is constructed in the private sphere as a field of material dependence. In mythically 
recounting the emergence of the political form of republicanism in and through the 
disarticulation between the public and the private, Freud tracks dethroned patriarchy as it 
takes refuge in and as the arche of the domestic interior.  In so doing, Freud makes the 
family legible as a site of materialist, sociological analysis.   
Thus, in reading the primal horde myth as a piece of Naturgeschichte, I mean, at 
the same time, to advance an anti-doctrinal understanding of psychoanalysis as a species 
of materialist dialectics.  To be more precise, my claim is that psychoanalysis is first and 
foremost to be understood as a hermeneutic method, one dialectically developed with and 
undertaken in light of its understanding of the modern aporia of authority and self-
authorization. This means further that, in the elaboration of the dialectical dynamic in 
which psychoanalytic mythmaking obtains, I will provide a sketch of the historico-
political horizon within which redemptive criticism is in context, thereby setting the 
scene for this dissertation as a whole. 
The insight that Freud’s scientific myth recasts the ideals definitive of the liberal-
democratic order and, in so doing, makes available a critical vantage-point from which to 
re-assess the problem and promise of democracy is not mine alone.  My dialectical 
reading is anticipated in Carole Pateman’s Sexual Contract and Lynn Hunt’s Family 
Romance of the French Revolution, analyses of the genesis and development of post-
revolutionary conceptions of authority that find their orientation through Freud’s primal 
horde myth.  Pateman and Hunt, attentive to the content of Freud’s tale if not always its 
self-consciously mythic proportions, are in agreement that Freud’s foray into prehistory is 
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unproductively read as a piece of ethnography and simultaneously that it cannot be fit to 
the contractarian genre even as it molds itself in the image of that tradition.  Hunt and 
Pateman maintain that, if the critical potential of Freud’s narrative is to be realized, it 
must be read in terms of the modern civil order rather than as a description of the origins 
of civilization per se.  As Hunt summarizes her own interest in Freud: 
I find Freud’s analysis in Totem and Taboo suggestive because it sees a set of 
relationships as being critical to the founding of social and political authority: 
relationships between fathers and sons, between men, and between men and 
women.  In addition, Freud’s own need to write a myth of human origins 
demonstrates the centrality of narratives about the family to the constitution of all 
forms of authority, even though Freud’s account cannot be fruitfully read as an 
analysis of an actual event in prehistory or as a rigid model for social and political 
relationships.  I will be arguing that the experience of the French Revolution can 
be interpreted to put pressure on the Freudian account, even though that account 
provides an important point of departure.
23
 
This expression of Hunt’s self-understanding, stripped of its specific reference to the 
French Revolution, captures as well Pateman’s sense of her own undertaking in relation 
to its basis in and its attempt to supersede Freud.  Where Hunt is concerned to offer a 
historicized treatment of the republican imaginary through which liberal-democratic 
conceptions of authority are generated and to show the essential role that the institution of 
the family plays in such a process, Pateman seeks to expose the patriarchal underpinnings 
of liberal society.  Both Pateman and Hunt invest in Freud’s primal horde narrative 
because it serves as a resource for their reconstruction of a story that is censured in and 
by contractarianism.  Against the ahistorical contractarian presentation of the isolated 
individual as the pre-given starting-point of the social order, Freud restores the violent 
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history of individuation itself, re-framing liberal-democracy in terms of the political past 
from out of which it proceeds and by means of which it formulates its concept of 
authority. 
Both Pateman and Hunt access Freud’s text as an allegory of civil society and, in 
so doing, use it to generate their own critical and historicized reconstructions of the 
genesis of liberal-democratic ideals; yet Freud is never taken up in their texts as a serious 
interlocutor.  Rather he remains but a point of departure.  That the question of what 
Freud’s scientific myth is meant to be, i.e., what meaning it has for and what role it plays 
within psychoanalysis, is left unaddressed is not without consequence for the projects of 
Pateman and Hunt.  In Hunt’s case, the failure to properly countenance Freud on his own 
terms appears as a failure of self-recognition; it hence undercuts the radicality of her 
account, although it must be acknowledged that she nonetheless preserves intact her 
insight into the centrality of mythmaking for politics and the centrality of familial 
authority to the construction of political authority.  In the case of Pateman, however, the 
misreading of Freud is fatal.  For psychoanalysis, properly read, would have yielded the 
conceptual equipment required for success in her battle against idealist political theory.  
As is, the Sexual Contract, while compelling, fails to develop a coherent account of the 
relationship between the myths in which it self-consciously trades and the historical 
realities that it attempts to bring to bear upon and incorporate into the political imaginary.  
Pateman, like Freud, believes that, if the good life is to become possible in the present, 
we must first establish a relation to our past that acknowledges the violence that 
constitutes and continues on in post-absolutist political culture.  But Pateman, unlike 
Freud, believes that it is epistemologically possible to get beyond myth to History itself: 
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that myth is merely a veil covering over the real historical conditions determining the 
nature of the present.  Pateman thus remains blind to the essential, unresolved 
problematic of her text and to the limit against which psychoanalysis establishes itself as 
a hermeneutic: the hermeneutic limit posed by the inextricability of myth and history.  In 
thrall to the myth of science as Freud was not (and here again Future of an Illusion is a 
possible exception), Pateman is attempting to arrive, beyond myth, at a real scene of 
violence.  This same hermeneutical urge that defines her text also prevents her from 
grasping the dialectical character of Freudian concepts and constructs.  Her odd attempt 
to collapse the primal horde into the primal scene, which I analyze below, makes 
perspicuous the limitations of her method and account.  While Pateman can tell us a story 
about the conservative and pernicious tendencies of mythmaking, she does not 
understand that the attempt to supplant myth with history already takes place within the 
tract of the former.   
There is the further matter that myth is not simply an instrument of oppression, 
but can, as well, serve as a revolutionary mode of remembrance.  This insight into the 
conservative-revolutionary capacities of fantasy is the crux of psychoanalytic 
hermeneutics and from whence its critical potential.  It is this insight into mythmaking 
with which Hunt is equipped.  Arriving on the theoretical terrain of The Family Romance 
of the French Revolution via the unresolved problematic of The Sexual Contract helps to 
make plain the stakes of Hunt’s text and to exhibit its decisive, albeit disavowed, 
Freudian cast.  While Hunt’s project is not damaged by her inadequate treatment of the 
psychoanalytic hermeneutic, in misrecognizing Freud, she misses what is of real interest 
in her own undertaking. That said, Hunt’s invocation and employment of the Freudian 
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concept of the family romance serves as the lens through which Freud’s “scientific myth” 
can be seen as a myth for modernity.  Because my leading concern is with the afterlife of 
individuation and problems of legitimate authority, a dialectical engagement with 
Pateman and Hunt will take me to the core of my concern. 
 
Negotiating Patriarchy and the Authority of Patriarchal Myth: 
Pateman on the Primal Scene 
The Sexual Contract, Pateman’s seminal 1988 feminist work, is a treatise devoted 
to the exposure of the essential misogynistic dimension of the liberal doctrine of rights.  It 
is in service to this goal that Pateman turns to Freud.  Pateman regards Freud’s work in 
Totem and Taboo as indispensible to her subversive re-writing of the myth of the social 
contract as a contract that establishes and sanctifies the “male-sex right,” i.e., the right 
that men qua men exercise over women.  As per Pateman (and Freud), the autonomous, 
rights-bearing individual, which serves as the conceptual nucleus of the liberal theory of 
politics, is so only in virtue of the dominium that this specifically male individual holds 
over the society of the family.  The liberal form is thus from the first self-divided, secured 
as it is on an essentially illiberal basis, and, if it is to maintain its appearance of 
consistency, the myths of liberal theory that prop it up and lend it the air of legitimacy 
must serve to suppress the fact that the deprivation of women’s public voice and standing 
is not incidental to the formation of the civil order, but constitute its very crux.  
Contractarianism achieves precisely this in that, while it recognizes the private sphere as 
an essential element of the liberal-democratic state, it nonetheless maintains that the 
dimension of domesticity, of privacy more generally, is ultimately a-political.  Freud’s 
myth of contract, conversely, in emphasizing the decidedly a-rational desiderative and 
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affective dimension of and motivations to the social order, allows access to the familial 
sphere as it exists in dialectical co-constitution with the sphere of politics.  Put otherwise, 
Freud rescues the political dimension of domesticity that is obviated in and by traditional 
tales of contract.  Freud’s account rests on the acknowledgment that fraternal society is 
significantly formed through and in service to the distribution of women’s bodies and, 
what is the psychic correlate of this material practice, the proscription and prescription of 
desire.  In Freudian parlance: fraternal society is formed in and as the shadow of the 
incest taboo.
24
  On Freud’s telling, the women are freed from the indiscriminate desire of 
the primal father only to become the symbolic tokens mooring, through their on-going 
circulation, the classificatory system of the fraternal clan and simultaneously the concrete 
objects through which sexual desire, the chastened remainder of inner nature, is 
channeled and legitimated.  In other words, sexual domination serves as the principle of 
this social order. This is because the “band of brothers” was only held together by means 
of the vertical relation to the sovereign patriarchy, his deposition results in a period of 
fratricidal strife (the war of all against all), which is only brought to an end through “a 
revival of the old state of things at a new level.  The male became once more the chief of 
a family, and broke down the prerogatives of the gynaecocracy which had become 
established during the fatherless period….And yet the new family was only a shadow of 
the old one; there were numbers of fathers and each one was limited by the rights of the 
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others.”25  In other words, patriarchy, no longer eligible to serve as the explicit principle 
of the political sphere, is reconstituted and re-affirmed as the arche of the private. 
Pateman argues along with Freud that, in the act of contract, patria potestas is not 
dispelled, but rather displaced.  This is what she records in her central concept of the 
sexual contract that generates the “the male sex-right, the right that men exercise over 
women.”  Pateman invests in Freud’s narrative of the primal horde both because it makes 
visible what is concealed in and by the myth of contract and because she is of the mind 
that this fantastic recapitulations of the origins of liberalism will, once appropriately 
corrected, yield a kernel of historical truth.  For Pateman, this truth is not, however, the 
crime of patricide, as one might expect given Freud’s telling of the myth.  Rather she 
pushes it further back to the necessary condition of patriarchal power, namely the forceful 
assertion of the male-sex right, a right that continues on obscured yet undiminished in the 
liberally constituted society.  “Freud ends Totem and Taboo with the words, ‘in the 
beginning was the deed.’  But which deed?  Before a father can be murdered by his sons 
a woman has to become a mother: was that deed connected to a ‘horrible crime’?”26  This 
citation of Freud’s desire for and assumption of an action, i.e., a positive historical 
precedent, is cited by Pateman in authorization of her archeological enterprise of 
discovering, behind the myths of contractarianism, the prior, biological reality of sexual 
conquest through which fatherhood and so paternal law, is formed. 
Pateman’s commitment to historical realism is not in itself odd, but paired with 
her fabulous objects of analysis, the classic myths of contract theory, it creates a 
dissonant effect, one that comes to disturb the very coherence of her undertaking.  
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Pateman stages her intervention in liberal consciousness by means of the reinterpretation 
and revision of political stories rather than through a reading of political histories, but 
references to epochal conjugal law and the citation of juridical incidents dot the 
landscape of her text.  It remains unclear how precisely these bits of fact can root 
themselves within, grow out of or enrich, the material of myth into which they are 
interjected and awkwardly transplanted.  They are presented, rhetorically, as 
supplements, but Pateman does not offer a theoretical explanation of how we can best 
negotiate, what is, by her own lights, the obvious disjunction that separates the registers 
of political imagination (the ideal) and historical fact (for Pateman, the real).  As a result, 
she oscillates, seemingly unawares, between the two.  Pateman’s account of the sexual 
contract ends up prostrated on the same unresolved dilemma between historical fact and 
the conceptual order that is given body in contractarian myth.  For the entire effort of The 
Sexual Contract proceeds from the conviction that the exposition of the misogynous 
foundations of the liberal state requires an engagement with the constitutive ideologies of 
this material institution, but instead Pateman reaches beyond the fantastical premises of 
liberal myth, searching for their positive basis in history.
27
  Pateman is right to maintain 
that it is precisely the idealist divorcement from historical reality that allows liberalism its 
veneer of universality.  It is what must be exposed or corrected if we are to gain insight 
into the conditions of injustice definitive of the present.  However, Pateman lacks a 
theory of ideology—of, that is, what drives idealism—by which she would be able to 
move coherently back and forth between the registers of the imaginary and historical. 
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Had Pateman countenanced Freud on his own terms, she would have discovered 
the methodological means by which to subvert from within the contractarian imaginary of 
liberalism.  The error of the Sexual Contract can be summarized in the following way: 
Pateman hears correctly, in Freud’s invocation of the Faustian deed, a declaration of his 
commitment to materialism.  Yet Pateman too quickly moves from the materialist 
recognition of the on-going power of the past to a commitment to historicism; that we can 
and must arrive at the scene of the past “the way it really was.”  Yet materialism does not 
entail historicism.  In fact, Freud’s scientific method of mythmaking is a consequence of 
his self-conscious rejection of historicism.  The problem that Freud claims as his own is 
how to get ahold of the myths constitutive of a form of life from within the horizon made 
possible by those very myths.  In other words, Freud’s conception of history is dialectical 
in nature.  This dialectical philosophy of history finds its clearest articulation in the 
concept of Nachträglichkeit, deferred action, in which the traumatic past, i.e., the 
repressed, receives its retrospective constitution.  According to Freud, the repressed is not 
a positivity that predates the emergency that calls it forth.  Rather the traumatic past only 
becomes legible in and through it activation in a present crisis.
28
  The past and the present 
are, on Freud’s view, interlocked in material struggle with one another.  While 
Nachträglichkeit is a concept that Freud develops at the level of ontogenetic history, it is 
my claim that this temporal dynamic is at play in his myth of phylogenetic prehistory, the 
myth of the primal horde.  Although I will not be able to demonstrate this conclusively 
until the end of my encounter with Hunt, we are, in this engagement with the Sexual 
Contract, already on our way.  From my analysis of Pateman’s mishandling of Freud, I 
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will derive two fundamental features of psychoanalytic critique: (1) the dialectical 
understanding of the relationship between myth and history and (2) the dialectical 
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the social totality, which is 
to say between the private and the public spheres.  In showing that Freud was, by no 
means, an historical realist, I will displace as well the basis upon which Totem and Taboo 
is received as a piece of social science and show rather that scientific mythmaking, in 
Freud’s sense, is an instance of, natural history, and, by extension, of the practice of what 
I am terming redemptive criticism. 
Let me now bring the problematic of Pateman’s text into full-relief and 
demonstrate, through her misreading of Freud, the limits of her method and the 
psychoanalytic alternative to it.  Pateman credits Freud with bringing to light sexual 
difference as the basis upon which the civil order gains its form, but simultaneously she 
indicates that his account of law-making violence fails to sufficiently appreciate the 
original and very real violence that is perpetuated against women.  For Pateman, Freud 
errs in his identification of the crime par excellence, i.e., the transgressive act upon which 
the liberal order is founded and which continues to animate post-absolutist space.  What 
must be foregrounded, she contends, is precisely what the stories of fraternal contract 
secretly inscribe within themselves, namely the sexual contract and its sanctification of 
the male-sex right and what is the historical correlate of this: the social and physical 
domination of women by men.  She attempts to rectify this Freudian slip in which the 
priority of sexual conquest gets buried beneath patriarchy and patricide through bringing 
together two central—and distinct—psychoanalytic constructs: the primal horde and the 
primal scene.  I have already offered a sketch of the primal horde.  The primal scene, for 
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its part, refers to three possible scenarios, which are mutually implicating: the observation 
of parental intercourse, a seduction to which the child is exposed and usually at the 
agency of an adult, and the castration threat.  Pateman’s interest, in particular, is in the 
primal scene of the Wolf Man, in which the observation of parental intercourse is equally 
seductive and threatening.  While Pateman appears to aspire to an integration of the 
primal scene and the primal horde, her treatment succeeds in no more than their 
juxtaposition.  Pateman introduces her task in the following way: 
To tell the story of the sexual contract a good deal of reconstruction has to be 
done…Freud’s stories of political origins have to be considered alongside the 
more famous social contract stories and the story of the primal scene has to be 
told…The arguments about ‘original’ political right all begin after physical 
genesis, after the birth of the son that makes a man (a husband) a father.  But a 
father cannot become a father unless a woman has become a mother, and she 
cannot become a mother without an act of coitus.  Where is the story of the true 
origin of political right?  In the stories of political origins, sex-right is 
incorporated into father-right, and this nicely obscures the fact that the necessary 
beginning is missing.  All the stories lack a political book of genesis.  The stories 
lack what, borrowing from another part of Freud’s work, I shall call the primal 
scene.
29
 
Pateman thus appropriates and transforms the Freudian concept of the primal scene.  She 
does so concretely by means of re-writing the moment in Freud’s reconstruction of the 
Wolf Man’s case history in which Freud treats a memory of a sadistic parental sex act as 
a product of revision hence attempts to push the memory “further back,” as it were.  
Freud claims that the initial impression upon which the memory is based was one of 
maternal gratification and, what’s more, a vision of maternal pleasure had in virtue of her 
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mutilated condition.
30
  Only in willfully submitting to male potency, i.e., only in virtue of 
castration, can that pleasure be had.  Pateman wants to read Freud against himself and 
tarry with the original interpretation of the primal scene as one of unambiguous violence.  
What the child was exposed to, she maintains, was knowledge of the male-sex right in its 
most distilled form: that of rape.  She stakes her tendentious reading simultaneously on 
two grounds.  One is a consideration of the historical reality of the marital laws of the 
period supplemented by reference to juridical precedent, while the other bears on the 
consistency of the Freudian imaginary.  The first is thus an external criticism, calling for 
historical fact to correct the mnemonic corruptions wrought upon the text of the past, 
while the second attempts to challenge and contest Freud on his own territory: the register 
of the fantastic afterlife of violence.  While Pateman does not indicate that one of these 
arguments is of more consequence than the other, the second objection must, in light of 
Pateman’s historicist commitments, be interpreted as subsidiary to the first, alien as it is 
to her way of thinking.  In fact, Pateman has no license to reinterpret the fantastic afterlife 
of violence.  In having constructed myth as the other of history—as that which must be 
dispelled by and replaced with historical fact—she has already rejected the idea of, hence 
deprived herself of the theoretical and methodological means necessary to, an internal 
critique of fantasy.  
Pateman is driven to this methodological inconsistency because, while she 
maintains that the possibility of justice in the present depends upon retrieving from its 
burial beneath myth the real violence of the past, she seems, at times, nonetheless, to be 
aware that historicism is not a position that can or should be ascribed to Freud. She is 
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thus compelled to contest Freud on his own terms even as she fails to apprehend precisely 
what those terms are.  As Pateman sees it, Freud’s interpretation of the Wolf Man’s case 
history is in contradiction with the myth of modernity offered in Totem and Taboo.  It is 
on this ground that she justifies the collapse of the primal scene into the primal horde—of 
imaginary sexual violence into imaginary social violence.  Pateman’s position appears to 
be that the myths in and through which we live do not cohere with one another and their 
collective unintelligibility is symptomatic of the amnesia from which we suffer, an 
amnesia that these myths effectuate by keeping the scandal of rape and the subjection of 
women out of consciousness.  Our self-understanding is inherently flawed, the stories 
through which we represent our shared life incoherent because they work in service of the 
repression of the facts of sexual violence that are fundamental to the social order.   
However, the identification of repression and incoherence represents Pateman’s 
most significant methodological departure from psychoanalysis.  Fundamental to 
Freudianism is the view that repression is not that which compromises or undercuts 
intelligibility, but rather the very force through which rational order obtains.  As in 
Nietzsche’s will to power and Spinoza’s conatus, Freudian epistemology maintains that 
knowledge has a corporeal source, its motivation ultimately affective and it is the 
unbearability of contradiction, what Freud registers as ambivalence, that calls for the 
repressive intervention of reason and from whence the imposition of the veneer of 
intelligibility on material that is otherwise unreconcilable.  The drive to intelligibility, 
rational reconciliation, is the force of repression.  The distortions of fantasy are not mere 
error, Freud maintains, but reflective of a contradiction in the objective situation that 
compels such fantasizing in the first place. 
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A full elaboration of ambivalence as the engine of myth-making will have to wait 
until our confrontation with Hunt.  Suffice it to say, for now, that where Pateman strives 
for coherence, citing the incoherence of fantasy as grounds for its dismissal as but 
illusion, Freud theorizes fantasy as an implicitly critical faculty inasmuch as it enjoys a 
relative autonomy from the demand for reality-testing to which the demand for coherence 
is central.  Pateman neither acknowledges nor disputes Freud’s opposed position on how 
it is that we should read fantasy in relation to reality, myth in relation to history.  Yet this 
is key.  For where Pateman ultimately reads the distortions of myth and fantasy as the 
token of social domination, Freud reads the contradictions and ambiguities of fantasy-
myth as both a sign of the repressive/oppressive work of reason and a quiet subversion of 
it.  Although there are numerous places in the Freudian corpus where Freud identifies 
reason as an oppressive force, we may remain within the text that is of primary concern.  
In Totem and Taboo, Freud likens philosophy to a “paranoiac delusion,”31 calling the 
latter a caricature of the former.  In general, Freud treats system-building—say, 
philosophy in the sense of rational doctrine—as inherently illusory and always affectively 
motivated.  In the third section of Totem and Taboo, entitled “Animism, Magic and the 
Omnipotence of Thoughts,” Freud explicates the animism of the Australian aborigines as 
a Weltanschauung, a “system of thought, the first complete theory of the universe,”32 
thereby according the mythic worldview the same status as monotheism and science and 
metaphysics.  To explain what is characteristic of a system, he turns, of course, to the 
dream, which is the psychoanalytic object par excellence.  Dreaming attains this status in 
Freud’s thought not simply for genetic reasons—his turn-of-the-century text the moment 
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in which psychoanalysis proper emerges—but because dreaming is fantasy, which is to 
say, mythmaking, in distilled form.  Whereas mythmaking is a collective form of fantasy, 
a mass delusion (as Freud describes religious systems in Civilization and its 
Discontents
33
), fantasy represents the privatization of this social practice hence the loss of 
the communal guarantee of meaning and ethical imperatives characteristic of mass 
practices.  Fantasy comes to be, through this process of privatization, exempted from 
reality-testing;
34
 yet, it still adheres to the norms of narrative coherence, norms enforced 
by the ego, the conscious mind.  However, in dreaming, there is a relaxation of the ego 
that, in waking life, polices the borders of the preconscious and refuses admission to any 
content at odds with the rational personality.  Dreaming is thus a form of imaginative 
activity that enjoys (relative) autonomy from the demand for intelligibility.  Freud writes 
in Totem and Taboo that 
The essential elements in a dream are the dream-thoughts, but these have 
meaning, connection and order.  But their order is quite other than that 
remembered by us in the manifest content of the dream.  In the latter the 
connection between the dream-thoughts has been abandoned and may either 
remain completely lost or be replaced by the new connection exhibited in the 
manifest content…It must be added that whatever the original material of the 
dream-thoughts has been turned into by the dream-activity is then subjected to 
further influence.  This is what is known as “secondary revision,” and its purpose 
is evidently to get rid of the disconnectedness and unintelligibility produced by 
the dream-activity and replace it by a new “meaning.” But this new meaning, 
arrived at by secondary revision is no longer the meaning of the dream-thoughts. 
The secondary revision of the product of dream-activity is an admirable 
example of the nature and pretensions of a system.  There is an intellectual 
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function in us that demands unity, connection, and intelligibility from any 
material, whether or perception or thought, that comes within its grasp, and if, as a 
result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true connection, it does 
not hesitate to fabricate a false one…The system is best characterized by the fact 
that at least two reasons can be discovered for each of its products: a reason based 
upon the premises of the system (a reason, then, which may be delusional) and a 
concealed reason, which we must judge to be the truly operative and real one.
35
 
The concealed reason for the system is, of course, the need for concealment itself: the 
repression of some element of unconscious mental life.  Further “instinctual repression (is 
the) measure of the level of civilization that has been reached,”36 where civilization 
presents itself as the rational ordering of shared social life.  Freud’s great insight is that 
reason, which presents itself in modernity as a salvific force, is also barbaric; it 
establishes its reign only through the subjugation of nature, inner and outer.  This deep 
suspicion of what presents itself as immediately and purely intelligible is a defining 
characteristic of redemptive criticism and from whence the problem it shapes for us and 
to which its hermeneutics stands as an answer: that the dream of reason is itself an 
element of the mythic milieu of our own thinking and so cannot offer us traction in 
redeeming myth.  This is a discussion that, for now, I set aside, but which I will take up 
in further detail in Chapter Two and my analysis of the work of Walter Benjamin.  For, in 
Benjamin’s distinctive appropriation of the Marxist conception of ideology critique as the 
disruption of victor history, we will see a reprisal of Freud’s Traumdeutung.  Benjamin’s 
allegorical critique of Paris qua phantasmagoria and Freud’s allegorical critique of 
dreamlife mutually interpret one another.   
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But I must first return to Pateman, whose contention that the repression of the 
sexual contract results in contradiction and that Freud can be shown to suffer from this 
amnesia insofar as there is a contradiction between his respective constructs of the primal 
horde and the primal scene, I can now criticize in light of the thought that, for Freud, the 
unreflective commitment to coherence is the mark of reason at its most barbarous.  
Concerning the initial and, as I maintain, primary justification of her revisionism that 
Freud’s reading of the Wolf Man’s fantasy is incongruent with the socio-historical reality 
of the time, Pateman writes that 
Freud’s interpretation depends on the assumption that ‘consent’ has genuine 
meaning in sexual relations, so that consensual intercourse can be clearly 
distinguished from enforced submission.  However, in most legal jurisdictions, 
the marriage contract still gives a husband right of sexual access to his wife’s 
body whether or not, in any instance of marital relations, she has consented.  The 
young Wolf Man may have accurately interpreted what he saw; we can never 
know.  Moreover, in sexual relations more generally, the belief is still widely held 
that women say ‘no’ when they mean ‘yes’, and the empirical evidence about rape 
and the way in which rape cases are dealt with in the courts shows, sadly, that 
there is widespread lack of ability to understand what consensual intercourse 
means; all too often, enforced or unwilling submission is treated as consent.
37
 
What is striking here is Pateman’s admission that “we can never know” about the reality 
of the primal scene and the further advisement that “it is important to note that an actual 
example of conjugal relations is not necessarily at issue here.”38  This is to say that 
whatever matters here will be missed if one approaches its relevance with a concern for 
“the way things really were” or in terms of verifiability.  The undialectical opposition of 
fantasy/reality is not the proper kind of distinction to make when we are dealing with 
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mythic history such as this.  The primal scene does not belong to the genre of novelistic 
realism in which, perhaps, the subtleties of the conjugal laws of the time and the appetites 
of the Wolf Man’s mother might have relevance beyond a boyhood imagination of the 
nature of female desire.  Rather, the primal, arising as it does at the limits of 
understanding, is the essential marker of “psychical reality,” which calls upon and 
elaborates a conception of fantasy that is not simply the opposite of reality.  Pateman 
offers her disputatious reading of the Wolfman despite her acknowledgement that “we 
can never know” and that what is at stake is a matter of psychical reality, not historical 
fact.  This admission, though, ultimately has no bearing on her account.  Her, I think, 
unwitting commitment to realism is clear and it is the belief that she needs a real act of 
violence to overturn Freud’s mythmaking that prevents her from getting a handle on what 
is actual at stake in psychoanalytic critique. 
Now, this critique of Pateman must not be overplayed.  We can detect in Freud a 
similar indecision, a similar desire for an account of fantasy in which it can be traced 
back and explained by original scene; this is a demand of reason that persists unaffected 
by the knowledge that, with mythical history such as this, there is no getting at the thing 
itself.  That Freudian texts testify to their author’s failure to fully vanquish his realism is 
a point that has been emphasized by Laplanche, who argues that it is precisely in the 
Wolf Man case history that Freud’s purported failure in his struggle to resist the 
seductions of a vulgar materialism are showcased.  Laplanche claims that 
Throughout the whole of Freud’s work, an endless series of oscillations 
concerning seduction and, more generally, the reality of primal sexual scenes may 
be discovered....whose very existence demonstrates that Freud by no means 
achieved a definitive mastery of the category of ‘psychical reality’; and thus, even 
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though he affirms that, after all, it makes little difference whether what has been 
discovered is reality or fantasy, since fantasy has its own reality, he is continually 
in search of factual clues concerning what happened in childhood.  We shall 
simply recall that the principle point of reference here is the analysis of the ‘Wolf 
Man’ and the discussion, to which numerous pages in the case history are 
devoted, of whether the ‘primal scene’—the witnessing of parental intercourse—
was in fact observed by the patient or simply refabricated from later events or 
virtually insignificant ones.
39
 
Freud, stricken by doubt as to the scientific adequacy of psychoanalysis, was, to be sure, 
tempted at times to be unfaithful to its concept, permitting himself flirtations with 
realism.  It must be said though: if Laplanche is correct that Freud was never able to fully 
quell the prurient desire to get his hands on the hard stuff of the real, in the majority of 
his work, it is textually underdetermined and indeterminable whether or not Freud offers 
his constructions as real or imaginary scenes.  The interpretive value of the distinction 
real/fantastic comes to be deflated to the point of its total impotence.  But while disabled, 
this opposition is not, for that, superseded.  Because reality and fantasy are mutually 
constitutive concepts, the reassertion of the epistemological hegemony of this binarism is 
a perpetual possibility.  The remark by which Freud concludes his detective work in the 
case of the Wolf Man testifies both to his dismissal of the relevance of the distinction and 
the impossibility of severing, once and for all, the concepts of fantasy and reality: “I 
should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene in my present patient’s case was 
a phantasy or a real experience; but, taking other similar cases into account, I must admit 
that the answer to this question is not in reality a matter of very great importance.”40  The 
gap between fantasy and reality ceases to be, for Freud, the place from which issues 
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pathological effects, but it does not, for that, admit of closure even on the side of fantasy.  
As in the Kantian schema, the disjunction between the noumenal and the phenomenal 
persists and so also the consternation—the dread—caused by this opening.  Reason wants 
still what it knows it cannot have.  Psychoanalysis, after the abandonment of the 
seduction theory, will no longer seek a resolution to the question of where fantasy leaves 
off and reality begins and it offers no guarantee that the anxiety caused by this 
indeterminacy can or will be cured.  Rather, it translates the dilemma posed by the 
composite knowledge of the imaginary constitution of the objective and the necessarily 
material and irretreivable origins of the imaginary into a contestation of and contention 
with fantasy in terms of its capacity to support a world fit for the good—that is to say, the 
happy—human life.41  The question thus becomes how to gain critical distance from the 
fantasies that form the bedrock of our own thinking.  Contra Laplanche, who, faced with 
this hermeneutical limit, brackets the question of history altogether and declares the 
independence of “psychic reality,” as though the real and the imaginary could exist 
indifferently alongside one another, for Freud, history and myth—reality and fantasy—
constitute a unity.  There is no access to the past save through the mediations of 
historically produced subjectivity.  History such as this is present only in the form of its 
fantastic afterlife.  And as with Laplanche, so, too, with Pateman, who endeavors to 
replace myth with history as though myth was merely a veil shrouding the historical 
rather than the vey means of its preservation.   
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Although Pateman’s second objection concerns the internal logic of Freudianism 
and thus challenges Freud on his own ground, this critique also fails and, on my reading, 
precisely because Pateman’s attachment to the fantasy of a real origin, one itself 
untainted by fantasy, prevents her from getting ahold of the way in which history is 
importantly at play in Freud’s constructions.  In this second line of attack, Pateman 
justifies her collapse of the primal scene into the primal horde on the grounds that 
Freud’s interpretation of the Wolf Man’s case history is in contradiction with the myth of 
modernity offered in Totem and Taboo.  She writes 
If the Wolf Man was reporting an infantile fantasy, Freud’s own account of 
political origins makes his interpretation of the primal scene most implausible.  
The will of the primal father, the patria potestas, is absolute and unbounded; in 
the beginning his is the deed.  His will is law, and no will counts but his own; 
thus, it is completely contradictory to suggest that the will of the woman is 
relevant in the primal scene.  Yet her will must be relevant if sexual intercourse is 
consensual.  It makes nonsense of the all-powerful primal father to imply that, 
before he becomes a father, his will is constrained in any way by the will of 
another being or the desire of a woman for coitus.
42
 
Pateman here reduplicates the same move that deprives her first objection of critical 
power, i.e., acknowledging the fantastic (and personal) status of the primal scene and 
then, despite this, trying to move beyond to the real, historical experience of the mother.  
For Freud’s reconstruction of the Wolf Man’s case history only makes nonsense of the 
all-powerful father if we take it that an identity holds between the prehistory of modernity 
(primal horde) and the prehistory of the modern individual (primal scene).  In other 
words, what is at stake here is the issue of how Freud theorizes the relation between the 
social totality and the individual and how Pateman should herself treat it insofar as her 
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concern is to elaborate and to understand precisely the privatization of patriarchy.  
Pateman’s central preoccupation is the consequences of the transformation of authority 
that occurs in the disarticulation of the private and public sphere hence the relation 
between the political past and the present. Yet Pateman, even as her text registers the 
disjunction between the primal scene and the primal horde, fails to see this disjunction 
between the individual and the social as an essential issue of Freudian theory and one that 
should be, as well, her foremost concern. 
What Pateman identifies as “completely contradictory” constitutes the dialectical 
character of Freudian myth-making—dialectics at a standstill in which the past and the 
present are graphically rendered in their dialectical co-constitution and irresolution.
43
  
The primal horde and the primal scene of the Wolf Man are such dialectically related 
images and can be seen as such on the condition that they are read in terms of the way in 
which they respectively and differently articulate the Oedipus Complex, which names the 
dialectical structure of secular selfhood.  The primal horde myth is the heuristic construct 
that grounds psychoanalysis and provides the interpretive horizon in which individual 
experience is to be handled.  In other words, it provides the socio-historical backdrop 
against which modern individuality obtains, narrating the emergence not of any particular 
individual, as does the primal scene, but rather of modern individuality itself in and 
through the negation of the absolute individuality embodied in the patriarch-monarch.  As 
Freud claims in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, the companion piece to 
Totem and Taboo: 
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We must conclude that the psychology of groups is the oldest human psychology; 
what we have isolated as individual psychology, by neglecting all traces of the 
group, has only since come into prominence out of the old group psychology, by a 
gradual process which may still, perhaps, be described as incomplete…Further 
reflection shows us in what respect this statement requires correction.  Individual 
psychology must on the contrary, be just as old as group psychology, for from the 
first there were two kinds of psychologies, that of the individual members of the 
group and that of the father, chief or leader…The members of the group were 
subject to ties just a we see them to-day, but the father of the primal horde was 
free.  His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in isolation, and his 
will needed no reinforcement from others…absolutely narcissistic, self-confident, 
and independent.
44
 
The atomistic individuality, which serves as the basis for liberal theory, is modeled upon 
the figure of the political sovereign, the one who is absolutely free, existing beyond any 
relations of dependence and obligation, and who guarantees the social order inasmuch as 
he stands outside of it.  This ideal of individuality as autarkic is unachievable in reality, 
but not for the reason that contractarianism specifies.  For the atomistic self is not pre-
given and then sacrificed for the sake of social order, but historically produced, molded 
from out of the prior life of the horde.  To put this elsewise: actual individual 
psychology—and its psychological concept—and the idealized individuality of the 
sovereign are not original, but rather derivative. Individual psychology represents the 
remains of the group psychology that preceded it and continues to be structured in terms 
of this prior moment.  The process of individuation thus remains incomplete in the sense 
that it threatens to collapse into the group psychology from out of which it proceeded.  
“Just as primitive man survives potentially in every individual, so the primal horde may 
arise once more out of any random collection; in so far as men are habitually under the 
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sway of group formation we recognize in it the survival of the primal horde.”45  Modern 
selfhood is both made possible and undermined by its on-going dependence on the 
delegitimized authority of prehistory. 
While the relationship between individual and group psychology requires further 
elaboration, this must wait for my direct engagement with the text of the primal horde.  
At this juncture, my concern is to make clear where and upon what grounds the primal 
horde and the primal scene meet, hence to specify the dialectical relation that holds, for 
Freud, between the individual and the social totality.  While the primal horde is the myth 
by which Freud makes sense of the problems and pathologies endemic to modern 
individuality, the primal scene, conversely, is a concept developed within this pre-
established framework.  The primal scene is the concept that countenances the origin 
story of a given individual.  What Pateman misses, even as she registers it in her 
objection that, between the primal scene of the Wolf Man and the myth of the primal 
horde there is a striking disparity, is that the primal scene of the Wolf Man is his primal 
scene alone: a fantasy constructed over the course of analysis and in service to the 
acknowledgment of his on-going attachment to the parental authority of his personal 
prehistory.  The concept of the primal scene is, unlike the concrete construct of the primal 
horde, an abstraction that only gains content in and through its application to specific 
individuals.  It is only in virtue of its abstract nature that the concept can be used to 
comprehend individuality.  The universality of its application, that it is part of the 
phylogenetic inheritance, is what allows for the identification of difference.  In the 
disarticulation of the private and public spheres, the Oedipus Complex remains universal 
and serves as the principle of totalization.  Yet nonetheless the passage through this 
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crucible is one that is privately undertaken.  This secret history, this private past, is both 
that which renders the individual other to the social totality and, at the same time, the 
very mechanism of her integration.  The Freudian concept of the primal scene thus 
registers the individual’s determination by the social totality and, at the same time, the 
fantastic parting of the individual and the group.   
In sum, the internal contradiction of Pateman’s account is this: Pateman’s avowed 
goal is to make perspicuous the fact that patriarchy has not been defeated, but rather has 
taken refuge within the private sphere and, from its position there, continues to determine 
the contours of public and political life; yet, she continually effaces the specificity and 
relative autonomy of the private sphere, insisting that it be read wholly in terms of the 
social totality within which it occurs.  There is no room in Pateman’s fantasy for 
experiences that exist in tension with the status quo.  And this means that the redemptive 
moment that guides Freud’s mythmaking remains invisible to her.  For fantasy is not 
merely a force of oppression, as Pateman maintains, but has, as well, the capacity to 
individuate, which is to say, to liberate.
46
  It is upon the ground of the emancipatory 
capacities of fantasy that Lynn Hunt meets Freud. 
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The conservative-revolutionary powers of mythmaking: 
Hunt’s Family Romance 
Where Pateman turns to Totem and Taboo in the conviction that it can help to 
make stark what is obscured in and by the idealist discourse of contractarian theory, 
Hunt, by contrast, turns to Freud’s Totem and Taboo as a means by which to grasp the 
historic imaginary that gave birth to modern conceptions of authority.  Furthermore, 
where Pateman, despite her commitment to history as the lens by which to correct the 
distortions wrought by liberal ideology, investigates liberalism as a structure of authority 
rather than in terms of its historical development and accordingly grants access to Freud’s 
“scientific myth” as a critical allegory of the a-historic myth of contract, Hunt is 
concerned to furnish an historical understanding of revolutionary consciousness and the 
germination of liberal-democratic ideals.  Her engagement with Freud thus offers the 
perspective from which the myth of Totem and Taboo becomes legible as a critical 
allegory of the French Revolution, which exists simultaneously as history and as myth.    
Like Pateman, Hunt’s reception of the primal horde is mediated through another 
central Freudian concept: that of the family romance.  Before turning to Hunt’s reading of 
the primal horde, we should first get this concept in hand.  A quick comparison with the 
“primal scene” will be of service.  Where the “primal scene” refers to the origin story of 
the individual, the family romance names a childhood fantasy of an origin alternative to 
one’s own.  This fantasy, unlike the primal scene, is not necessarily constituted through 
the work of repression.  Or, to be more exact, it does not refer exclusively to a construct 
shaped through the discursive process of psychoanalysis by which repression is undone.  
Freud specifies that there is both a consciously remembered family romance and a 
“neurotic family romance.”  Conscious or unconscious, the family romance designates a 
 55 
fantasy precipitated in and by a disappointment dealt the child at the hands of his parents 
and, what this amounts to, the loss of conviction in the absoluteness of parental authority 
and love.  Disabused of this belief in the parents’ omnipotence and omni-benevolence 
and by way of compensation for this bereavement, the child fantasizes that he is a step-
child or adopted; in other words, that his origin is other than it is and that his association 
with his own disappointing parents is but happenstance.  Inasmuch as “for a small child 
his parents are at first the only authority and the source of all belief,”47 fantasy is here not 
merely compensatory but emancipatory.  “These day dreams are found to serve as the 
fulfillment of wishes and as a correction of actual life.  They have two principle aims, an 
erotic and an ambitious one—though an erotic aim is usually concealed behind the 
latter…The child’s imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the 
parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others, who, as a 
rule, are of higher social standing.”48  Hence disillusionment is not, for Freud, the end of 
myth-making, but rather one of its most notable beginnings.   
It is in the introduction of a gap between need and its fulfillment that fantasy 
arises.  This faculty of fantasy, exempted from reality-testing, accomplishes the 
hallucinatory gratification of the need whose satisfaction has been denied.  Fantasy 
“props” desire up, as it were.  Desire requires such support in that, without trust in the 
possibility that it can, in principle, be met, it cannot be sustained.  In the development of 
this capacity for imaginative wish-fulfillment, the individual gains relative autonomy 
from the external world.  For what will not be given in reality, he will find in the 
imagination.  The denial of desire and the loss of the absolute parent of prehistory is thus 
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a necessary event if the child is to gain the internal resources that characterize normative 
adulthood.  Fantasy is an essential resource in that it is by means of this capacity that the 
individual is able to satisfy and sustain himself in an inherently unsatisfying and 
generally indifferent world.  Disillusionment dealt at the hands of the parents is thus not 
only ineludible, but necessary if the child is to discover a feeling for the future and to 
maintain himself in relative independence from not just those first love-objects, but as 
well, from the anonymous group to which he will inevitably be delivered up.  Indeed, 
Freud introduces the problem of the family romance specifically in terms of the problems 
of autonomy and succession: 
The liberation of an individual, as he grows up, from the authority of his parents 
is one of the most necessary though one of the most painful results brought about 
by the course of his development.  It is quite essential that that liberation should 
occur and it may be presumed that it has been to some extent achieved by 
everyone who has reached a normal state.  Indeed, the whole progress of society 
rests upon the opposition between successive generations.  On the other hand, 
there is a class of neurotics whose condition is recognizably determined by their 
having failed in their task.
49
   
This event by which the child is “freed” from external authority is the birth of the 
skeptical predisposition, but, at the same time, this event gives rise to fantasy, specifically 
the fantasy of the family romance through which the child takes the first steps in the 
process of self-authorization, which is to say the project of personal autonomy that is, in 
modern democratic space, a political, personal, and moral imperative. 
Hunt makes the rich observation in the introductory pages of her text that “in 
Totem and Taboo (1913)…Freud offered his own version of the origins of the social 
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contract, or what might be called the original family romance.”50  This insight that 
privatized mythmaking is an indispensible part of entering into and maintaining oneself 
in the social order and further that this need is rooted in the mythic conditions of 
modernity as specified by Freud’s primal horde construct serves as the stimulus to Hunt’s 
re-thinking of the French Revolution.  For her, the de-legitimation of a long established 
political system whose roots are deep—cosmological, ontological, and religious—and the 
shaping from out of its remains new ethico-political grounds is to be characterized 
predominantly as an imaginative effort.  The Family Romance of the French Revolution 
takes as its presumption and then demonstrates this thesis through a series of concrete 
engagements with cultural artifacts of the period that there is, indispensable to any 
revolutionary reconstruction of the socio-political sphere, a decidedly imaginative effort 
that precedes, accompanies, and follows moments of profound historical breakage.  What 
must be defeated is not simply a set of material institutions, but the pre-reflective belief in 
their legitimacy.  In other words, dissatisfaction with the status quo must be experienced 
not as incidental but identified, through a narrative elaboration, as endemic to the system 
itself and so as a demand for a different form of life in which needs and desires could be 
properly met.  Disillusionment, though, is not, of itself, sufficient, as the establishment of 
an alternative system of relations of command and subordination cannot be accomplished 
without the simultaneous development of a new model of political legitimacy.  The 
stability of the state is attained in virtue of the citizen’s belief in its legitimacy, but 
conviction in the rightness of a new form of authority requires more than reason alone 
can supply.  There is an investment that must be made before a framework can come to 
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serve a justificatory function and Hunt, following Freud, argues that such 
“reasonableness” obtains only in light of an investment that is affective and imaginative.  
In other words, liberation from the belief in a particular form of authority is not 
enough; disillusionment must be accompanied by a concomitant re-enchantment.  Yet the 
imagination of a happy home(land) in which ones needs would be met, hence one that 
appears as just, has no place else to derive its content but the past.  Here, we come up 
against the limit of the emancipatory capacity of the imagination, a limit the recognition 
of which serves as the basis of Hunt’s exploration of French Revolutionary consciousness 
and of her view that familial symbolic imagery played a decisive role within its attempts 
to re-conceive political authority.  As Freud remarks of the family romance, “the 
technique used in developing phantasies like this…depends upon the ingenuity and the 
material which the child has at his disposal.”  Hunt, like Freud, knows that the only 
material with which we have to work is that which descends to us from our past.  Hence 
any new system generated in and through the destruction of a prior order will necessarily 
be both a reconfiguration and repetition of the delegitimized past. 
As Hunt sees it, Freud’s account of childhood disillusionment and the 
emancipatory purpose served by the formation of a personal mythology of a superior 
origin provides the theoretical framing by which to apprehend the experience of the 
French Revolution of 1789 as it is concretized and preserved in the artistic monuments of 
the period, which is to say by means of an analysis of its fantastic afterlife.  Hunt takes up 
the major cultural objects of the France of the late 18
th 
Century as embodied expressions 
of the pre- and post-Revolutionary “political unconscious.”  She treats these aesthetic 
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objects as the production of a collective “psychic reality,” hence as the means by which 
to get a hold of the inner agenda of French revolutionary culture.
51
 
Hunt thus sees what Pateman does not.  That social fantasy— of which art is, in pre- 
or proto-capitalist secularized society, the primary expression—is not undialectically 
opposed to reality, hence does not serve merely to obscure it.  Rather fantasy is, as wish-
fulfillment, engendered by material conditions, hence, in its own way, testifies to these 
conditions.  Because fantasy and reality are mutually constitutive—because our access to 
history is mediated in and through the fabricated cultural objects in which it is 
preserved—the contestation with myth is not to be thought of as the attempt to rip or pull 
back the “ideological veil” shrouding objective fact.  Rather, one must develop the 
hermeneutic means to enter into the logic of and gain critical traction within these 
aesthetic/fabulous constructs.  Such is basic to the practice that I am referring to as 
redemptive criticism. 
In this, Hunt is profoundly Freudian, her methodology arising from out of the 
insight that myth and history, fantasy and remembrance, cannot simply be pulled apart 
but form a conceptual constellation.  This though is not Hunt’s understanding of her 
engagement with Freud.  She instead accounts for the usefulness of Freud in terms of an 
analogical relation that she sees between the subject-matter of the primal horde narrative 
as interpreted through the concept of the family romance and the predominant subject-
matter of the cultural artifacts of 18
th
 Century France: that of familial symbolic 
imagery.
52
  As was the case with Pateman, Hunt’s account explicitly acknowledges the 
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fantastical status of the Freudian primal horde, but somehow this insight has no bearing 
on the subsequent uses that she makes of Freudian texts.  Hunt is unfaithful to the 
implications of her own suggestion that Freud’s account of the social contract is the 
“original family romance” and, as it is Freud’s attempt to give expression to “psychic 
reality” in the expanded sense of the “collective political unconscious,” the primal horde 
narrative is only appropriately evaluated according to the standards specific to this 
register.  Oddly, Hunt remains blind to the methodological kinship that she shares with 
Freud.  Although in her introduction, she claims that the French Revolution “can be 
interpreted to put pressure on the Freudian account,” this pressure is never directly 
applied.  Rather she distances herself from Freud by means of invoking what she takes to 
be the central characteristics of Freudian dogma—that it is ahistorical, evolutionist, 
potentially misogynist, realist, etc.—and then summarily dismisses it.  Regarding the 
former: “In Freud’s terms, there is no escape from the “longing for the father.”  I reject 
this view as inherently ahistorical and reductionistic (everything can be interpreted as 
reflecting longing for the father), and I hope to demonstrate that the shift toward the good 
father fatally undermined absolutist royal authority.”53  As for the latter: “For Freud, true 
development consists in the replacement of such matriarchal systems with patriarchal 
ones…Social organization, then, requires the reinstitution of patriarchy in a sublimated 
form, the form of the law.”54  The few other invocations of Freud that occur throughout 
the text can be sorted, for the most part, along these two axes of interpretation.  While she 
correctly declaims that, construed as either an explanatory piece of philosophic 
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anthropology or read in the hortatory register of normative contractarianism, the primal 
horde narrative cannot support or enable a critical apprehension of modern forms of 
authority, this being the fruit that, Freud’s account, properly met would bear,55 she herself 
vacillates between precisely these two formulations. 
In sum: while it is the case that Hunt sees in psychoanalytic theory a means to 
newly illuminate French revolutionary consciousness, she does not make the inverse 
move and re-read Freud in terms of the ideological and material legacy of the French 
Revolution.  Quite the opposite: Hunt’s reading of Freud remains static, unmoved by her 
own insight that the co-determination of the familial and political sphere is specific and 
necessary to the formation of republicanism and that the significance of this fact is 
uniquely registered in Freudian theory.  
In light of these observations, I would like to turn to a closer consideration of 
Hunt’s mistaken assessment of the terms of her engagement with Freud’s “Family 
Romance.”  I deploy the same method with Hunt as I did with Pateman, rendering 
explicit the elements of Freudian mythmaking either misrecognized or as-yet incipient in 
his critics’ account.  What Hunt sees about the family romance—that it serves as a model 
by which to apprehend the process and purpose of mythmaking—is not lost on Freud.  He 
explicitly identifies the family romance as a relative of, hence a means to comprehend the 
nature of, myth. 
There are only too many occasions on which a child is slighted, or at least feels he 
has been slighted, on which he feels he is not receiving the whole of his parents’ 
love, and, most of all on which he feels regrets at having to share it with brothers 
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and sisters.  His sense that his own affection is not being fully reciprocated then 
finds a vent in the idea, often consciously recollected later from early childhood, 
of being a step-child or an adopted child.  People who have no developed 
neuroses very frequently remember such occasions, on which—usually as a result 
of something they have read—they interpreted and responded to their parent’s 
hostile behaviour in this fashion...These consciously remembered mental impulses 
of childhood embody the factor which enables us to understand the nature of 
myths.
56
 
Granted, the constellation drawn above between the acknowledgement of ambivalence, 
the impulse to mythmaking, and the initiation of the successful process of individuation 
(of self-authorization) deserves a more sustained elaboration than Freud himself provides, 
but nonetheless the observation is there, demanding Hunt’s recognition insofar as it is an 
articulation of the very conceptual constellation upon which her own account rests.  This 
passage not only licenses the reading of the primal horde narrative as the original family 
romance in its observation that the ambivalent relationship to authority (the irresolution 
of the dialectic), which has its first occurrence in relation to one’s parents, points in the 
direction of myth, but the argument elided therein begs the supply of its missing 
premises.  What’s more, the passage embodies the factor which, if explored would enable 
us to understand Freud’s view of mythmaking as a positive norm of modern life and thus 
what Freud intends in describing his myth of the primal horde as “scientific.” 
Rather than undertaking such work, Hunt distances herself even further from 
Freud.  She describes her transformative appropriation of the concept of the family 
romance in the following way: 
By introducing the term family romance, I do not mean to suggest that the French 
revolutionaries were acting from out of some kind of pathological fantasy rooted 
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in warped individual psychologies.  The revolutionary family romances (and they 
were plural) were not neurotic reactions to disappointments—as in Freud’s 
formulation—but creative efforts to reimagine the political world, to imagine a 
polity unhinged from patriarchal authority.  I use the term family romance to 
suggest that much of this imaginative effort went on below the surface, as it were, 
of conscious political discourse.
57
 
While it is not the case that there is no distinction to be made between “neurotic reactions 
to disappointment” and “creative efforts to reimagine the political world,” I want to 
suggest that the difference is not what Hunt takes it be.  Allow me to bracket, for now, 
the question of collective mythmaking and to begin with an analysis of Hunt’s 
characterization of neurosis in contradistinction to the “normal,” i.e., normative 
adulthood.  First, neurosis is not, in principle, opposed to creative acts of the imagination; 
as Freud observes in “Family Romance;” “a quite peculiarly marked imaginative activity 
is one of the essential characteristics of neurotics and also of all comparatively highly 
gifted people.”58  As is also clear in Freud’s essay, the well-adapted individual is not so in 
virtue of having escaped childhood unscathed by knowledge of parental fallibility, i.e., 
without disappointment.  She too has resentment that finds its means of expression in the 
fantasy of the family romance.  But more to the point: neurosis does not represent a 
“warped individual psychology” for there is, between neurosis and normalcy, no 
structural difference.  To reproduce the relevant quotation: “It is quite essential that that 
liberation should occur and it may be presumed that it has been to some extent achieved 
by everyone who has reached a normal state.”  According to psychoanalytic theory, 
liberation from the past is essential, but always and only partial.  For subjectivity is 
formed only through the transformation of object-choice into identification, i.e., the 
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introjection of the lost love-object in and as the ego and the superego.
59
  What 
distinguishes neurosis from normalcy, and always along a sliding scale, is the factor of 
repression: whether or not the individual is capable of tolerating “one of the most 
necessary though one of the most painful results brought about by the course of his 
development,” which is to say whether or not the individual is capable of acknowledging 
the reality of ambivalence.  For the child’s hostile impulses towards the parent are a 
reaction to the threat of the loss of love, a threat that is primarily to be understood not as 
the withdrawal of parental affection, but as a threat posed to the child’s own attachment 
to the absolute parental authority.  It is the absoluteness of his love that is being 
threatened and that he is loath to give up.  This threat calls up a retaliatory response 
against the offending parental party.  Yet because the “inertia of the libido…its 
disinclination to give up an old position for a new one,”60 the child continues to love the 
person at whose hands she has suffered.  Love and hate are internally related.  This bind 
of both loving and hating parental authority is, for Freud, universal.  The resulting 
ambivalence—this conflict that reason cannot adjudicate—is the source of myth and, as 
such, is secreted in the mythical constructs to which it gives rise.  Hence the neurotic 
must subject fantasies such as the family romance to repression lest she be confronted 
with the reflection of her own aggression against idealized authority. 
If anyone is inclined to turn away in horror from this depravity of the childish 
heart or feels tempted, indeed, to dispute the possibility of such things, he should 
observe that these works of fiction, which seem so full of hostility, are none of 
them really so badly intended, and that they still preserve, under a slight disguise, 
the child’s original affection for his parents.  The faithfulness and ingratitude are 
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only apparent.  If we examine in detail the commonest of these imaginative 
romances, the replacement of both parents or of the father alone by grander 
people, we find that these new and aristocratic parents were equipped with 
attributes that are derived entirely from real recollections of the actual and humble 
ones; so that in fact the child is not getting rid of his father but exalting him….He 
is turning away from the father whom he knows to-day to the father in whom he 
believed in the earlier years of his childhood; and his phantasy is no more than the 
expression of a regret that those happy days are gone.
61
 
The family romance is both a critique of the past—the attempt to free oneself from it—
and, at the same, the means by which the individual preserves her attachment to it.  This 
holds for both the neurotic and the “well-adapted” individual.  For the aspiration to and 
imagination of a better future inseparable from the possibility of any future at all and 
upon which the process of individuation from one’s parents depends is produced in and 
through the very disappointments of the past.  Or, as Freud puts it, fantasy is a 
“correction of actual life, the technique [of which]…depends upon the ingenuity and the 
material which the child has at his disposal.”  Desire only comes to know itself, i.e., to 
discover its aim and the object capable of fulfilling it, in consequence of its denial.  The 
image of happiness is thus molded from out of the very experience of its failure to obtain, 
which is to say from out the past in which love suffered betrayal.
62
  Desire, the dimension 
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of futurity that opens in the individual, draws the individual back into the past.  The 
human being is one strangely riveted between these two opposed impulses, one towards 
new conditions that exist beyond the painful restrictions and denials of the past and the 
other towards the restoration of this very past.  “The finding of an object is always the re-
finding of it.”63 
The family romance does not represent the supercessionist overcoming of the 
past, but rather the imaginative fulfillment of its betrayed promise.  Fantasy then, as 
conceived by Freud, holds an entirely ambiguous position, reflecting the dual character of 
the force that fuels it.  It is simultaneously critical and complicit; that which reinforces 
our illicit attachment to the past and, inasmuch as it issues a grievance, that through 
which we might find our way into a better future. 
Had Hunt chosen to follow out Freud’s claim that the acknowledgment of 
ambivalence is what makes the difference between neurotic attachment to the past and 
successful individuation, she would have thereby gained the means by which to detect the 
dialectical stakes of Freudian mythmaking and, by extension, his purpose of making a 
myth for modernity.  On Freud’s account, the unconscious family romance of the 
neurotic and the consciously remembered family romance of the non-neurotic individual 
both arise in and through the experience of ambivalence.  What distinguishes the former 
from the latter is the ability to tolerate the rage of betrayal.  Unable to bear the corruption 
of filial love and, what this amounts to, the burden of authority that redounds upon him in 
the loss of the parent of prehistory, the neurotic maintains his melancholic, secret 
attachment to this authority and, in the refusal to remember and, accordingly, to mourn, is 
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condemned to reenact the past.  Psychoanalysis undertakes to correct this situation not 
through reconciling the opposed sides of the ambivalent complex, but rather through the 
self-conscious undertaking of fantasies that allow the individual to recognize the reality 
of ambivalence and transform her attachment to the past into a pathway by which to enter 
into a genuinely new future.  Or, as Freud puts it: the patient “must have (his) capacity 
for love, which is invaluable to (him) but has been impeded by childhood fixations, 
placed freely at (his) disposal.”64   
My suggestion then is that Freudian mythmaking as a positive norm of modern 
life consists in the self-conscious (scientific) employment of the imagination for the sake 
of rendering ambivalence concrete and, accordingly, making its acknowledgment, which 
is to say, its acceptance possible.  This is the pivot upon which the conservative, 
repressive tendencies of fantasy turn to release its emancipatory potential.  In such 
consists fantasy’s redemption. 
Let me now re-tread this ground in terms of the issue that I bracketed: that of 
collective myth-making in its subversive or revolutionary and conservative or oppressive 
dimension and, in so doing, to turn more decisively toward the question of Freud’s 
intentions in constructing a myth for the modern collective.  As we have seen, Freud 
maintains that the horde is the most archaic, i.e., natural, social formation, hence that 
group psychology is the oldest.  Yet, this claim dialectically entails its opposite: that the 
absolute individuality of the primal father in relation to which obtains the group 
psychology of the brothers is, in fact, original.  In Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego, Freud argues that, after the demise of the sovereign patriarch, the epic-poet, i.e., 
the mythmaker, is the first individual to emerge from out of the psychology of the group 
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and that myth serves as the new basis for shared social life.  Here we see again the 
dialectic of individuation and de-individuation, of self-authorization and the idealization 
of past authority, of emancipation and social enchainment: 
It was then that, perhaps, some individual, in the exigency of his longing, may 
have been moved to free himself from the group and take over the father’s part.  
He who did this was the first epic poet; and the advance was achieved in his 
imagination.  This poet disguised the truth with lies in accordance with his 
longing.  He invented the heroic myth.  The hero was a man who by himself had 
slain the father—the father who still appeared in the myth as a totemic monster.  
Just as the father had been the boy’s first ideal, so in the hero who aspires to the 
father’s place the poet now created the first ego ideal…The myth, then, is the step 
by which the individual emerges from group psychology.  The first myth was 
certainly psychological, the hero myth.  The explanatory nature myth must have 
followed much later.  The poet, who had taken this step and had in this way set 
himself free from the group in his imagination, is nevertheless able to find his 
way back to it in reality.  For he goes and relates to the group his hero’s deeds 
which he has invented.  At bottom this hero is no one but himself.  Thus he lowers 
himself to the level of reality, and raises his hearers to the level of imagination.  
But his hearers understand the poet, and, in virtue of their having the same 
relation of longing towards the primal father, they can identify themselves with 
the hero.
65
 
The epic poet achieves an imaginative emancipation for himself, but, also, in his capacity 
as a storyteller to the group, establishes myth as a new basis for communal life.   In the 
concretization and exemplification of the traumatic history of the group, the epic poet 
individuates them as a people and, in the collective (albeit unconscious) recognition and 
acceptance of this past as their own and their subsequent recital of it, the listeners confirm 
themselves as a community.  Thus, in the loss of the absolute individual, mythic-history 
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becomes the means by which the disaggregated horde is re-collected.  Myth is the 
keystone of the tribal form, the horizontal relations of equality between its members 
assured through the vertical relation to the myth.  Myth comes to serve in the place of the 
absent sovereign, serving as the basis for collective social practice. 
Yet, where tribal communities assure their cohesiveness through myth, precisely 
what we lack in Western secularized modernity are the myths in relation to which 
individual experience is aligned with that of the group and through which shared social 
life obtains.  In analyzing the ethnographic documentation of tribal rituals and myths in 
relation to the obsessional acts and fantasies of his bourgeois patients, Freud comes to the 
conclusion that the pathology of neurosis is a direct consequence of the loss of myth as 
social practice and the rarified, abstract conception of authority that, through the process 
of secularization—where secularization is understood to entail the overcoming of 
arational or mythic grounds for our political and social obligations—comes to stand in its 
places.  Consider here, once again, the invocation of Kant that prefaces the text:  
Though expressed in a negative form and directed toward another subject-matter, 
[taboos] do not differ in their psychological nature from Kant’s ‘categorical 
imperative’, which operates in a compulsive fashion and rejects any conscious 
motivates.  Totemism, on the contrary, is something alien to our contemporary 
feelings—a religio-social situation which has been long abandoned as an actuality 
and replaced by newer forms.  It has left only the slightest traces behind it in the 
religions, manner and customs of the civilized peoples of today.
66 
 
While, on Freud’s account, modernity continues to rely upon taboos, these prohibitions 
have been privatized, deprived entirely of the concrete embodiment of the totem and the 
collective social practice that such a shared god enables.  Now we must do right simply 
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because that is what our reason requires.  Deprived of the collective practices of 
mythmaking, the individual is left to shoulder, on her own, the burden of making 
meaningful the sacrifices and self-denial requisite to sociality.  Freud’s verdict, in Totem 
and Taboo, is that the suffering of neurosis results from the dissolution of the ethos and 
the privatization and abstraction of ethics as the moral law.  “The neuroses are social 
structures; they endeavor to achieve by private means what is effected in society by 
collective effort.”67  The neuroses are asocial social structures.  In so far as they enable 
the individual to comply with, at the same time as she secretly (symbolically) violates 
social prohibitions, they both serve the purposes of socialization and as the 
representatives of what is socially outlaw, what is disavowed and thus must remain 
private and incommunicable.  Such is the  
…private nature [of neurosis] as opposed to the public and communal character of 
religious observances, religious ceremonial are full of significance and have a 
symbolic meaning, those of neurotics seem foolish and senseless.  In this respect 
an obsessional neurosis presents a travesty, half comic and half tragic, or a private 
religion.  But it is precisely this difference between neurotic and religious 
ceremonial which disappears when, with the help of the psycho-analytic 
technique of investigation, one penetrates to the true meaning of obsessive 
action.
68 
  
Here it must be emphasized that the job of the psychoanalyst is not exhausted in the 
revelation of the “true meaning of obsessive action.”  For, as Freud learned in his 
experience with Dora,
69
 the therapeutic effects of psychoanalysis abide, not in the 
disclosure of the missing facts of personal prehistory, but in the transferential/counter-
transferential dynamic: the communicative techniques, i.e., the concrete practice, through 
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which the rapport is established between the analyst and the analysand and sustained.  
Through the bond of transference, the analysand imbues the psychoanalyst qua doctor 
with all the authority of love, which enables the analyst, in turn, to use this authority to 
foster the individual’s attempts at self-authorization, providing the intersubjective support 
that the patient otherwise lacks and by which she might begin to bear the private burden 
of meaning-making in a secularized and fragmented social world. 
If this further specifies the normativity of critical mythmaking in the analytic 
context, what of Freud’s intentions in constructing a myth for modernity such as he does 
in the final essay of Totem and Taboo?  With the insights derived from the dialectical 
overcoming of Pateman and Hunt, I am now prepared to assert that Freud undertakes the 
mythic reconstruction of modernity for the sake of being able to get ahold of the 
pathology of neurosis for the sake of psychoanalytic practice.  In so doing, Freud 
discovers that this pathology arises in the disarticulation of the private and public spheres 
and thus internal to the secularized, post-absolutist collective, structurally inseparable 
from the condition of its health.  My suggestion is that, in the myth of the primal horde, 
Freud sought not, as the realist reading would have it, to secure a new basis for shared 
social life—he is not the epic poet—but rather to expose the indefeasible ambivalence 
that lies at the heart of post-absolutist community and which undercuts any attempt to 
secure a foundation for this collective.  In other words, the Oedipus Complex, the 
conceptual yield of Totem and Taboo’s investigation of neurosis in relation to tribalism, 
is not a solution to a pre-given problem, but rather the articulation of the structuring 
paradox of secular modernity.  It is to that structuring paradox that I now turn. 
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The Myth of the Primal Horde: 
Freud’s Natural History of Secularism 
What neither Pateman nor Hunt saw was the dialectical architecture in which the 
significance of the fraternal clan is embedded.  Only when the primal horde myth is 
regarded as an exercise in historical materialism, the present investigated in terms of its 
constitutive past, can it be redeemed as a critical resource for thinking through 
democratic modernity.  Yet, if Pateman and Hunt’s respective insights are conjoined 
dialectically, the critical edge of the primal horde myth can be brought fully into purview.   
Through Pateman, we were able to see that, to the extent that Freud’s primal 
horde narrative mimics liberal mythmaking, it is as a critical allegorization of that 
political fantasy and the post-revolutionary reality to which it corresponds.  Seeking to 
excavate and render explicit the conceptual framework undergirding liberal institutions, 
contractarianism disregards the historicality of political space and, even as it avows the 
“state of nature” as an imaginative construct, it presents its principles as timeless 
universals.  Accordingly, contractarianism cannot yield a critical perspective on the 
political ideals of the present and represents no more than an ideological justification of 
the status quo, oppressing precisely where it would claim to liberate.  What’s more, in 
order to derive its sovereign political ideals, contractarianism affects the forcible erasure 
of the violent history by which the atomistic individual is produced.  In so doing, it 
obfuscates precisely the problem of individuation and self-authorization that drives the 
vicissitudes of post-absolutist social space.  Against its hegemonic contractarian 
interpretation, Freud’s myth restores the violent history of individuation to the republican 
collective.  As we have seen, the primal horde is not a mere aggregate, but rather the 
collective that obtains in and through the vertical relation to a leader, the one within 
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whom the power of the law resides and from which it proceeds.
70
  In other words, the 
primal horde does not represent a state of nature, if by this we mean, a pre-social 
condition.  In Freud’s rendering, prehistory is a space already defined by the presence of 
an institution, namely that of patriarchal monarchy or, in Freudian parlance, that of 
fraternal castration in which all prerogative devolves upon and is consolidated in a single 
figure, “the violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself.”71  About 
this state of affairs there is nothing anarchic, nothing pre-social.  Freudian prehistory thus 
does not comport with the idea of an original, animal condition, but rather that which 
follows from the rejection of a strong, centralized figure of authority and prior to the 
recognition and institution of a new basis for socio-political relations and the form of 
power by which such relations can be regulated and maintained.  This is the period of 
fratricidal strife that follows the deposition of the primal father and which Freud relegates 
to a footnote.
72 
 For psychoanalysis, the social state is the natural condition of the human 
being.  Or, to turn this thought slightly: what is pure fantasy for Freud—unimaginable—
are social relations of an unmediated nature. 
Thus, what contractarianism presents as the most primitive, Freud discloses as a 
product of history, reading the anarchism of “the state of nature” as precipitated in and 
through the demise of our fealty to sovereign authority and, moreover, the demise of the 
pre-reflective acceptance that sovereign power might rightly be held by any given 
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individual.  In other words, at the same time as the primal horde is readable in terms of 
the myth of contract, it is legible, as Hunt maintains, as the allegorical representation of 
the origin story of Republicanism: that of the French Revolution, the episode capable of 
emblematizing through its radicality and its spectacular imagery, the centuries-long 
process of the desacrilization of kingship.  Freud bestows upon this historic content its 
proper mythic form.  In the projection of the French Revolution into the prehistoric past, 
Freud names as origin the ritualistic bloodletting of Louis XVI by which the French 
people anointed themselves as a collective body capable of bearing sovereignty.  In so 
doing, he de-historicizes this moment, showing that it constitutes a second nature, the 
substance of modernity but the remains of the murdered ideal of kingship.  Freud figures 
the “French Revolution” as the epochal horizon from which we cannot remove ourselves 
and within we receive the past.  The French Revolution is mythic in the sense that it 
arises at the limits of historical understanding, the ethico-political ideals that it embodies 
not liable to justification inasmuch as they constitute the very bedrock of our thinking, 
appearing as “natural,” i.e., self-evident, principles. 
As I have argued in my review and critique of Pateman’s revisionist reading of 
Freud, in narrating the foundation of the civil order through the concept of fraternity, 
Freud is able to show that post-revolutionary politics has not yet been stripped of an 
essential patriarchal moment.  In the act of contract, patria potestas is not dispelled; it is 
simply displaced in and through the creation of the domestic sphere.  The historical 
accomplishment of liberalism is thus cast as but the repetition of the struggle against and 
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failure to overcome our transhistorical condition of patriarchal domination.
73 
 Freud 
reveals, in this way, the Revolution as nothing but the repetition of the primitive 
struggle—and failure—against patriarchal oppression.  It is but nature, the repetition of 
the ever selfsame.  “The persons who were united in this group of brothers gradually 
came towards a revival of the old state of things at a new level.  The male became once 
more the chief of a family…and yet the new family was only a shadow of the old one; 
there were numbers of fathers and each one was limited by the rights of the others.”74  
However, from out of this archaic circuit of repetition, there is produced a genuinely new 
historico-political form—that of fraternal society.  While the revolution is betrayed in the 
reinstitution of the law of the father,
75 
the privatization of patriarchal power nonetheless 
represents the creation of a new sphere of experience, hence a new arche and, in the 
division of the private, the public, and the political, a new historical formation: that of 
civil society in which women/sisters are structurally excluded.  Viewed this way, Freud’s 
primal horde myth shows the historical dimension (privatization) in that which appears to 
be the most primitive (the struggle against patriarchal domination).  In other words, 
Freud’s myth is a piece of natural history, disclosing the natural in what presents itself as 
the most historic and the modern in that which appears as the indefeasible and the 
archaic. 
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As Adorno writes, “natural history is not a synthesis of the natural and historical 
methods, but a change of perspective,” accomplished by way of a shock.76  In the 
redemption of the ideal of fraternity, Freud re-casts the problem and promise of 
democracy.  For, not only does fraternity frame political modernity in terms of its 
patriarchal past, it casts into relief a feature of post-absolutist life that remains invisible to 
formal political theory: that the cohesiveness of the democratic social fabric is to be 
discovered in its intrinsically affective texture.  Such a thought is anathematic to any 
political theory that seeks to justify the liberal-democratic order in terms of its intrinsic 
rationality.  The specific affect of disillusionment is a prerequisite to democracy from 
Freud’s perspective, for only through a process of progressive demythification do 
ecclesiastical and monarchical forms of power lose their self-evidence and so become 
vulnerable to a process of contestation.  This Freud shares with the enlightenment.  Yet, 
where Freud departs from the enlightenment treatment of secularization is in his 
observation that an ineradicably mythic element remains.  For without an element of 
authority beyond justification, there can be no society at all.  Freud, in rendering foremost 
in his account the question of the terms of investment, argues that democracy cannot 
separate itself from myth any more than its historical predecessors and so, if it is to 
maintain its claim to legitimacy, it must countenance its own mythic dimension. 
For fraternal solidarity continues to be mediated by the prehistorical patriarchy 
that it would abjure.  Only in the shadow of the patriarch-monarch does equality between 
male citizens, submission to no particular person but to the authority of the group as a 
whole, come appear as a desirable ethico-political ideal.  On Freud’s account, that which 
founds and makes democracy possible exists simultaneously as the innermost point of its 
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irredeemable instability.  What is mythically dissimulated in the ideal of fraternity is this 
primordial ambivalence. 
I have often had occasion to point out the emotional ambivalence in the proper 
sense of the term—that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate toward the 
same object—lies at the root of many important cultural institutions.  We know 
nothing of the origin of this ambivalence.  One possible assumption is that it is a 
fundamental phenomenon of our emotional life.  But it seems to me quite worth 
considering another possibility, namely that originally it formed no part of our 
emotional life but was acquired by the human race in connection with their father-
complex, precisely where the psycho-analytic examination of modern individuals 
still finds it revealed at its strongest.
77
 
Again, we see that Freud does not locate the primacy of patriarchal power in uncultured 
nature, but rather views the father-complex as a historical precipitate, i.e., one that results 
from the irresolvable dialectic between desire (inner nature) and authority (culture).  
While Freud registers patriarchal domination as a contingent condition of human 
existence rather than as fate, he nonetheless acknowledges it as the single historical 
constant: universal history is that of patriarchal domination in the superstitious form of 
monotheism, the political form of monarchy, or the liberal domestication of paternal 
power.   
We thus see, in Freud’s treatment of fraternity, which names both the desire to 
live beyond the law of the father and the on-going attachment to the de-legitimized 
authority of the past, a reprisal of the dynamic that I was able to pronounce in and 
through Hunt’s uptake of Freud’s concept of the family romance.  Only in the 
determinate negation of the past does a revolutionary picture of the future obtain.  The 
fraternal clan has, as its precondition, a state of bondage and deprivation.  The brothers 
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are motivated to their criminal deed by the pain of thralldom and the imagination of the 
gratifications they have been denied.  On the one hand, they wish to be free from the 
omnipresent threat of the father’s violence and, on the other, they claim, in their revolt, a 
right to the women’s bodies.  Liberty is conceived only negatively, as the thought of 
emancipation, and it receives positive content through the utopian fantasy of unimpeded 
(sexual) fulfillment.
78 
 No lesser promise than utopia could serve to motivate and license 
the revolutionary overthrow of the current world-order. 
The utopian imagination that drives the revolutionary impulse is, however, at 
odds with the self-authorization of the band of brothers.  In Freud’s telling of the myth of 
the primal horde, equality and fraternity, far from being the motivation for the brother’s 
rebellion, do not appear until after the father has already been deposed.  The rebellion is 
not proof of an existent proto-solidarity; rather the republican ideal of a community of 
interest is constituted post festum.  “Sexual desires do not unite men but divide them.  
Though the brothers had banded together to overcome their father, they were all one 
another’s rivals in regard to the women.  Each one of them would have wished, like his 
father, to have all the women to himself.”79  The aspiration to be like the father, to 
possess unlimited mastery over the social environment, must, in post-revolutionary 
politics, transform itself into an identificatory relation between the (male) members of the 
polis.  Only in accepting that “no one could or might ever again attain the father’s 
supreme power, even though that was what all of them had striven for”80 does the primal 
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horde transform itself into a fraternal clan and “rescue the organization that had made 
them strong.”81  In this sense, Freud is a liberal, regarding equality not as its own self-
contained principle of justice, but rather as the compromise-formation necessary if the 
period of fratricidal strife is to be brought to an end by means other than patriarchal 
restoration.  Equality is not part of Freud’s conception of liberty, but rather that which 
liberty gives rise to as the alternative to direct submission.
82  
 
The band of brothers, in other words, is only retrospectively constituted as a band 
rather than a gang of assassins and would-be rapists.  The primal horde narrative thus 
presents that the central challenge of post-revolutionary politics as that of transforming—
redeeming—what was primarily a parricidal impulse, a negative ideal, into the basis for a 
positive articulation of social space and a new political project.  Fraternity, the “aim-
inhibited love” of the brothers, is the libidinal investment without which the desire for 
liberty would dissolve the commitment to equality, but the victory of fraternity has to 
sustain itself against the loss of the father with which it is identical.  Brotherhood only is 
so through the fact of orphanage.  The fraternal clan does not, in deposing the king, 
succeed in disrupting the vertical relation to the father.  Rather democratic social space is 
haunted by the memory of absolutism, “the dead father (become) stronger than the living 
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one had been.”83  In democracy, the role of the absent father is strengthened because his 
function, which he can serve only when absent, is to maintain the non-closure of the 
space from which sovereign authority has been evacuated, which maintenance cannot be 
performed by any single brother, driven as he will be by his ‘utopian’ fantasies.  The 
ideals of fraternity and equality are, in this way, merely derivative, constructed as a 
barrier around this void over which secular modernity teeters.   
As a reaction-formation
84 
rather than a primary libidinal position, the bonds of 
fraternity are highly unstable and, on Freud’s account, this lability renders democratic 
social space vulnerable to two possible deformations, deformations that correspond to the 
bipolarity of the ambivalence complex: 
After a long lapse of time their bitterness against their father, which had driven 
them to their deed, grew less, and their longing for him increased; and it became 
possible for an ideal to emerge which embodied the unlimited power of the primal 
father against whom they had once fought as well as their readiness to submit to 
him
.85 
Concerning the first aspect of this ideal: Freud’s text suggests that republicanism receives 
its justification, in part, through the imaginative reconstruction of the patriarch-monarch 
as a beast: an all-powerful, sexually voracious, and unremittingly vicious figure.  
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Triumph is such only against a worthy adversary; a coup d’etat justified only against 
corrupt authority.
86
  Retrospectively created as a figure of unlimited power and insatiable 
appetites, the patriarch-monarch appears as both a terrifying threat and as a seductive 
incarnation of the freedom that could be had beyond the strictures of democratic life.  
This trope of freedom and fulfillment gets constructed as the negative image of the 
interdependence of democratic life and the renunciations that it requires, renunciations 
that become a festering source of resentment against the newly established social form.  
The “longing for the father” that will not be stilled, when read this way, refers to an illicit 
fantasy of freedom as licentiousness and domination.  The primal father is demonized, 
but simultaneously exalted as the individual par excellence, the only person to ever live 
by the strength of his will and desire alone, unencumbered by dependencies and 
obligations.  He is, as Freud says, a Nietzschean Ubermensch.
87  
 
The longing for the father must, however, be approached from the other side as 
well: not as the imagination of unfettered freedom, but as an insatiable desire for a 
definite figure of authority.  While Freud’s re-writing of the French Revolution inscribes 
the principle of absolutism as beastly, he explicitly identifies deification as a consequence 
of the murderous act.  The primal father is exalted not only in the form of an admirable 
                                                        
86
 This point should be connected to Freud’s earlier treatment of kingship.  Quoting Fraser, “The idea…that 
early kingdoms are despotisms, in which the people exist only for the sovereign, is wholly inapplicable to 
the monarchies we are considering.  On the contrary, the sovereign in them exists only for his subjects; his 
life is only valuable so long as he discharges the duties of his position by ordering the course of nature for 
his people’s benefit.  So soon as he fails to do so, the care, the devotion, the religious homage which they 
had hitherto lavished on him cease and are changed into hatred and contempt; he is dismissed 
ignominiously, and may be thankful if he escapes with his life.  Worshipped as a god one day, he is killed 
as a criminal the next” (Ibid, 44). 
87
 “The father of the primal horde was free.  His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in 
isolation, and his will needed no reinforcement from others…He, at the very beginning of the history of 
mankind, was the ‘superman’ whom Nietzsche only expected from the future.  Even to-day the members of 
a group stand in need of the illusion that they are equally and justly loved by their leader, but the leader 
himself need love no one else, he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and 
independent” (GP, 123). 
 82 
adversary, the imitable object that occupies the position to which one would like to attain, 
but as “everything that a childish imagination may expect from a father—protection, care 
and indulgence.”88  In a post-absolutist world in which no one can claim to have more or 
better knowledge of what constitutes a worthwhile life, we are left to find our own private 
salvation.  While the absence of absolute authority is, as we have seen, the condition of 
liberty, it also initiates a form of life characterized by isolation, an anarchic state in which 
there exists nothing to reliably connect individuals.  In other words, the indeterminacy of 
non-absolutist social space can be read either as a condition of hope or anxiety.  Left to 
authorize and authenticate ourselves in a world in which no one else is seen as fit to do so 
and to discover how this personal autonomy fits with the lives of others, we are apt to 
seek a recusal from such responsibility.  We could say, with Aristotle, that this pre-
political being of the primal father is both a god and a beast:
89 
the beast that must be 
killed and the god that must be propitiated for the individual to persist as such. 
Freud, in this way, identifies the democratic individual and the society constituted 
by a plurality of such individuals as prone to regression in two directions.  On the one 
hand, the orientation secured in relation to absent authority gives way to a movement 
towards anarchy in which each seeks to restore in their own person the father-king, 
denying the social constitution of the self and its freedom; and, on the other, the project 
of personal autonomy collapses under its own weight, the commandment to gain for 
oneself a private life forsaken for a return to a “closed” system of meanings in which the 
community comes to occupy the position of absolute authority.  Under the former 
impulse, this constitutive absence comes to act as a centrifugal force, under the impact of 
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which the democratic collective fragments into a mere aggregate of individuals not bound 
to one another by any compelling norms.  Under the latter, it acts centripetally, 
solidifying the bonds of fraternity in such a way that the individual is taken over by the 
demands of the totality.  Democracy is in danger of dissipating into anarchy or ossifying 
into fascism.  Whether this is the fate of the project of modernity depends upon the 
critical recognition of the ambivalent emotional straits upon which this new form of life 
is grounded.  Fraternity must be recognized as a condition of inheritance in which 
democratic hope remains secretly indebted to the patriarchal past that it would forswear.  
It is here that the work of scientific myth—or, let me now say, redemptive criticism—is 
required; the material of the mythic past taken up in such a way that thought is able to 
gain a critical grip upon it.  In approaching the cohesiveness of secularized space as a 
problem, fraternity as a cipher, Freud restores to the republican collective the history in 
terms of which it continues to be defined.  Only in the acknowledgment of fraternity as a 
condition of inheritance in which democratic hope remains secretly indebted to hence 
defined by the patriarchal past can the animating tension of the present be known and 
secured as the problem in light of which collective action and meaning-making must 
obtain.  Here the meaning and possibility of justice cannot be known or had independent 
of the acknowledgment of the material oppression from out of which the present emerged 
and in terms of which, in the disarticulation and material intertwinement of the private 
sphere and the public spheres, it is still configured. 
Through restoring to the modern polity the history of which its hegemonic liberal 
interpretation deprives it, Freud’s fantastic recapitulations of the (incomplete) drama of 
individuation recovers a crucial and insoluble problem of democratic social life.  How 
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can community be justly formed and sustained in a political order that, by definition, 
lacks the sovereign principle in and through which collective identity obtains?  There 
exists nothing other than the memory of shared subjugation to reinforce the horizontal 
bonds of a community of equals.  Democratic space is one that is haunted by the memory 
of absolute authority and must remain so if it is to resist a return to absolutism and if it is 
to acknowledge its structural dependence upon the patriarchal power that it allegedly 
abjures.  Freud’s fantasy of the primal horde makes visible—bodies forth—the absence 
that is the feature without which democracy would not exist, an absence that the 
democratic imagination holds in continual repression by means of positive concepts such 
as “the will of the people” or by means of projecting outward this threat internal to the 
system in the form of a fanatical, invading other.  This lacuna in the system into which 
Freud re-instates the dead body of the king is a site of trauma, a perennially open tear in 
the fabric of democracy.  In this way, “the dead father became stronger than the living 
one had been.”90  Whether or not and how it is possible to live with the remnants of 
absolute authority that cannot be extruded from the system insofar as they act as its 
foundation and with the results of the criminal deed becomes, in and through Freud’s 
text, the question central to democracy and, as “society is now based on complicity in the 
common crime,” one to which each citizen must respond.91 
 
At the Limits of Psychoanalysis as Social-Political Theory: 
The Paradox of Cultural Psychoanalysis 
The myth of the primal horde cannot be said to advance a normative political 
vision nor, if taken descriptively, can it be said to offer anything more than a negative 
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anthropology.  Freud is not advocating the social form that arises from out of the pre-
political principle of fraternity.  Fraternity, which both names and conceals the root of the 
modern polis, can only serve to undermine the ideals of liberty and equality with which it 
is arrayed but over which it is ultimately intended to reign as guardian.  The concept of 
fraternity through which the affective basis of post-Revolutionary politics is dissimulated 
is a radically insufficient conception of solidarity insofar as it hides within itself the 
sanctification of the patriarchal politics that it claims to supersede.  Through rendering 
fraternity the conceptual center of his analysis, Freud illuminates the mythic 
underpinning of what liberalism presents as the pure rationality of modern political 
authority.  Fraternity continues to rely upon the patriarchal structure that it would disown 
and does so both at the level of the political imaginary and at the material level of 
bourgeois social life in the sacrifice of women and children to the power of the private 
patriarch.  Such a comprehension of the family in its objective role as the private 
producer of the republican citizen, thus as a space whose contours are determined by the 
requirements of the public sphere from which it is separated off, is essential to the 
analytic enterprise.  Only through this awareness of the dialectical co-constitution of the 
individual and the social through the mediating term of the family does Freud gain access 
to the fundamental pathology of modernity: the on-going attachment to the delegitimized 
authority of personal and collective prehistory.  Viewed this way, oedipal individuality 
appears not as the result of natural fate, but rather as a piece of natural history—a cultural 
inheritance that we do not know how to appropriate and so which continues to dominate 
both public and private life.   
 86 
If Freud’s critical allegorization of the origin stories of Republicanism gains 
critical traction in the mythic milieu of our own thinking, does it further offer or point us 
in the direction of a solution?  What positive political norms, if any, can be derived from 
the psychoanalytic disclosure of the patriarchal dimension of democratic, secular 
modernity?  I suggest at the outset that psychoanalysis does not have nor can it be made 
to yield a theory of social life beyond that of our transhistorical condition of domination.  
Freud’s critique of republican society does not arise against the assumption of a 
normative political vision nor does it seem to provide an adequate basis for the 
formulation of such a theory.
92
  Freud’s insistence that psychoanalysis was no more than 
a neutral instrument and so could not provide a Weltanschauung was a dictum to which 
he remained faithful in his writing.  That said: while psychoanalysis is not directly bound 
up with any particular political project, insofar as it is an historically-indexed ethos 
committed to supporting the individual in the project of self-authorization, it must 
possess some normative conception of personhood and, insofar as it countenances 
personhood in terms of its socio-historic determinates, this normative image of the 
individual must entail the recommendation of a particular form of sociality. 
While it would be too narrow to suggest that Freud takes a wholly liberal view of 
the individual, his texts do express liberal-leanings of a sort, sympathies that become 
augmented when he is juxtaposed with figures such as Benjamin and Cavell.  Of interest 
here is Freud’s uncharacteristically optimistic Future of an Illusion in which Freud is at 
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his closest to issuing what are, if not directly political recommendations, then at least 
social prescriptions for assuring the stability of a secularized community.  This work 
appears as anomalous against the backdrop of the Freudian oeuvre not just because it 
arrogates to psychoanalysis a voice, albeit faint, of political authority, but—perhaps more 
remarkably—in that Freud, whose skepticism, pessimism, and resignationism are 
infamous, appears there unambiguously as a proponent and prophet of the Enlightenment.  
Freud turns—or rather returns—in Future of an Illusion to the question of the 
sustainability of a state stripped of its divine veneer.  He maintains that, once the rift 
between political and religious authority has formed, the two are destined to fall asunder; 
the divestiture of faith in the religious provenance of politics is not a process that admits 
of reversal and so “the relation between civilization and religion must undergo a 
fundamental revision.”93  Religion is no longer eligible to serve as the ground of shared 
social life, yet it nonetheless inappropriately persists in that role.  The Freud of 1927 is 
confident that “the turning-away from religion is bound to occur with the fatal 
inevitability of a process of growth and we find ourselves at this very juncture in the 
middle of that phase of development.”94  Future of an Illusion thus presents the dilemma 
of modernity in the following way: either coercive society must be reinstated and through 
means other than the defunct monotheistic model or reason which unceremoniously 
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stripped the halo from the state must come to supply of itself the ground of shared social 
life.  
Freud, in elucidating monotheism as the age of the neurosis of mankind in which 
society was assured by “purely affective means,” is not, à la Nietzsche, trying to unmask, 
demystify, hence defeat religion so much as he is attempting to show us how to finally 
put the nails in the coffin.  The words of his text will not be the invocation that finally 
banishes the spectre of absolutism.  Rather, Freud takes up the role to which Kant, a 
century and a half earlier, had appointed the philosopher that of the “sensible teacher who 
does not oppose an impending new development but seeks to ease its path and mitigate 
the violence of its irruption.”95  The transition from the society based on universal 
oppression to that of universal equality can only transpire and persist if the right kind of 
education is made available to all.  Only those who have been raised up to the use of their 
own reason can be charged with the Kantian demand “Sapere aude.”  For this, what is 
required is an irreligious education in which the cognitive capacities of the mass of men 
aren’t hobbled by the premature introduction to religious dogma.  Religious doctrine is 
tantamount to a ban on inquiry and when it is paired with the forceful prohibition against 
sexual activity and sexual inquiry, the individual is unable to develop the epistemic and 
existential resources that would make her a fit citizen of the secular state.  
Granted: such a recommendation does not a political theory make.  However, 
Freud’s prescription of an “irreligious education” makes clear that he, like Kant before 
him, at this moment believed that “infantilism was destined to be surmounted” and that 
he stood “justified in a hope for the future”96 domain over which rationality alone would 
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rule.  He so embraces a gradualism tantamount to the repudiation of revolution (whence 
the very popular—and very probably correct—view that Freud regarded rebellion as no 
more than an instance of mania
97
 that could only result in the eventual restitution of 
patriarchy in an even more consolidated form: 
We may insist as often as we like that man’s intellect is powerless in comparison 
with his intellectual life, and we may be right in this.  Nevertheless, there is 
something peculiar about this weakness.  The voice of the intellect is a soft one, 
but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.  Finally, after a countless 
succession of rebuffs, it succeeds.  This is one of the few points on which one 
may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no 
small importance.  And from it one can derive yet other hopes.  The primacy of 
the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but probably it is not an 
infinitely distant one.  It will presumably set itself the same aims as those whose 
realization you expect from your god (of course within human limits—so far as 
external reality, necessity, allows it), namely the love of man and the decrease of 
suffering. This being so, we may tell ourselves that our antagonism is only a 
temporary one and not irreconcilable.  We desire the same things, but you are 
more impatient, more exacting, and—why should I not say it?—more self-seeking 
than I and those on my side.  You would have the state of bliss begin directly after 
death; you expect the impossible from it and you will not surrender the claims of 
the individual.  Our God, logos, will fulfill whichever of these wishes nature 
outside us allows, but he will do it very gradually, only the unforeseeable future, 
and for a new generation of men.  He promises no compensation for us, who 
suffer grievously from life.
98
 
In Future of an Illusion, we thus meet with a strange Freud, one who seems to place 
himself squarely in the Enlightenment tradition and to indulge unselfconsciously in the 
thesis of the predestination of historical progress: our God, reason.  Of course, one should 
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not be too hasty with this conclusion that, in Future of an Illusion, Freud prostrates 
himself senselessly before the altar of teleological history.  A reasonable hermeneutical 
perspective is that Freud’s imaginary interlocutor, who remains vociferously unconvinced 
at the closure of the text, is nothing but Freud’s own skepticism in externalized form and 
thus that he is not so single-minded in his view. 
It is but three years later that we find Freud fully sobered, awakened from the 
dream of progress and the objections of the “opponent” of The Future confirmed.  
Science may be no illusion, but that it can serve as guarantor of the good and just life—
“the love of man and the decrease of suffering”—in the way in which Freud outlines 
above surely is.  Read in the afterglow of its immediate predecessor, Civilization and its 
Discontents take on an elegiac appearance and one hears, beneath the stridency of the 
opening notes by which Freud resumes his war against monotheism, the undertone of 
lamentation.  This text is not the space of battle but a burial ground over which Freud 
indirectly eulogizes The Future and the high price that his thinking has had to pay in the 
form of the sacrifice of the enlightenment faith in progress so that the psychoanalytic 
theory of ontogenetic history could give rise to a properly psychoanalytic history of 
civilization.
99  
In Civilization and its Discontents, it is not only religion that is shifted 
from the category of an illusion (beliefs generated in service of wish-fulfillments) to that 
of delusion (beliefs of this variety that are in conflict with reality qua experiential 
evidence), but the notion of progress itself.  No gain in civilization, which, in The Future, 
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Freud associated with scientific mastery, leads to the satiation of human need or to a 
transcendence of social antinomies.  What appears prima facie, in the technologically 
revolutionized conditions of life, as advancement is merely the effectuation of the same 
longings in new form and thus the repetition of denial.
100 
 Freud “observes that this 
newly-won power over space and time, this subjugation of the forces of nature, which is 
the fulfillment of a longing that goes back thousands of years, has not increased the 
amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from life and has not made 
them feel happier.  From the recognition of this fact we ought to be content to conclude 
that power over nature is not the only precondition of human happiness, just as it is not 
the only goal of cultural endeavor.”101  In other words, the work of instrumental, 
scientific reasoning is indubitably a form of development, but it makes progress only in 
the direction of the domination of nature, which is in no way correlative to gains in 
human happiness or in social justice. 
That said: it is partial to treat Civilization and its Discontents solely in relation to 
its immediate predecessor, which is to say to pronounce its significance only in terms of 
the negation of the enlightenment.  For Civilization and its Discontents has its own 
positive project, hence a positive tone whose timbre is defined by the return of myth.  
Civilization turns away from Logos, the god of the enlightenment invoked within Future 
of an Illusion, so that Mythos, in the form of Eros and Thanatos, might be summoned 
once again.
102
  In abandoning the dream of pure political reason, Freud retrieves and 
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places centrally the thought fundamental to Totem and Taboo: that society depends upon 
authority in excess of what can be rationally justified.  Yet, where in Totem and Taboo 
the social tie appeared as inescapably violent, Civilization attempts to think sociality as a 
form of mutuality—in terms of an obligation that, while it does not admit of grounding 
(not even the instrumental grounding of mutual advantage), might nonetheless be 
sustained solidaristically.  “Civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose 
is to combine human single individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and 
nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind.  Why this has to happen, we do not 
know; the work of Eros is precisely this.  These collections of men are to be libidinally 
bound to one another.  Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold 
them together.”103  Such is Freud’s mythic reprisal of what Kant referred to as the 
unsocial sociability of men: our need of one another matched only by our need to be free 
of one another.
104
 
While Freud returns to the normative power of myth-making, redeeming the 
excess upon which society depends in and as Eros, the question of justice remains at an 
absolute remove.  Civilization holds open the possibility that there might be a life lived in 
solidarity with others, but this is, for Freud, a material question that can only be answered 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interest.  Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they 
would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man.  They know this, and hence comes a 
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103
 108. 
104
 “The two urges, the one toward personal happiness and the other towards union with other human 
beings must struggle with each other in every individual; and so, also, the two processes of individual and 
of cultural development must stand in hostile opposition to each other and mutually dispute this ground.  
But this struggle between the individual and society is not a derivative of the contradiction—probably an 
irreconcilable one—between the primal instincts of Eros and death.  It is a dispute within the economics of 
the libido, comparable to the contest concerning the distribution of libido between ego and objects; and it 
does admit of an eventual accommodation in the individual, as, it may be hoped, it will also do in the future 
of civilization, however much that civilization may oppress the life of the individual to-day,” (141). 
 93 
by the future.  Freud will no longer indulge in prophecies of reconciliation, rational or 
otherwise, for the aspiration to the supersessionist overcoming of antinomies is 
antipathetic to the ethos of psychoanalysis, whose charge is to render ambivalence 
bearable both in the sense of tolerable and in the sense of articulable; to transform 
ambivalence from a condition of paralytic ambiguity into the engine of a new form of 
meaning-making. 
Yet, even as psychoanalysis would seem to call for such an emancipatory project 
of critical mythmaking at the level of the collective action, it is, per Freud, only possible 
on the part of the individual.  For social mythmaking is, as Freud sees it, necessarily 
oppressive; we must be left to find our own way.  It is here that we reach the limits of 
psychoanalysis as social-political theory, its insight into the on-going attachment to the 
de-legitimized authority of the past hence the indefeasible fragility of post-absolutist 
social space calling for a practice that psychoanalysis cannot itself provide.  As Freud 
remarks in the final pages of Civilization, which is ultimately a piece of theory and not a 
piece of therapy: 
I hasten to come to a close.  But there is one question which I can hardly 
evade.  If the development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to the 
development of the individual and if it employs the same methods, may we not be 
justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some 
civilizations, or some epochs of civilization—possibly, the whole of mankind—
have become ‘neurotic’?  An analytic dissection of such neuroses might lead to 
therapeutic recommendations which could lay claim to great practical interest.  I 
would not say that an attempt of this kind to carry psycho-analysis over to the 
cultural community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless.  But we should have to 
be very cautious and not forget that, after all, we are only dealing with analogies 
and that it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to tear them 
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from the sphere in which they have originated and been evolved.  Moreover the 
diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special difficulty.  In an 
individual neurosis we take as our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the 
patient from his environment, which is assumed to be ‘normal’.  For a group all of 
whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background 
could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere.  And as regards the therapeutic 
application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis 
of the social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy 
upon the group?  But in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day 
someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities.
105 
      
In the foregoing passage, Freud cites what are, to his eyes, two seemingly insuperable 
obstacles to the undertaking of a cultural psychoanalysis: the absence of a normative 
backdrop against which a critical diagnosis could obtain and the absence of an 
authoritative figure who could, in turn, implement the measures yielded by such a 
diagnosis.  Concerning the first impediment: in the dissipation of the illusion of rational 
progress upon which the ethico-political hopes of The Future hinged, what also 
evaporates is the image of a better future.  The diagnosis of a culture as pathological 
requires a conception of the good and just life, but, from within the space of mundane 
history, i.e., the position to which the materialist critic must assiduously restrain herself, 
the only means of nature’s cultivation that we know is that of its mortification.  To put 
this otherwise: the idea of a universal history from a psychoanalytic point of view is that 
of (patriarchal) domination for this is the only transhistorical condition of humankind. 
Concerning the second impediment to cultural psychoanalysis: the provision of 
group therapy requires that there be someone in the position to offer it.  It requires not 
only epistemological authority—a knowing that, given Freud’s repudiation of The 
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Future’s rational hopefulness, would be soothsaying—but political authority as well— 
the power to impose the therapeutic programme upon the social totality.  What cultural 
psychoanalysis seems to entail is the prophet as political leader, one who could undertake 
the revolution of the material conditions of life by which oedipal individuality and the 
fraternal solidarity that is its correlate could be overcome in order to induce a mood of 
critical self-reflection.  But this means that cultural psychoanalysis is not simply, from 
the outset, a troubled undertaking, but a deeply paradoxical one.   Modernity is, according 
to Freud, unable to free itself from the de-legitimized authority of personal and collective 
prehistory.  To demand the emergence—or rather the reemergence—of a Mosaic figure 
would be to breathe life into the spectre of sovereign authority, our haunting by which is 
the crux of our pathology and yet potentially the very condition of our health inasmuch as 
solidarity only obtains in and through the memory of shared oppression.  In short, cultural 
psychoanalysis would, in its undertaking, violate the very self-authorization—of each 
individual and so the polis constituted by a plurality of autonomous individuals—that it 
would aim to support.   
We thus arrive, in the psychoanalytic interrogation of democratic modernity, at a 
stalemate. 
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CHAPTER III 
SEEING PAST THE FREUDIAN PROHIBITION ON CULTURAL 
PSYCHOANALYSIS: WALTER BENJAMIN’S “WEAK MESSIANISM”  
& THE CRITICAL REDEMPTION OF HISTORY 
In this chapter, I will argue that Walter Benjamin can fruitfully be read as the 
direct inheritor of the theoretical and methodological aporias inherent in the proposition 
of cultural psychoanalysis.  My suggestion is that Benjamin undertakes the therapeutic 
treatment of culture and, in so doing, shows the way past the bind of modernity at which 
Freud himself halted.  Benjamin’s texts, formed at the site where criticism and prophecy 
meet, enact what Freud’s teach.106  As critical historiography, Benjamin’s “weak 
messianism” attempts to read the text of history against its ideological authorship.  As 
prophetic revelation, Benjamin’s writings open, from out of the past, the dimension of 
futurity that would seem, prima facie, to be closed in the cultural writings of Freud.
107
  In 
other words, it is my thesis that Benjamin’s poetic-philosophic ambition was to 
constitute, within his texts, a therapeutic space through which the utopian promise of 
collective life beyond domination might be renewed in and through the recovery of the 
history of its betrayals. 
Benjamin’s strategy in dealing with the Freudian problematic is two-fold, 
corresponding to Freud’s bipartite prohibition, and can be parsed accordingly along both 
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theoretical and practical (or methodological) axes.  These two issues, the inability to 
conceive of a political form beyond domination and so proffer a theory of justice, and the 
(necessary) absence of sovereign authority, which becomes for Benjamin as it was for 
Freud an issue of method or technique, must ultimately be resolved in tandem.  
Nonetheless, we can allow, for a moment, the dialectical unity of diagnosis and treatment 
to come apart so as to obtain a clear picture of the anti-progressive philosophy of history 
that abides between Benjamin and Freud and which we will see repeated in the third 
chapter in Cavell’s conception of the ordinary.  As I indicated in the introduction, it is 
this “messianic” philosophy of history grounds Benjamin and Freud’s isomorphic 
practices of allegoresis: the interpretive process of decontextualization by which they 
seek to undo the unity of texts so that, within a fragmented field, the dialectical image 
may emerge.  By allegoresis, I mean to disambiguate a hermeneutical approach to texts 
from allegory qua mode of textual production.  Where allegory manufactures literary 
symbols, allegoresis regards the literal surface structure of a text as a dissimulation and 
aims at discovering the hidden meaning that is concealed behind this surface.  It was such 
an approach that I attributed to Freud’s dismantling of the discursive structure of 
fraternity.  While the original object of such a hermeneutics is scriptural, Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams secularizes this theological practice.  In its secular form, 
revelation is not the goal.  Rather the aim is to understand the motivation behind the work 
of concealment.  Before we can turn to a fuller treatment of allegoresis, it is first 
necessary to establish the conditions under which Benjamin develops this practice of 
physiognomic reading and how it is that he deals with the theoretical problem of a lack of 
a normative backdrop against which to establish a cultural psychoanalysis.  I thus 
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suspend the methodological question of allegoresis till section three of the current 
chapter, treating first of the historical circumstances of Benjamin’s critical hermeneutics 
and his solution to the Freudian deadlock as well as the philosophy of history that 
supports his interpretive practice. 
Beginning from the theoretical axis and the Freudian prohibition on imagining 
justice: Benjamin’s critical treatment of culture roots itself in a utopianism negative in 
character.  In a fragment from the highly instructive “Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of 
History,’” Benjamin echoes the Freudian prohibition on investigating the future yet 
simultaneously identifies the critical force of materialist historiography as precipitated in 
and by its prophetic regard for the past.  For Benjamin, prophecy consists not in the 
revelation of the form of the future, but rather in detecting the revolutionary potential as 
yet unrealized in the text of “victor history:” 
The historical materialist who investigates the structure of history performs, in his 
way, a sort of spectrum analysis.  Just as a physicist determines the presence of 
ultraviolet light in the solar spectrum, so the historical materialist determines the 
presence of a messianic force in history.  Whoever wishes to know what the 
situation of a “redeemed humanity” might actually be, what conditions are 
required for the development of such a situation, and when this development can 
be expected to occur, poses questions to which there are no answers.  He might as 
well seek to know the color of ultraviolet rays.
108
 
From within the space of profane history, we cannot conceive of a form of life beyond 
the order of domination.  To refuse to help oneself to such normative speculation is 
simply to take seriously the problem of ideology: that it has no outside, as Althusser put 
it, or, as Freud said, that we lack an “elsewhere.”  The concepts of justice to which we 
have recourse and which form the basis of any positive utopian vision represent the 
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sedimentation of a history of violence and so simultaneously conceal and symbolically 
re-affirm in their operation the violence by which they came about.  The attempt to 
specify the situation of a “redeemed humanity” and elaborate a theory of justice 
reiterates, at a higher level, the ideological precepts through which we live.   
Given that history is but “one single catastrophe,”109 which Benjamin defines in 
the Arcades as “having missed the opportunity,”110 justice remains, in itself, 
unimaginable.  Yet any chance of seizing the material of the present as that through 
which to actualize a life truly befitting humanity depends upon a sensitivity to the 
particular form of failure that is as-yet on-going in the present.  It is in the Marxist 
concept of “classless society” that Benjamin gains the critical lens by which to bring into 
view the pathology particular to his modern moment.  Hence, Benjamin’s utopianism, 
while negative in character, is not to be thought, as Agamben does in his Potentialities, as 
an abstract or universal negation. While we are precluded from elaborating a theory of 
justice, a critical conception of justice can nonetheless be obtained through the 
determinate negation of the injustice definitive of the present.
111
  In identifying “classless 
society” as the emblem of life beyond domination, Benjamin registers that which eluded 
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Freud even in his revelation of rational progress as bearing in its deepest interior a 
regressive trend.  Freud’s devotion to the exposition of individual psychology and the 
examination of sociological phenomena in terms of this psychology left him blind to the 
fact that, in the crisis of authority, the social world, emancipated from its ecclesiastical 
domination, fell under the spell of “another system of doctrines (that)…from the outset 
took over all the psychological characteristics of religion—the same sanctity, rigidity and 
intolerance, the same prohibition of thought—for its own defense.”112  In the defeat of 
religious dogma that supplied the ideological support for a network of personal 
domination, capitalist logic became itself such an authority, gaining interpretive 
hegemony over the ideals of freedom, equality, and fulfillment.  The scientific, 
technological progress that Freud championed in The Future as boundless and inevitable 
stands as the signature of this new mythology.  In the secular religion of progress, 
worshipped in the image of the novel commodity, the urgency for the revolutionary 
demand to realize, in this moment, a life truly befitting humanity is stilled, satiated in and 
by the illusion of the future and its perfections.  What could be achieved only through 
undertaking politics in the present, i.e., through the work of individuals, is displaced onto 
the field of progressive history, the natural school in which instrumental reasoning 
receives its tutelage. 
However, while it is the case that Benjamin discovers a political orientation in 
Marx with which he is able to overcome the Freudian prohibition on imaging justice, he 
nonetheless remains more closely aligned, philosophically and methodologically, with 
Freud.  To the first generation of Critical Theorists it had become apparent that economic 
analysis was insufficient to account for the intransigence of social institutions and 
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Benjamin himself, although a self-declared Marxist, is uninterested in furthering the 
concept of class.  His method, in other words, is not that of the critique of political 
economy.  Rather, after his exposure to Marxist theory at the close of the 1920’s, 
Benjamin’s primary interest is in the “phantasmagoria” of mass culture, i.e., the 
phenomenon that covers over the reality of class whilst inculcating the kind of 
subjectivity prone to fascistic fascination.  In his theory of the everyday life of capitalism 
as phantasmagoric, Benjamin transforms the idea of mass life into a critical—rather than 
a merely descriptive—concept.  Where Marx thought that mass production would 
produce class consciousness, the isolation wrought by the division of labor surmounted 
by the very mechanism by which it was created, from Benjamin’s historical vantage point 
it is clear that the capitalist production of culture engenders the simultaneous 
fragmentation of society and the total determination of the individual by exchange-value, 
resulting in a state of unconscious conformity.
113
  It is not that the relations of production 
appear to Benjamin as irrelevant, but rather that the relations established—suspended, 
really—in consumption are, on his assessment, the first line of defense in the fight for the 
oppressed past, the site from which good tidings of a future beyond domination might 
proceed.  Benjamin thus takes it that paramount to the project of emancipation is wresting 
culture from the grip of capital where capital is understood as a totalizing context of 
storytelling about the past and its victims, the present in which the weak messianic power 
is at work, and the future, i.e., the empty time of justice.  Thus, if we are to characterize 
Benjamin’s ambitions to expropriate culture from the expropriators as “revolutionary,” it 
is in the attenuated sense of freeing the cultural treasure from its commodity-character 
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and hence disrupting the attitude of consumption in which the individual is attached to 
the very (economic) force that maintains her in subjugation.
114
  Benjamin identifies the 
problem of political modernity as primarily a neurotic failure of self-authorization, i.e., a 
matter of desire, rather than straightforwardly an issue of domination or, for that matter, 
of reason.   
Having offered this preliminary treatment of the theoretical means by which 
Benjamin’s lifts the ban on psychoanalysis as cultural critique, I turn now to sketch the 
social conditions under which Benjamin develops and takes up his therapeutic practice.  
In the last chapter, I argued that, while Freud lacks the theoretical resources by which to 
offer a normative critique of political modernity, psychoanalysis is nonetheless about 
authority—that is its topic—and thus that it bears crucially on democratic theory.  The 
problem of psychoanalysis is the paradox of individual self-authorization in which the 
self is, at its crux, constituted in and through its relation to external authority and thus 
remains unable to detach itself from this prehistoric authority.  In the myth of the primal 
horde, Freud identifies the essentially ambivalent constitution of post-absolutist social 
space and shows that, garnered upon and caught within this ambivalent complex, society 
is prone to deformation in one of two directions: threatened on the one hand, with 
disaggregation and, on the other, with the absorption of nascent individuality back into 
the primitive psychology of the horde.  In his analysis of the social-world defined by the 
commodity-form, Benjamin demonstrates that fragmentation and totalization are not 
opposed but rather the two moments by which modern society is constituted.  In other 
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words, Benjamin, in his politicization of psychoanalysis casts the practice of redemptive 
criticism in a very particular light: specifically as fascism in reverse. 
As Benjamin sees it, the promise of a life through which there could be developed 
the robust psychic resources definitive of individuality and upon which the constitution of 
a democratic republic depends has remained unfulfilled and that this is to be accounted 
for in terms of objective social structures rather than in terms of the private prehistory of 
individuals.  Where Marx saw the alienation and isolation of modern life in terms of the 
relations of production, Benjamin conversely sees this isolation as effectuated in and 
through the culture of consumption.  Furthermore, the cultural objects upon which the 
individual sustains herself and which she consumes in isolation are mass products of 
capitalist firms.  Totalization thus occurs automatically in and through this economic 
mechanism: what is common between individuals occurring as unconscious conformity.   
As Marx argued in his concept of commodity fetishism, the exchange-principle 
deprives objects of their natural (use-) value and instead imposes upon them a false 
equality, calculating value in terms of the object’s fungible worth on the market.  What is 
hidden behind this reductive calculus is the real social inequality that is constitutive of 
commodity production.  Benjamin, defining the commodity from the position of desire, 
re-thinks this equalization wrought by reification in terms of the suppression of 
heterogeneity and the occlusion of class domination.  Collectives form haphazardly, 
lacking any principle beyond the procurement and consumption of commodities.
115
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Within the mass, equality reigns inasmuch as each individual, defined only in relation to 
the commodity, is rendered anonymous, stripped of all other qualities that would 
distinguish her. The mass represents the false reconciliation of social antinomies, 
preventing the formation of solidarity whilst instating a “repressive” or “malicious 
egalitarianism.”116  Benjamin thus reformulates the Freudian problem of de-individuation 
in the following Marxist inflected-way: “a curious paradox: people have only the 
narrowest private interest in mind when they act, yet they are at the same time more than 
ever determined by the instincts of the mass.”117 
While Freud’s mythic recasting of the primitive social conditions of modernity 
was focused—and hence restricted—in terms of his interest in the landscape of private 
experience as established in the detachment of the familial sphere from communally-
constituted space, Benjamin takes up the deformation of privatized experience from the 
perspective of objective social structures.  In the era of mechanical reproducibility, the 
individual’s uptake of social products is isolated from the historical conditions of their 
production, rendering these objects anonymous and, therefore, mythic.  This economic 
approach to the analysis of the distortion of private experience enables Benjamin to give 
a historically specific account of the possibility of political tyranny latent in the 
pathology of the “dreaming-collective” and the phenomenon of fascism that Freud avant-
la-lettre examined in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, the companion 
piece, as it were, to Totem and Taboo.  Benjamin writes that 
Considered apart from the various classes which join in its formation, the mass as 
such has no primary social significance.  Its secondary significance depends on 
the ensemble of relations through which it is constituted at any one time and 
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place.  A theater audience, an army, the population of a city comprise masses 
which in themselves belong to no particular class.  The free market multiplies 
these masses, rapidly and on a colossal scale, insofar as each piece of 
merchandise now gathers around it the mass of its potential buyers.  The 
totalitarian states have taken this mass as their model.  The Volksgemeinschaft 
aims to root out from single individuals everything that stands in the way of their 
wholesale fusion into a mass of consumers.  The one implacable adversary still 
confronting the state, which in this ravenous action becomes the agent of 
monopoly capital, is the revolutionary proletariat.  This latter dispels the illusion 
of the mass through the reality of class.
118
 
The mass, i.e., the agglomeration of atomistic individuals, is the pivot upon which 
authoritarianism turns.  For capitalist culture breeds the anaesthetized and reactive 
subjectivity upon which the effectiveness of fascist aesthetics depends and, as Benjamin 
sees it, fascism is only possible under the inevitable conditions of capitalist economic 
crisis.  Fascism arises, in these moments of socio-economic upheaval, as a counter-
revolutionary force, preserving class-society while claiming to overcome it in the renewal 
of tradition conceived as a homogeneous, ancestral, and organic basis for politics.  
Nazism, the “revolution from above” and, of course, the form of fascism that Benjamin 
himself confronted, leaves untouched the exploitative structural core of capitalism and 
yet unifies the masses through the promulgation of the notion of the “soul” of the nation 
and a totalitarian politics based on racial purity and cultural conformity.   
In other words, fascism synthetically generates bonds between the members of the 
polis, the Volksgemeinschaft standing as the negative image of genuinely democratic 
solidarity.  
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The increasing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of 
masses are two sides of the same process.  Fascism attempts to organize the newly 
proletarianized masses while leaving intact the property relations which they 
strive to abolish.  It sees its salvation in granting expression to the masses—but on 
no account granting them rights.  The masses have a right to changed property 
relations; fascism seeks to give them expression in keeping these relations 
unchanged.  The logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life.  
The violation of the masses, whom fascism, with its Fuhrer cult, forces to their 
knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into 
serving the production of ritual values.
119
 
The foregoing quotation is pulled from Benjamin’s Artwork essay, by my lights the only 
essay in which he attempts to generate an image of political solidarity in the present.  
(This effort of the Artwork essay is one to which we will return.)  The urgency by which 
Benjamin seeks to politicize cultural objects is a function of this insight that the fate of 
modern democratic societies is ineluctably bound up with culture, i.e., the customary use 
of the “apparatus,” a term narrowly used in the foregoing quotation to refer to film.  Yet 
culture and economy—artwork and commodity—can no longer, in the era of 
technological reproducibility, be strictly parsed.  In the case of film, the mandarin fantasy 
of a distinction between culture and economy—i.e., culture as Kultur—is definitively 
displaced.  While the initial secularization of art in its bourgeois-era instantiation 
maintained the artwork’s aura and, in preserving its autonomous status, rendered culture a 
surrogate for the religion that could no longer hold its faith, the second industrial 
revolution results in the situation in which culture, realized through the machine and 
subject to mass dissemination, is itself the instrument by which the material arrangement 
of society is established and, as advertisement, slogan, bluff, etc., replaces religion as the 
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constitutive force and interpreter of the popular imagination.  In its commodification and 
technologization, culture becomes the naturo-historical matter of the everyday.  Against 
the economistic Marxist, Benjamin demonstrates that the culture of late capitalist 
modernity is simultaneously material and symbolic and cannot be treated undialectically 
as epiphenomenal.  While film is the exemplary instance of culture so transformed, the 
“apparatus” referred to in the foregoing quotation stands equally for all technologies that 
establish the dimensions of the modern public sphere.  As culture is now the formative 
milieu through which there is achieved the organization of individuals, the political 
mobilization of the collective is bound up with the use of this apparatus.  Inasmuch as it 
determines and hence directs the energies of the collective, the tendencies of this 
apparatus determine the outcome of capitalist crisis: whether or not property relations 
will be preserved or subject to total transformation. 
 Culture, now defined by this liberal fusion of art and technology, is, for Benjamin 
the battleground over which the fate of political modernity must be waged.  Inasmuch as 
culture has an ineliminably historical character, the restoration of which is necessary to 
its demythification, the question of justice descends to Benjamin, within secularized 
social space, specifically as a question of tradition, which is to say as an issue of the 
rightful authority of the past in and for the present.  Benjamin turns to a treatment of mass 
culture not simply to revile it as the utter degradation of subjectivity and hence to 
pronounce the dark fate of modernity as does Adorno. “Pathos of this work: there are no 
periods of decline;”120 for “overcoming the concept of ‘progress’ and overcoming the 
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concept of ‘period of decline’ are two sides of one and the same thing.”121  In 
contradistinction to his protégé and pre-eminent critic, Benjamin seeks to redeem “low 
art” by exposing that its oppressive character harbors, at the same time, its emancipatory 
potential: to show that, inasmuch as we already have everything that we need at our 
disposal, the achievement of justice is prolonged for no other reason than that we allow it 
to be.  Against fascism’s alleged proletarianization of culture, Benjamin’s revolutionary 
recasting of the cultural treasure undoes the “‘enshrinement,’ or ‘apologia’ (that) is meant 
to cover up the revolutionary moments in the course of history,” exposing within the 
cultural treasure the discontinuity and heterogeneity, “the peaks and crags, which offer 
footing for those who wish to move beyond this view.”122  Posed between the 
unreflective celebration of the populism of modern mass culture and Adorno’s critical 
negation of it, Benjamin’s work undertakes the emancipation of the commodity qua 
utopian wish-image of the collective from the ideological network within which it is 
ensnared.  “Every age must strive anew to wrest the tradition away from a conformism 
that is working to overpower it.”123  Wresting tradition away from its domination by the 
status quo—for Benjamin, the divestment of it commodity-character—would be, at the 
same time, the overcoming of the attitude of consumption or, to invoke the master-
metaphor of the Arcades Project, the awakening of the collective from its dream-state.  
For Benjamin as for Freud, there is no futurity without desire and so the possibility of a 
just social order requires that desire first be liberated from exchange-value.   
In shifting the emphasis from production onto consumption; from the scientific 
discourse of political economy to concrete historical experience; and from consciousness-
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raising to the vicissitudes of desire: Benjamin succeeds in expanding the Marxist concept 
of commodity festishism into the totality of everyday life.  On Benjamin’s analysis, not 
only is the working-day subsumed completely under the capitalist form of production, but 
the “free-time” of consumption as well.  As he writes in the 1921 fragment “Capitalism 
as Religion:” “Capitalism is the celebration of a cult sans rêve et sans merci [without 
dream or mercy].  There are no ‘weekdays.’  There is no day that is not a feast day, in a 
terrible sense that all its sacred pomp is unfolded before us; each day commands the utter 
fealty of each worshipper.”124  Benjamin inverts the platitude that, in capitalism, every 
day is a workday to that of the permanence of festival in which even our leisure hours are 
dominated by this mode of production. 
The master-metaphor of Benjamin’s phenomenology of the unfolding of everyday 
life in and under capitalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that of 
“phantasmagoria” and it is in and through this concept that he develops his micrological 
brand of social criticism.  With the term phantasmagoria, Benjamin invokes the pre-
cinematic screen practice popular in nineteenth century Paris.  In the magic lantern 
shadow-play, images were projected onto a wall by means of the illumination of glass 
plates inscribed with said images and the passage of these beams of light through 
magnifying lenses.  The exhibitors of fantasmagorie, prime among them Étienne Gaspar 
Robert, devised elaborate techniques for producing motion and “special” effects, using 
several different lanterns at once so as to create composite, moving images.  As Charles 
Musser observes of fantasmagorie, its practitioners “played on the simultaneous 
realization that the projected image was only an image and yet one that the spectator 
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believed was real.”125  With the term phantasmagoria, Benjamin designates and 
elaborates the surrealism of lived experience in commodity culture, a surrealism that was 
the effect of the divorcement of products from their social sites of production—the de-
coupling of subjectivity and objectivity, for, as Benjamin saw it, the commodified social 
products of the nineteenth century (not to mention that of the twentieth) took on a 
supersensible aspect, not just at the conceptual level, but phenomenologically as well, 
despite the fact that they were the manufactured products of human labor.  The 
commodity was defined by its “aura,” appearing simultaneously as a mundane object and 
yet, at the same time, as one whose value and meaning was irreducible to its concrete 
properties.   
The subject of this book [Arcades Project] is an illusion expressed by 
Schopenhauer in the following formula: to seize the essence of history, it suffices 
to compare Herodotus and the morning newspaper.  What is expressed here is a 
feeling of vertigo characteristic of the nineteenth century’s conception of history.  
It corresponds to a viewpoint according to which the course of the world is an 
endless series of facts congealed in the form of things.  The characteristic residue 
of this conception is what has been called the “History of Civilization,” which 
makes an inventory, point by point, of humanity’s life forms and creations.  The 
riches thus amassed in the aerarium of civilization henceforth appear as though 
identified for all time.  This conception of history minimizes the fact that such 
riches owe not only their existence but also their transmission to a constant effort 
of society—an effort, moreover, by which these riches are strangely altered.  Our 
investigation proposes to show how, as a consequence of this reifying 
representation of civilization, the new forms of behavior and the new 
economically and technologically based creations that we owe to the nineteenth 
century enter the universe of a phantasmagoria.  These creations undergo this 
“illumination” not only in the theoretical manner, by an ideological transposition, 
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but also in the immediacy of their perceptible presence.  They are manifest as 
phantasmagorias.
126
 
In the use of this term, Benjamin declares his position in a history of allegorical social 
critique that begins with Plato’s cave.  However, in theorizing social mystification in 
terms of a screen-practice, Benjamin, of course, offers a materialist diagnosis of the 
source of this illusion and also indicates that disillusionment requires a—let us say—
spectrology, i.e., a self-conscious engagement with this aesthetic practice rather than 
turning away from it as but mere illusion and nothing more.  Awakening, for Benjamin, 
occurs dialectically in and through our dreams, which are not to be regarded as pure 
falsehood, but rather seen as products of material circumstances, their distortions 
measured as indexes of their truth.
127
 
For Benjamin, the phantasmagoria—the fragmented, disordered, and transient 
nature—of modern experience had its material roots not only in the invisibility of the 
social conditions of commodity production, but, as well, in the accelerated rate of 
technological innovation and production in modernity.  This acceleration of the rate of 
production was itself sanctified in enlightenment theology as an inevitable course of 
progress by which there would be yielded the material abundance and gratification, 
which we now, having lost our fidelity to another world, could only hope to achieve by 
ourselves.  On Benjamin’s analysis, the commodity achieves the status of the icon, 
embodying and confirming the ideal of progress into which the utopian hopes of the 
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collective have been diverted.  And the unmistakable mark of that icon, of its promise of 
a full future, is newness.  “Newness is a quality independent of the use value of the 
commodity.  It is the source of that illusion of which fashion is the tireless purveyor.”128  
Commodity culture promises a form of happiness that it cannot deliver in that it is 
newness itself that is desired; thus what proposes itself as the object of fulfillment 
condemns us to the hell of repeated unfulfillment.  “Novelty (is) an attribute of all that is 
under sentence of damnation:”129  Just as, for Freud, the finding of an object is always the 
re-finding of it, Benjamin’s “dreaming-collective” is, in the form of novelty, fated to the 
eternally selfsame.
130
 
Benjamin’ appropriation and deployment of Marx significantly alters the field of 
Marxist social criticism in that it de-couples cultural critique from the teleological project 
of consciousness-raising.  Indeed, it is arguably Benjamin’s central contribution to 
Marxist theory to have exposed the conceptual complicity between consciousness-raising 
and capitalist ideology.  Both rest on the uncritical acceptance of the idea that history is a 
field of progress to be measured in terms of the ever-increasing rationalization of the 
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world.  Where mainstream Western Marxism develops class-consciousness as the 
counter-concept to ideology, Benjamin dialectically posits “actualization” in dialectical 
opposition to phantasmagoria. Where phantasmagoria is an elaboration of everyday 
experience under and in capitalism, actualization designates the disruption of such 
experience qua totalizing context of storytelling in which the past (the victims), the 
present (the switch point in which the weak messianic power is always at work), and the 
future (the horizon on which empty time and justice are in context). Actualization 
designates an interpretive mode in which the oppressed past becomes legible in its 
interpenetration with and disruption of the present symbolic and political order.  
Benjamin shifts the terms of Marxist criticism from the register of consciousness to that 
of a hermeneutics in which the unconscious utopian aspirations of the collective are only 
to be read indirectly off of concrete cultural objects.
131
  Max Pensky elegantly articulates 
this methodological turn. 
Even in its inversion of Hegel’s idealism, Marx’s materialist historical theory 
preserves Hegel’s insistence on the logical structure of development, and 
therefore generates the significance of historical appearances without any real 
engagement with those appearances themselves. To realize the critical power of 
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Marx’s basic insight – the primacy of the material dimension of history, and the 
ideological occlusion of just this fact in capitalist modernity – Benjamin proposes 
a methodology entirely alien to Marxist political economy…borrow(ing) an 
aesthetic technique of the literary avant-garde, the French Surrealists, and to apply 
that method beyond the aesthetic sphere, into the practice of critical 
historiography.
132
 
While I will make argument with this claim that Benjamin’s methodology is “entirely 
alien” to Marx, Pensky’s analysis of Benjamin’s phantasmagoria as the concretization of 
Marx’s theory of ideology and the basis for a micrological analysis of the social 
physiognomy.  And it is here that we begin to approach Benjamin’s methodological 
solution to the second prong of Freud’s bipartite prohibition against cultural 
psychoanalysis.  As Dora taught Freud, the emancipation of desire from its melancholic 
consignment in and to the everyday cannot be accomplished abstractly through the 
provision of more or better knowledge, but instead requires working-through.  De-
reification must be performed on the concrete particulars in which desire is sedimented 
and through which it receives its hallucinatory gratification.  Only thereby can the 
illusion of progress be dispelled and the collective awoken from the dream-filled sleep of 
capitalism.  It is such a liberation of the imagination that Benjamin undertook in the 
Arcades Project, the controlled fragmentation of which was meant to both mimetically 
capture the transient, dissociative, and disordered experience definitive of the Paris of the 
19
th
 century and hence of the European world and to demonstrate the “commodity” as the 
totalizing form of this otherwise anarchic condition.  
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Benjamin’s re-purposing of Marxist theory is undertaken for the sake of such 
liberation, activating or, to use Benjaminian terminology, actualizing the abstract, which 
is to say empty, concept of justice that he takes over from Marx.  
A central problem of historical materialism that ought to be seen in the end: Must 
the Marxist understanding of history necessarily be acquired at the expense of the 
perceptibility of history?  Or: In what way is it possible to conjoin a heightened 
graphicness [Anschaulichkeit] to the realization of Marxist method?  The first 
stage in this understanding will be to carry over the principle of montage into 
history.  That is, to assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and 
most precisely cut components.  Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small 
individual moments the crystal of the total event.
133
 
In this conviction that the graphicness of history is paramount to the project of 
emancipation abides Benjamin’s deep kinship with Freud.  The impetus to render the past 
legible and hence to particularize historical failure in the mosaic form of the Arcades is a 
function of the insight that, while nothing less than the demand for absolute justice is 
adequate to the preservation or actual achievement of a life lived in freedom, equality, 
and solidarity with others, such a project requires content. The systemic injustice of class 
society must not simply be known speculatively; if overcoming it is to become the basis 
for social practice in the present, it must be felt as an injustice, visible in and at the level 
of everyday life.  Benjamin’s methodological innovation, which he refers to in the 
foregoing passage as that of “montage,” linking himself to Freud, is meant to address this 
problem of how to make the concept of “classless society” concrete and hence to render it 
an imperative in and for the present. 
So we reach our first conclusion: Benjamin, whose vision exceeds the Freudian 
focus upon the bourgeois interior to take in the character of objective social structures 
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and yet is fine-grained enough to retain, against the logical structure of development 
emphasized by Marx, the physiognomic details constitutive of culture, is able to push 
past the Freudian prohibition on imagining justice and offer not a theory of the neurosis 
endemic to civilization per se, but that specific to democratic, secular modernity, a 
specificity without which there can be no genuine diagnosis and hence no possibility of a 
therapeutic address of culture.  Benjamin generates a political “psychoanalysis” in 
securing, through the Marxist critique of capital, an orientation towards justice 
understood as classless society.  The reading that I will offer of Benjamin’s unique 
contribution to democratic theory could be put thus: it is not that the Marxist 
understanding of liberation from capitalist modernity requires enrichment through a 
Freudian sensitivity to the robust and multifarious nature of desire, but rather that, if the 
psychoanalytic hermeneutics and its mythic reconstruction of modernity is to gain 
normative grip, it requires a supplement in the form of a Marxist pre-occupation with the 
oppressive structures of capitalist modernity.  Hence the accomplishment of this chapter 
needs to be three-fold: (1) to approach Benjamin as himself a systematic thinker in a 
redemptive vein; (2) to offer a viable form of Freudo-Marxism; (3) to forward the aim of 
this dissertation to offer a model of democratic solidarity that is consonant with the 
essentially paradoxical nature of democratic community. 
 
The State of Emergency 
It may be considered one of the methodological objectives of this work [The Arcades 
Project] to demonstrate a historical materialism which has annihilated within itself the 
idea of progress.  Just here, historical materialism has every reason to distinguish itself 
sharply from bourgeois habits of thought.  Its founding concept is not progress but 
actualization.
134
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Having provided this preliminary sketch of Benjamin’s diagnosis of the pathology that 
has overtaken post-absolutist social space, I now turn to elaborate the theoretical basis 
upon which Benjamin undertakes his treatment of the dreaming collective, the “technique 
of awakening” expressed in the foregoing quotation as the “actualization” which “ignites 
the explosive materials that are latent in what has been.”135  If the ideal of “classless 
society” is to make a claim on us in the present, it must be rendered concrete.  Given that 
the material of its embodiment is that which descends to us from out of the past and this 
material represents but the crystallized remains of a history of violence, the problem that 
we confront is how to inherit and transmit a tradition tainted by barbarism such that it 
serves the purposes of overcoming injustice in the present.  It is thus a theory of history 
that underlies Benjamin’s interpretive practice.  This theory achieves its most mature 
articulation in “On the Concept of History,” a critique of historicism, enlightenment 
teleology, and Western Marxism in one.  While each thesis monadologically encapsulates 
the meaning of the essay as a whole, Thesis VII, in particular, provides a clear picture of 
the central problematic of Benjamin’s philosophy of history: 
Addressing himself to the historian who wishes to relive an era, Fustel de 
Coulanges recommends that he blot out everything he knows about the later 
course of history.  There is no better way of characterizing the method which 
historical materialism has broken with.  It is a process of empathy. Its origin is the 
indolence of the heart, the acedia, which despairs of appropriating the genuine 
historical image as it briefly flashes up.  Among medieval theologians, acedia was 
regarded as the root cause of sadness.  Flaubert, who was familiar with it, wrote: 
“Peu de gens devineront combien il a fallu être triste pour ressusciter Carthage.”  
The nature of this sadness becomes clearer if we ask: with whom does historicism 
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actually sympathize?  The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all rulers are 
the heirs of prior conquerors.  Hence, empathizing with the victor invariably 
benefits the current rulers.  The historical materialist knows what this means.  
Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal 
procession in which current rulers step over those who are lying prostrate.  
According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession. 
They are called “cultural treasures,” and a historical materialist views them with 
cautious detachment.  For in every case these treasures have a lineage which he 
cannot contemplate without horror.  They owe their existence not only to the 
efforts of the great geniuses who created them, but also to the anonymous toil of 
others who lived in the same period.  There is no document of culture which is not 
at the same time a document of barbarism.  And just as such a document is never 
free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was transmitted from 
one hand to another.  The historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from 
this process of transmission as far as possible.  He regards it as his task to brush 
history against the grain.
136
 
Historicism is guilty of the naïve presumption that one can simply shed their historically 
determined vantage point to enter into the spirit of an earlier age.  But as there is no 
unmediated access to the world, past or present, the seeming receptivity of historicism 
accomplishes but the unreflective imposition of its concepts on the matter of history.  
Denying the situatedness of its own perspective, the historicist method unwittingly yields 
the past as the inchoate form of the present.  “Historicism rightly culminates in universal 
history”137 in which the unruly and heterogeneous material of the past is gathered under 
the concept of progress, i.e., taken up from the allegedly higher vantage point of the 
present.  While enlightenment teleology renders explicit what remains latent in the 
medieval approach, it is, to Benjamin’s eyes, no less pernicious.  In totalizing the material 
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of the past as the narrative reconstruction of the condition of possibility of this present, 
teleological history exists as an apologia, confirming the rights of the status quo and 
excusing historical injustice.  With this promotion of the present as the apogee of 
civilization thus far, the teleological perspective justifies the sufferings of the past as 
necessary casualties in the educative process of humankind’s self-realization and further 
suggests that any inequality that persists in this moment is an unfortunate but inescapable 
necessity for an even better future.  Such forgiveness of past barbarism through its 
instrumentalization is a form of complicity.  Furthermore, in taking up the past from the 
self-vindicating perspective of the present, that which does not cohere with the logical 
structure of development is dismissed as a meaningless aberration, senseless “natural” 
suffering.  The imposition of teleological order upon the matter of the past extrudes from 
the field of history precisely that element that could contest the dominant powers of the 
present, dismissing that which fails to cohere with the logical structure of development.  
What results is the doubling of the occlusion of the already anonymous victims of 
history. 
If the thesis of rational progress is one in which Freud momentarily indulged but 
which remains, nonetheless, anathematic to psychoanalytic thinking, it appears to play a 
constitutive role for Marx.  Or, it does so, at least, for a certain Marx, as his social 
ontology contains a perspective alternative to that of the progressivist one.  This tension 
in Marx’s philosophy of history is from whence the strange situation that his inheritors 
include those such as Habermas, who maintains a deep commitment to the idea of social 
evolution, and, at the same time, by those such as Adorno and Benjamin, who reject such 
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enlightenment progressivism as part of the bourgeois ideological formation.
138
  This 
doubling of the Marxist identity is an issue to which we will have to return, but which, 
for now, I bracket to elaborate the predominant character of the Marxist philosophy of 
history against which Benjamin develops his own critical hermeneutics.  As Matthias 
Fritsch has argued in his book, The Promise of Memory: History and Politics in Marx, 
Benjamin, and Derrida, Marx’s philosophy of history, as it is articulated in “The 
Eighteenth Brumaire,” conforms to the basic teleology schema.1  While, for Marx, the 
struggle against and the perpetual reinstitution of oppressive political structures 
determines the movement of history, this movement is essentially progressive.  That said: 
the history of class struggles appears as a history of progress only retrospectively in and 
through its fulfillment in the communist revolution.  As in the Hegelian philosophy of 
history, it is solely from the vantage-point of its completion that the slaughter-bench of 
history and its piecemeal content receives the rational form of a narrative drama of the 
self-creation of humankind.  Hence the claim that, in the concept of classless society, 
Marx secularized messianism.   
As Fritsch aruges, while Marx, still operating under the ban on prophecy, 
provides no content to the notion of classless society, he does stipulate one essential 
condition: that of an active forgetting.
 
 It would be false to assert that Marx is himself 
forgetful of the history of violence by which capitalism came about.  In the midst of the 
economic analysis of Capital, “The Working Day” arises as a massive monument upon 
which is etched a chronicle of suffering.  Marx inscribes, in these pages, case after case 
of archival research attesting to the atrocities of industrialization and undertaking the 
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impossible memorialization of the anonymous and so ungrievable laborers whose toil 
made possible the plentitude of the present.  Yet, in treating the proletarian revolution as 
the culmination of the historical dialectic, Marx vindicates this history of suffering 
inasmuch as it is treated as part of the necessary educative process by which humankind 
reached the level of historical consciousness and technological development necessary 
for the establishment of a just social order.  The past is ultimately to be left behind and 
revolutionary action depends upon an active form of forgetting in which the materials of 
the past are superseded in their incorporation into present consciousness.  In an ironical 
appropriation of the biblical adage, Marx claims that the communist revolution will only 
be so in severing itself from the “dead”—or the de-authorized—spiritual—or spectral—
authority of the past.  Revolutionary action is intrinsically future-directed even if this 
future by which it gains its orientation is held in suspension on the horizon as empty time.  
Hence, like Kant and Hegel before him, Marx instrumentalizes the sufferings of the past 
as unavoidable casualties of progressive history.  
If, for this Marxism, the proletarian revolution accomplishes the business of the 
past and so settles its accounts, the dead left to bury the dead, for Benjamin, conversely, 
there can be no justice in a present that ceases to mourn the violence of history.  The debt 
that we owe to the anonymous others of history is one that cannot be repaid in full and so 
our accounts with and for the past do not admit of satisfaction.  For Benjamin, our debt to 
the dead is one of remembrance and in such consists the “weak messianic power…on 
which the past has a claim.  Such a claim cannot be settled cheaply”139 for what it 
requires is the withdrawal of our investment in the future; the sacrifice of our faith in 
progress and so the hopefulness intrinsic to a future-oriented life.  This is the “high price 
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that our thinking has to pay.”140  For non-absolutist social space, there is no basis for 
community save in the memory of oppression: solidarity can only be had with and 
through the dead and so the past can never be lain to rest.  Where, for idealist ethics, an 
ethical position in the present cannot be obtained without faith in progress, Benjamin, in a 
reversal of this position, argues that such faith is tantamount to an invidious forgetfulness 
in which we willfully render ourselves deaf to the plaints of the past, left unable to 
undertake the burden of injustice that is our inheritance.  “It is only for the sake of the 
hopeless ones that we have been given hope.”141  In this light, Benjamin issues an ethico-
political imperative, charging the present with the task of redeeming the sufferings of 
history.   
History is not simply a science but also and not least a form of 
remembrance.  What science has ‘determined,’ remembrance can modify.  Such 
mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and 
the complete (suffering) into something incomplete.  That is theology; but in 
remembrance we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as 
fundamentally atheological, little as it may be granted us to try to write it with 
immediately theological concepts.
142
 
In this way, Benjamin attempts to restore a “genuinely messianic face…to the concept of 
classless society.”143  Yet it is expressions such as these that contribute to the general aura 
of mystification and hushed cultishness in which Benjamin’s corpus and the scholarly 
meditations upon it remain submerged.
144
  Even perspicuous readers of Benjamin such as 
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Pensky insist on a literal reading of Benjamin’s epigrammatic 1st Thesis in which he 
images a philosophic device in which the dwarf of theology secretly guides the puppet of 
historical materialism.
145
  Such literalism has lead readers, Habermas perhaps foremost 
amongst them to interpret Benjamin’s philosophy as staked on the synthesis of the 
opposed doctrines of messianism and Marxism, a project that could not but fail.
146
  Such 
readings are insufficiently attuned to Benjamin’s allegorical mode of expression as well 
as to the tension native to Marx’s philosophy of history and from whence its critical 
potential.  This practice of actualization by which the sufferings of history come to 
propose themselves as incomplete, as still on-going hence still in need of redress, can and 
should be de-theologized (although perhaps it does not, for that, amount to a method in 
the scientist sense of the term).  It is in this de-theologization of Benjamin’s weak 
messianism that there opens up an alternative Marxist legacy and the one which 
converges with Freud’s practice of redemptive reading.  
While much Marxism secularizes eschatology though the ideal of classless 
society, in placing this utopia as the culmination of an ineluctable natural-historical 
process, it assigns to history a task that rightly devolves upon a politics of memory.  
According to Benjamin, revolution should not be conceived as the outcome and 
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consummation of a process of development, but rather as the breaking open of the 
continuity of homogeneous time.  A genuinely revolutionary moment would not amount 
to a contribution to or a completion of the progressive succession of historical epochs; it 
would consist in the interruption and dispersion of its triumphal procession.  “Marx says 
that the revolutions are the locomotive of world history.  But perhaps it is quite 
otherwise.  Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on this train—namely, 
the human race—to activate the emergency brake.”147 The criticality of Benjamin’s 
historiography is garnered in and through approaching the field of history as a scene not 
of ineluctable progress but of the catastrophic repetition of the failure of the revolution.  
Benjamin’s weak messianic remembrance does not totalize and render whole; it aims 
instead to divest the past—and hence the present—of the coherence that reason, 
comprised of the “concepts of the ruling class,” retrospectively imposes upon it, 
shattering the false unity of the text of victor history so that we might remember elsewise: 
The course of history, seen in terms of the concept of catastrophe, can actually 
claim no more attention from thinkers than a child’s kaleidoscope, which with 
every turn of the hand dissolves the established order into a new array.  There is 
profound truth in this image.  The concepts of the ruling class have always been 
the mirrors that enabled an image of “order” to prevail.—The kaleidoscope must 
be smashed.
148
 
Reason functions here, as in Freud’s theory of secondary revision, not as a critical agency 
but as a force of censorship that imposes order upon material intrinsically disparate, 
fragmented, at odds with itself, thereby silencing or repressing that which exists in 
conflict with present authority.  Both Benjamin and Freud, in the face of unforgivable 
suffering, cannot confirm the present as the unavoidable outcome of a self-developing 
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entelechy.  They argue instead that what appears from the hegemonic self-understanding 
of the present as a linear process of growth and self-transformation, is, in reality, a series 
of catastrophes.  History abandoned by eschatology and religious guarantee has proven 
itself to be but the compulsive repetition of the ever self-same—not the space of the 
achievement of human aspirations but rather the site of their perpetual denial. 
 This is the fundamental methodological insight hence the characteristic definitive 
of redemptive criticism.  It is only from taking up history as catastrophe, which is to say 
from the perspective of the element that but suffers history’s weight, that critical traction 
within the present can be gained.  The hermeneutics of Freud and Benjamin (and, as we 
shall see, of Cavell, as well) arise in and through the attunement to that which, from the 
dominant perspective appears as senseless and hence that which, in its becoming legible, 
has the power to disorder the foreclosed field of experience.  That which cannot be 
incorporated into the logic of development remains as a crack within the totalized field of 
history in which the historical materialist can gain a foothold in the otherwise 
impenetrable terrain of ideology.  It is from this marginal and precarious position that the 
materialist critic is able to brush history against the grain, standing simultaneously in and 
against her own time.  
 In this vision of history in which the unrealized futures of the past jut into and 
disrupt the self-evidence of the present, there is an essential homology between the 
philosophies of history held by Benjamin and Freud, which, in turn, engenders their 
shared methodology.  In the last chapter, I was able to elicit Freud’s philosophy of history 
through the discussion of the family romance and its disclosure of the archaic-utopian 
character of desire.  Desire unsatisfied gives rise to fantasy, which, in turn, exists as a 
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secret record of unfulfillment.  Benjamin, however, provides the context in which this 
insight can be generalized in and as a principle of historical understanding.  As I see it, 
the philosophy of history that Freud posited at the ontogenetic level, for which the 
concept of Nachträglichkeit (deferred understanding) is determinative, and which served 
as the basis for his critical hermeneutics, is rearticulated by Benjamin, given application 
to the collective, in and as Vergegenwärtigung, meaning literally “to make present” and 
translated as “actualization.”  The concepts of deferred action and actualization condense 
philosophies of history in which the present and the past are not self-enclosed, isolated 
moments within the continuum of empty time, but rather are locked in material struggle 
with one another, dialectically co-determinative.  “Every present day is determined by the 
images that are synchronic with it: each ‘now’ is the now of a particular 
recognizability.”149  The past is not safely behind us.  Rather “the facts are something that 
just happened to us; to establish them is the affair of memory.”150  While the text of 
history has ideological authorship, this narrative construction of the past as a teleologic 
process aimed at the provision of our historical now, carries within itself its constitutive 
outside, i.e., the “toil of anonymous others” whose obscurity is the very condition of the 
present order of representation, politically and symbolically, and which the historical 
materialist aims to redeem. 
    “Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it ‘the way it really 
was.’  It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger.”151  For 
Benjamin and Freud, what of the past rightly exercises authority over the present accedes 
to legibility not when the present is shoring up its identity—as in Kant’s idea of universal 
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history—but rather in the crisis in which political and symbolic forces heterogeneous to 
the prevailing powers emerge.   This is what Benjamin calls “the state of emergency:” 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which 
we live is not the exception but the rule.  We must attain to a conception of 
history that accords with this insight.  Then we will clearly see that it is our task to 
bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the 
struggle against fascism.  One reason fascism has a chance is that, in the name of 
progress, its opponents treat it as a historical norm.—The current amazement that 
the things we are experiencing are “still” possible in the twentieth century is not 
philosophical.  This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge—unless it is 
knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.
152
 
In this ironic appropriation of Carl Schmitt, Benjamin argues that the critical moment is 
that in which the status quo of history itself threatens to be preserved.  For as the 
principle of history and of historical order is domination, the barbarism that is fascism is 
not out of synch with the present in which it appears, but is simply the latest instantiation 
of the tradition of oppression that is humankind’s patrimony.  The materialist critic 
attunes herself to those moments of emergency in which the present fails to coincide with 
itself not so that the conflict can be resolved and the self-identity of the text or history re-
established (as in, say, Gadamerian hermeneutics), but so that crisis can be preserved and 
intensified into paradox, rupturing the easy self-evidence of common understanding.  
“Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well.  Where 
thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that 
constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad.  The historical 
materialist approaches a historical object only where it confronts him as a monad.  In this 
structure he recognizes the sign of a messianic arrest of happening, or (to put it 
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differently) a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past.”153  In the 
disruption of the identity of the present, there is gained a glimpse of an alternative order.  
The legibility of these heterogeneous, revolutionary elements that emerge in the present 
depends upon their coming into connection with images of the oppressed past: the prior 
moments of crisis in which the revolution was upon us but was nonetheless betrayed.  
Just as Benjamin defines the dialectical image through which the truth of history is 
visible “as the involuntary memory of redeemed humanity,”154 Freud describes the 
nachträglich temporal structure of historical understanding in the Wolf Man case study: 
At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable 
to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when 
the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, 
during the analysis, is he able to grasp with his conscious mental process what 
was going on in him.  The patient justifiably disregards the three periods of time, 
and puts his present ego into the situation which is so long past.
155
 
“No state of affairs having causal significance is for that very reason historical.  It 
becomes historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from 
it by thousands of years.  The historian who proceeds from this consideration ceases to 
tell the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary.  He grasps the constellation into 
which his own era has entered, along with a very specific earlier one.”156  That which 
was, at the time of its occasion, illegible falls outside the domain of history; yet, as the 
absence through which conscious history erects itself—unincorporated precisely for the 
sake of unified experience—it is integral to this history.  In this orientation to the pre- or 
a-historic, Freud and Benjamin coincide, for, while non-narratable, it persists nonetheless 
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as a memory-trace, latent in the present.  “Nothing that has ever happened should be 
regarded as lost to history.”157  It is paramount to the materialist critic to “overcome the 
error of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signifie(s) a destruction of the 
memory-trace…in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that 
everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, 
regression goes back far enough) it can once more be brought to light.”158   In the 
repetitive structure of history, a repetition to which we are doomed by our very failure to 
‘react adequately,” the repressed past will find its reoccurrence and activation within the 
present moment of emergency.  What is emergent in this moment is the “memoire 
involuntaire” of the dialectical image. 
It is only in its activation of the threat of the repetition of catastrophe, i.e., the 
failure to achieve revolutionary fulfillment, that the past becomes traumatic—or, as 
Benjamin says, causal.  This is the retrospective origination of the repressed, an insight 
essential to psychoanalysis but perhaps the point upon which it is most often 
misunderstood.  The repressed is not a pre-existent positivity that emerges once the veil 
of amnesia has been ripped off; the “tradition of the oppressed” has no content that could 
subsequently be integrated into the text of victor history.  But what then precisely is 
redeemed?  It is but the knowledge of the on-going failure to achieve fulfillment; that our 
past has not been overcome; that what we take as progress is but the repeated failure of 
desire; that we have not yet entered history.  “The dialectical image is an image that 
flashes up…The redemption enacted in this way and, solely in this way, is won only 
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against the perception of what is being irredeemably lost.”159  In the dialectical image, 
fulfillment shows itself only under the sign of its negation just as, for Freud, infantile 
desires, as prehistoric, do not admit of direct representation, but interlay themselves in the 
matrices of the dream-work, causing its fragmented, mosaic structure.  In a highly 
eroticized passage from the N convolute, reprised as well in “On the Concept of History,” 
Benjamin offers what stands, for me, as an emblematic expression of the dialectical 
image: 
It is one of the most noteworthy peculiarities of the human heart…that so much 
selfishness in individuals coexists with the general lack of envy which every 
present day feels towards its future.”  This lack of envy indicates that the idea we 
have of happiness is deeply colored by the time in which we live.  Happiness for 
us is thinkable only in the air that we have breathed, among the people who have 
lived with us.  In other words, there vibrates in the idea of happiness (this is what 
that noteworthy circumstance teaches us) the idea of salvation.  This happiness is 
founded on the very despair and desolation which were ours.  Our life, it can be 
said, is a muscle strong enough to contract the whole of historical time.  Or, to put 
it differently, the genuine conception of historical time rests upon the image of 
redemption.
160
 
Happiness receives its (imaginary) form only in and through the experience of loss; it 
thus has an intrinsically retrograde “orientation,” gaining its embodiment through its very 
failure to obtain.  Desire calls us back to the mournful scene of the betrayed past even as 
it strives for the correction of this past in and through its very reproduction.  The 
Benjaminian image of happiness, as in Freud’s family romance, is eminently dialectical 
in character; in the determinate negation of past denial, there is indicated the non-space of 
the edenic whose impossible restoration drives life forward.  The past is both an object of 
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condemnation and from whence issues the promise of fulfillment, the oppressed past 
demanding the redemption by which it could be made whole.  This on-going human 
failure to realize justice is itself the melancholy truth of history and this mournful 
knowledge is the basis of Benjaminian solidarity: from whence “the strength to shake off 
the burden [of the cultural treasure accumulating on the back of humanity] so as to take 
control of it.”161 
 
Naturgeschichte and the Allegorical Intention 
Allegorical intention is, as natural history, as the earliest history of signifying or 
intention, dialectical in character.
162
 
 
For Benjamin, the realization of a just relation between the present and the past and, by 
implication, the relevance of the Marxist tradition in and for his own era, occurs in and is 
determined by—and itself dialectically determines—the present “critical moment” in 
which the “status quo threatens to be preserved.”163  The appropriation of the material of 
the past is properly undertaken only in relation to and for the sake of overcoming that 
which imperils justice in the present.  In the “Copernican revolution in historical 
perception” performatively undertaken in Benjamin’s work, the past is not a “fixed point” 
over which the present “concentrates the forces of knowledge.”164  “Politics attains 
primacy over history”165  in that the truth of history is not something static and eternally 
assured.  Rather, the truth of history is inextricably bound up with the perilous critical 
                                                        
161
 SW3: “Edward Fuchs,” 268. 
162
 OGT, 166. 
163
 “Definitions of basic historical concepts: Catastrophe—to have missed the opportunity.  Critical 
moment—the status quo threatens to be preserved.  Progress—the first revolutionary measure taken,” (AP, 
474; N10, 2). 
164
 Ibid, 389; K1, 2. 
165
 Ibid, 389; K1, 2. 
 132 
moment in which it is read.  While Benjamin inherits the Marxist problem of the 
formation of political agency in and against the totalizing context of capital, he 
nonetheless roots solidarity, the commitment to the discovery of what, in practice, 
emancipatory politics might mean and require, in the development of a critical practice of 
remembrance.   
 I accordingly take myself to have fulfilled the first of my three aims: to 
demonstrate that Benjamin is a thinker in a redemptive vein.  Benjamin has a normative 
theory of modernity and this theory dictates his approach to the past as a whole.  Having 
contextualized and motivated Benjamin’s departure from canonical Marxism, I will now 
proceed to show that Benjamin’s philosophy of history is not antinomic to Marxism, but 
rather represents the realization of an alternative Marxist legacy and one which is in 
essential consonance with Freudian analysis.  Latent within Marx’s social ontology, as it 
is articulated in “The Labour Process,” chapter 7 of Capital, as well as The German 
Ideology, is a philosophy of history radically opposed to the progressivist view that Marx, 
at times, also endorsed.  Those readers of Benjamin that interpret the first thesis literally 
and hence view the gambit of Benjamin’s philosophy as abiding in the synthesis between 
the two opposed doctrines of messianism and Marxism, are insufficiently attuned to 
Benjamin’s allegorical mode of expression as well as insensitive to the tension that 
defines Marx’s own conception of natural-history.  It is from out of this under-developed 
dimension of Marxist theory that arises Benjamin’s practice of montage, citationality, and 
allegoresis: the techniques by which he handles the material past such that the dialectical 
image is actualized within its field.  The allegorical concept of Naturgeschichte, in which 
the opposing concepts of nature and history are treated in their dialectical co-constitution, 
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has, as its deepest implication, the “eddy in the stream of becoming,”166 that, for 
Benjamin is the proper understanding of origin (Ursprung), a phenomenon that we have 
just examined through the grammar of “On the Concept of History” and under its 
Arcades Project title of “actualization.” 
My concern here is not to adjudicate between differing interpretations of Marx, 
but rather to establish a “mono-Benjaminianism” by means of the demonstration that, in 
the modern world as framed by Marx, Benjamin found a natural object for the materialist 
hermeneutics that he had already developed in his early examination of Baroque allegory.  
Establishing this affinity between the Marxist assessment of historical experience under 
capital and what Benjamin discovered in the German Baroque will, at the same time, 
show from whence the possibility of a marriage, not of mysticism and a late-won 
Brechtian political consciousness,
167
 but rather between the redemptive criticism of Freud 
and the normative sociology of Marx thus allowing me to fulfill the second of my 
promissory notes. 
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Part I: Naturgeschichte in Marx, Lukács, and Benjamin 
Marx’s social ontology offers a philosophy of history not just alternative to but 
radically opposed to the progressivism of eschatological Marxism.  This argument 
internal to Marx’s own thinking fully emerges in the intensification of the already 
dialectical relation at play in his concept of Naturgeschichte.  Fundamental to Marx’s 
philosophy was a dispute with the undialectial binarism by which the tradition handled 
the categories of the natural and the social, categories integral to the identity of modern 
philosophy and as well as to modern institutions.  Against this binary framing, Marx 
erected his own social ontology in which labor, at the same time thoroughly natural and 
thoroughly social, was the central structuring concept. 
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature.  He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature.  He 
sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, 
head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted 
to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and 
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.  He 
develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its 
forces to his own sovereign power…A spider conducts operations which resemble 
those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the 
construction of its honeycomb cells.  But what distinguishes the worst architect 
from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he 
constructs it in wax.  At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which 
had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally.  Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also 
realizes his own purposes in those materials.
168
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For Marx, the social is but nature that exists in excess of itself, this surplus taking the 
form of human intentionality.  Driven by need and able to represent the means of its 
fulfillment, the human being purposefully sets to work upon the world.  Labor or 
“productive consumption” is undertaken so as to produce, from out of the “raw” material 
at hand, new materials suited to the needs of a specific historical moment.  In this needy 
laboring in the present, the human being alters the conditions under which her future 
labor will take place.  In the re-fashioning of outer nature, the human being effectuates a 
transformation in her own nature.  This is because, while external nature appears as the 
passive basis of human labor, it nonetheless conditions human activity.  Thus, in self-
consciously transforming the outer environment and establishing new conditions, the 
human being also changes the means by which her need can and will be satisfied.  For 
Marx (as for Freud), the alteration of the aims and objects of need is tantamount to the 
transformation of our own inner nature insofar as it alters the way in which we perceive 
and represent our needs hence our fundamental character.  The experience of need is 
bound up with the representation of the means of its gratification and so is determined by 
the specifics of the world in we find ourselves and the instruments that we have at our 
disposal.  It could be said that, inasmuch as the transformations of outer nature are 
dialectically bound up with changes in inner nature, the human being and her world grow 
up together.  Therefore, need—that which, as the “most natural,” would seem to be the 
most intransigent, the most unresponsive, hence non-negotiable aspect of human 
existence—sets into motion this dialectic of enrichment, serving as the source of its own 
transformation.  As Cavell remarks, a remark which evidences the materialist dimension 
of Cavell’s thinking and which we will re-visit in some detail in the upcoming chapter, “it 
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should not be surprising that what is necessary is contingent upon something.  
Necessaries are means.”169 
Nature, the ever selfsame, is not strictly opposed to the historical, but rather, in 
the form of its human surplus, opens the dimension of history which betokens the 
intentional transformation of social conditions.  Furthermore, outer nature, as the material 
upon which the human being sets to work, is itself saturated with the labor of past 
generations.
170
  History qua human labor merges into the setting.
171
  The past is yet 
present in and as the naturo-historical landscape of the everyday, and, in setting to work 
upon this terrain, human labor activates the past at the same time as it molds its future.  
At the site of present labor, the past and the future are wedded together. 
This alchemy of the labor process by which nature is transformed into history and 
history is crystallized in and as nature is from whence Marx’s formulation of the 
commodity as “dead labor,” commodity fetishism the concealment of the social processes 
by which commodities are produced.  Under capitalism, the network of activity in which 
individuals are embedded and through which commodities are produced is obscured and, 
accordingly, value takes on the illusory appearance of being a natural attribute.  
Moreover, the socio-economic system, which is nothing more than the effect of our own 
collective effort, appears as an independent natural reality over which we have no 
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control.  Marx thus likens, in The German Ideology, consciousness under the material 
conditions established by capitalism to the “animal consciousness” of pre-scientific man.  
In this discussion of “animal consciousness,” the natural has an entirely negative 
character, defined as the other of reason, and, as that which remains incomprehensible, it 
exists beyond human control as a fearsome and fatal force.  Unable to gain rational 
mastery over elemental forces, animal consciousness instead “masters” natural 
phenomenon through the work of the imagination.  Through myth and fetish, the human 
finds a means by which to relate to this otherwise indifferent and terrifying force.  For 
ideological consciousness, on the other hand, that which is a piece of history—socially 
produced—comes to appear as a non-negotiable fact of nature to which we can merely 
submit.  While fully historical, the products of our own labor are, like a piece of nature, 
non-narratable: simply given.  In our ignorance of the history of labor by which the stuff 
of our world is produced, we come to be oppressed by the objects and economic system 
that we ourselves have created.  Hence Marx claims that, at the very apogee of 
enlightenment, there occurs the ferocious resurgence of myth.   
It is in the work of Lukács, in particular his concept of “second nature” that serves 
as the basis of what he comes to articulate as reification, that this Marxist insight into the 
tendency of history to become as if nature receives more direct thematization.  “Second 
nature” names the ossification of history whereby it becomes the pre-reflective, “natural” 
attitude in and at the level of daily life.  It names social establishments the origins and 
history of which have been forgotten and which, consequently, appear as and accordingly 
exercise all the authority of what is by nature.  For Lukács, under capitalist conditions of 
production, the space of history has become one of fateful repetition; it has passed 
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entirely into the sphere of nature in the negative sense that Marx articulated in The 
German Ideology.  In the occlusion of the history by which our current practices have 
come about hence represent the solidification of human interest and effort over time, 
these practices take on the false appearance of pregiven reality: self-standing, self-
evident, and non-negotiable.  Unable to see the historical origins of the conventions 
constitutive of our culture, they exercise an absolute but meaningless authority over us 
and we submit to them as to fate.  These structures “form the world of convention...it is a 
world that does not offer itself either as meaning to the aim-seeking subject or as matter, 
in sensuous immediacy, to the active subject.  It is a second nature, and, like nature (first 
nature), it is determinable only as the embodiment of recognized but senseless necessities 
and therefore it is incomprehensible, unknowable in its real substance.”172  As Lukács 
saw it, under capitalism, humankind was fated to such forgetfulness hence the social 
world became but petrified history, “a charnel house of rotted interiorities.”173  
In this concept of second nature, Lukács succeeds in articulating a dialectical 
concept of history.  History, in its proper human sense, nominates the intentional 
transformation of naturo-social conditions for the sake of better life.  In its negative 
sense, history names the unthinking reproduction of the social world; history stagnates in 
and as nature—a force of unfreedom and domination.  However, while Lukács furthers 
this dialectical conception of history, the criticality of this concept is undone in his 
rendering of (first) nature as wholly negative in character, a set of “senseless 
necessities…incomprehensible, unknowable.”  For Lukács, nature stands as the other of 
human reason and freedom, hence that the mastery of which is the progressive task of 
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history.  Lukács, in treating nature undialectically as opposed to the human, weds himself 
to precisely the idealist teleology and instrumentalism that Benjamin discovers at the 
heart of capitalist ideology.  What Lukács fails to see is that the will to the domination of 
nature is itself a form of barbarism and that the instrumental exploitation of the natural 
world is grounded in the same logic that justifies and undertakes the exploitation of men.  
The Lukácsian glorification of instrumental reason amounts to the unwitting vindication 
of precisely the social domination the overcoming of which provides the ethical 
orientation of his philosophizing.  As Benjamin writes: 
The savoir of modern times is called work.  The…perfecting…of the labor 
process constitutes the wealth which can now do what no redeemer has ever been 
able to accomplish.”  This vulgar-Marxist conception of the nature of 
labor...recognizes only the progress of mastering nature, not the retrogression of 
society; it already displays the technocratic features that later emerge in fascism.  
Among these is a conception of nature which differs ominously from the one 
advocated by socialist utopias prior to the Revolution of 1848.  The new 
conception of labor is tantamount to the exploitation of nature, which, with naïve 
complacency, is contrasted with the exploitation of the proletariat.
174
 
  While Benjamin is not referring here specifically to Lukács, the criticism holds.  A 
properly critical theory is one that maintains nature and history in their dialectical 
tension.  In its negative aspect, nature designates that which is the ever selfsame; 
unchanging and beyond human control.  It is a fatal force to which we are subjected both 
in the form of external nature and the suffering of our own mortal vulnerability.  
However, nature names, as well, the individual, existent being—the desiring body—and 
that primal element of the world—that kernel of the human and the non—which both 
grounds and resists full incorporation by the social totality.  It is this nature—the material 
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in which history violently instantiates itself—that provides the ethical orientation of the 
materialist and libidinal critic.  For, as the source of suffering, it is the source of pleasure 
and happiness as well.  Furthermore, insofar as it belies reason and, in its intransigence, 
undercuts history, it stands as the site from which there continues to issue the hope for an 
order beyond domination.  Nature indeed names our fatedness to repetition, hence is a 
source of despair, but it stands simultaneously as the source of hope: in the repetition of 
catastrophe, there abides the possibility of the redemption of the failed matter of history.  
It is from out of this very archaic, “natural” cycle that a genuinely new moment might 
emerge. 
To develop a properly critical theory, Benjamin thus had to move beyond Lukács 
and, as Adorno argues in his 1932 lecture, “The Idea of Natural History,” Benjamin had, 
prior to his Marxist-turn, found the resource by which such a move could be made.  In his 
early study of the Trauerspiel, Benjamin had already articulated a dialectical conception 
of nature as itself historical, providing, albeit unawares, the Marxist-Lukácsian insight 
into second nature with its dialectical counterpart.
175
   
In his 1925 rejected Habilitationsschrift on mourning plays, Benjamin described 
German Baroque allegory as rooted in “natural history,” employing the same term that 
Marx had used in his social ontology.  In this early encounter with the Baroque, 
Benjamin’s materialist tendencies are already clearly in outline.  The Trauerspiel had 
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been dismissed by Benjamin’s forerunners and contemporaries as but a failed renaissance 
of the Greek tragic form; allegory itself discounted as a debased and arbitrary aesthetic.  
Benjamin, however, maintained that the German play of lamentation could not be 
adequately assessed from a purely aesthetic perspective, but rather required a historico-
philosophic explanation.  Benjamin, in his materialist treatment of Baroque allegory as 
the literary expression of the material conditions of its time, redeemed this repudiated 
aesthetic, showing that the characteristic “deformation” of the genre was an index of its 
historical truth.  On Benjamin’s analysis, the dramatic structure and the allegorical mode 
of expression constituitive of the form was not arbitrarily chosen but rather necessitated 
in and by the theologico-political crises of the 17
th
 century.  Having stood witness to the 
Thirty Year War, the Baroque allegorists could no longer maintain an eschatological 
view of history.  The impermanence and instability of the civil order disclosed the 
essence of human history to be nothing more than endless catastrophe—the continual re-
enactment of the same political failures.  Yet, while “the Baroque (knew) no 
eschatology,”176 the allegorists remained thoroughly entrenched in a theological context.  
History no longer appeared as a road to salvation, but it was still regarded as created, i.e., 
divinely ordained.  History was thus reduced to the status of profane nature, viewed as 
fatedness to ruination and death.  As Benjamin writes, “fate is not a purely natural 
occurrence—any more than it is purely historical.  Fate, whatever guise it may wear in a 
pagan or mythological context, is meaningful only as a category of natural history in the 
spirit of the restoration theology of the Counter-Reformation.  It is the elemental force of 
nature in historical events, which are not themselves entirely nature, because the light of 
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grace is still reflected from the state of creation.  But it is mirrored in the swamp of 
Adam’s guilt.”177   
It was this natural history that was the subject of the German Mourning play.  
“The events of history shrivel up and become absorbed in the setting”178 just as, in 
Lukács, the unthinking repetition of social practices results in their sedimentation in and 
as a form of second nature.  History appears, in the Baroque plays, in the form of a 
…petrified, primordial landscape.  Everything about history that, form the very 
beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful is expressed in a face—or 
rather a death’s head…This is the form in which man’s subjection to nature is 
most obvious and it significantly gives rise not only to the enigmatic question of 
the nature of human existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of 
the individual.  This is the heart of the allegorical way of seeing, of the baroque, 
secular explanation of history as the Passion of the world.  The greater the 
significance, the greater the subjection to the power of death, because death digs 
most deeply the jagged line of demarcation between physical nature and 
significance.  But if nature has always been subject to the power of death, it is true 
that it has always been allegorical.  Significance and death both come to fruition 
in historical development, just as they are closely linked as seeds in the creature’s 
graceless state of sin.
179
   
The skull simultaneously offers itself to be read in two counterposed directions.  On the 
one hand, it is the appearance of the human spirit in petrified form.  The fossil is 
hollowed out nature and, as nature evacuated of its life, the skull simultaneously signifies 
an individual history.  On the other, the skull is nature in decay—mere matter—and, as 
death incarnate, it is the apotheosis of the fact of human beings subjection to nature.
180
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Through such allegorical signification, emblematized in the skull, the Baroque allegorists 
provide the counterpoint to Lukács’s second nature.  Where Lukács reads history qua 
convention as a form of nature, the allegorists of the German Baroque treated nature-in-
decay as a sign for history and for history specifically understood as ruination and failure.  
They turned to a nature the mute melancholy of which testified to a former repleteness of 
meaning as an allegorical representation of human history in its evident futility.  For 
nature, too, had, in its time, undergone this disenchantment in the Christian triumph over 
the pagan gods, which reduced nature to the condition of mere matter (the profane).  So 
evacuated of its animating spirits, left hollow, and the sign of humankind’s graceless 
mortal state, nature was seen primarily not in terms of its generative capacities but in its 
over-ripeness as matter-in-decay.   
If Lukács argued that, under capitalism, history has become but the field of fateful 
repetition hence a form of nature, Benjamin, in his redeployment of Baroque allegory, 
forwards this insight to show that the concept of nature, opens itself, at a certain juncture, 
onto the dimension of history.  Time within the concept of nature appears as the 
repetition of the process of origination, maturation, decay, and finally death.  Yet, 
inasmuch as time is at play in nature in the element of change, nature qua transitory being 
is itself already historical.  Nature is the eternality of transience: “The word ‘history’ 
stands written on the countenance of nature in the characters of transience.”181 
Where Lukács comprehended the redemption of the world petrified under the 
Medusan-gaze of capital within an eschatological context, rendering nature the degraded 
marker of the sphere of enslavement and imbuing the proletarian revolution with all the 
salvific power of the future, Benjamin’s philosophy of Naturgeschichte, formed in his 
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study of and thus saturated in the melancholy of Baroque allegory, rests upon a non-
salvific concept of redemption, wholly immanent and wholly critical.  For nature and 
history conceived in their dialectical interrelation provide the key to one another’s 
demythification.  In the disclosure of what we take to be given reality—a piece of 
indefeasible nature—as history, these structures open themselves to interrogation and 
thus, potentially, to transformation.  Conversely, showing the primitive in that which 
presents itself as the most historically advanced constitutes a decisive intervention within 
the ideology of progress by which the present maintains itself in its authority.   
As I argued in the last chapter, Freud’s Totem and Taboo aims to render precisely 
such a natural-historical perspective available.  While Freud’s treatment of the Australian 
aboriginal tribes has been read as an instance of colonialism and primitivism, this 
undialectical interpretation fails to see the criticality of Freud’s investment in the concept 
of the natural or prehistoric.  For Freud does not ethnocentrically hold up bourgeois 
conventions as an historical achievement and norm against which to measure the 
practices of tribalism. Freud’s effort is to show that what is taken to be primitive—mere 
nature—in these tribes is yet at play in what we identify as the most civilized and rational 
of institutions—hence the provocative reference in his preface to the categorical 
imperative.  Nature has not been overcome by us, it has simply been beaten farther back, 
a fact that Freud neither celebrates nor precisely mourns.  Rather the mortification of 
nature is an abiding source of ambivalence for Freud: an impetus to dialectical criticism.  
Likewise, Benjamin, in The Arcades Project, aims to show that what, under capitalism, 
presents itself as progress hence as normatively justified is but the hell of perpetual 
unfulfillment—the ongoing oppression of nature both inner and outer.   
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The Baroque’s crucial contribution to Benjamin’s emancipatory practice of 
remembrance can be formulated thus: as Lukácsian-Marxism is able to read the 
commodity and the constitutive conventions of a social world as the ossification of social 
activity hence as a sign for history, restoring the subjective valence to the reified world, 
Benjamin is, as in the “baroque cult of the ruin,”182 able to discover nature hiding within 
the ruins of civilization.  For ruins are, like the death’s head, to be read dialectically: both 
historical and natural.  It is in his attention to “the fallen nature that bears the imprint of 
historical progression,”183 the rags and the refuse of early capitalism, that Benjamin is 
able to correct the uncritical progressivism of Lukácsian-Marxism.  We thus arrive again 
at the dialectical image, but now with an account in hand that will ground an analysis of 
the critical method of allegoresis by which Benjamin redeems “the rags, the refuse” of 
capitalism.  Benjamin evokes from the failed matter of the immediate past, i.e., history in 
decay, a protest against the form of life in which such once treasured objects are thrown 
onto the trash-pile of history, their utopian promises of fulfillment unmet. 
 
Part II: Benjamin’s critical method of allegoresis  
(Between the vision of the baroque and the world created by capital) 
 
“The events surrounding the historian, and in which he himself takes part, will underlie 
his presentation in the form of a text written in invisible ink.  The history which he lays 
before the reader comprises, as it were, the citations occurring in this text, and it is only 
these citations that occur in a manner legible to all.  To write history thus means to cite 
history.  It belongs to the concept of citation, however, that the historical object in each 
case is torn from its context.”184 
 
In its disclosure of the material conditions that give rise to the natural-historical 
viewpoint and hence to the allegorical mode of expression, the Trauerspiel study 
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anticipates Benjamin’s ambitious Arcades Project in which he sought, through the 
decaying matter of the 19
th
 century, to expose what presented itself as progress as but the 
continuation of history’s violent subjugation of nature.  Benjamin found, in his study of 
capitalist culture as refracted through Marx, a world subject to the same crisis in meaning 
already fit to the interpretive method of allegoresis developed in light of his early 
confrontation with the Trauerspiel.  
 As Benjamin describes the antinomies of the allegorical: 
Any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else.  With 
this possibility a destructive, but just verdict is passed on the profane world: it is 
characterized as a world in which the detail is of no great importance.  All of the 
things which are used to signify derive, from the very fact of their pointing to 
something else, a power which makes them appear no longer commensurable with 
profane things, which raises them onto a higher plane, and which can indeed 
sanctify them.  Considered in allegorical terms, then, the profane world is both 
elevated and devalued.  This religious dialectic of content has its formal 
correlative in the dialectic of convention and expression.  For allegory is 
convention and expression; and both are inherently contradictory.  However, just 
as baroque teaching conceives of history as created events, allegory in particular, 
although a convention like every kind of writing, is regarded as created, like holy 
scripture.  The allegory of the seventeenth century is not convention of 
expression, but expression of convention.
185
 
On Benjamin’s analysis, the allegorical intention is rooted in the subjective condition of 
melancholia, the loss of one’s pre-reflective practical orientation in and to the world.  
Such a crisis in perception was the corollary of the theological-political upheaval of 17
th
 
century.  In this loss of practical orientation and the melancholic withdrawal from the 
everyday, we are left to confront a world the objects of which have been divested of their 
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natural meaning hence a world that is but a scene of fragments.  Yet, it is precisely in the 
shattering of the coherence of the mundane that the world comes to take on the aspect of 
the phantasmagoric, its hollowed out objects reduced to the condition of mere appearance 
at the same time as they take on an auratic quality, imbued with a supersensible meaning.  
Brokenness implies the possibility of unification and the experience of disintegration 
calls upon the thought of wholeness.  In bespeaking the possibility of a new, heretofore 
unanticipated order into which these pieces might fit and by which the appearance of 
fragmentation might be explained, the allegorist devalued the mundane world at the same 
time as she elevated it to the order of the divine, natural images treated as a hieroglyphic 
code through which God’s intentions were secreted and which awaited human 
decipherment.  Thus, under the melancholic gaze of the allegorist, the material world is 
both denigrated and sanctified. 
 This dialectic of devaluation and elevation is precisely the dynamic that Marx 
developed in his concept of commodity fetishism and which Benjamin registers in and at 
the level of everyday life through his concept of phantasmagoria.  As Benjamin observes 
in “Central Park,” an essay of fragments that presents Baudelaire as the modern allegorist 
of Paris, “the devaluation of the world of things in allegory is surpassed within the world 
of things itself by the commodity.”186  Under the regime of capital, Benjamin argues, 
there occurs the economic literalization of the poetic movement of allegory.  Objects are 
alienated from their use-value (natural meaning), hollowed out and reduced to the 
common denominator of exchange-value.  They thus become bearers of mysterious, non-
natural significance.  For Benjamin, the Parisian Exposition Universelle, a lavish 
industrial show that had its first iteration in 1855 and recurred approximately once a 
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decade through to the end of the century, exists as the emblematic early instance of the 
dialectic of alienation and fetishization that congeals in the 20
th
 Century in and as the 
framework of the entertainment industry.  The world exhibitions appear retrospectively as 
the schoolhouse in which individuals are first trained in the attitude of consumption and 
thus inducted into what becomes the 20
th
 century cult of the commodity, a cult that, 
Benjamin maintains, is the same as that of the Fuhrer cult.
187
  
World exhibitions are places of pilgrimage to the commodity fetish…World 
exhibitions glorify the exchange value of the commodity.  They create a 
framework in which its use value becomes secondary.  They are a school in which 
the masses, forcibly excluded from consumption, are imbued with the exchange 
value of commodities to the point of identifying with it: ‘Do not touch the items 
on display.’  World exhibitions thus provide access to a phantasmagoria which a 
person enters in order to be distracted.  Within these divertissements, to which the 
individual abandons himself in the framework of the entertainment industry, he 
remains always an element of a compact mass.  This mass delights in amusement 
parks—with their roller coasters, their ‘twisters,’ their ‘caterpillars’—in an 
attitude that is pure reaction.  It is thus led to the state of subjection which 
propaganda, industrial as well as political, relies on.
188
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The world exhibitions are the hyperbolic instance of goods-on-display in which the 
commodity is aggrandized as a spectacle, divorced from the context of its use hence 
stripped of its practical character. “Do not touch the items on display.”  In the alienation 
of the object from its purposefulness and its material relation to the individual, it is 
elevated to the status of an icon. 
Just as nature evacuated of meaning becomes the vehicle for the subjective 
intentions of the melancholic Baroque allegorist, Benjamin maintains that, in the 
capitalist present, the commodity becomes the object into which the utopian aspirations 
of the collective are displaced.  Only in the lapse of a given commodity’s hold over the 
social imagination, i.e., the diminution of its aura of novelty that constitutes its 
desirability, can it be read in its phantasmagoric aspect.  In the object’s extrusion from 
the system of circulation, it becomes legible as the wish-image that it once was just as the 
skull signifies in and through the very fact of its decay that it was once the site of life.
189
  
The capitalist world is replete with such ciphers.  In an entry from the N convolute, 
Benjamin writes, quoting a letter from Adorno:  
‘With the vitiation of their use value, the alienated things are hollowed out and, as 
ciphers, they draw in meanings.  Subjectivity takes possession of them insofar as 
it invests them with intentions of desire and fear’… With regard to these 
reflections, it should be kept in mind that, in the nineteenth century, the number of 
‘hollowed out’ things increases at a rate and on a scale that was previously 
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unknown, for technical progress is continually withdrawing newly introduced 
objects from circulation.
190
   
The ideology of endless newness that reigns in modern mass culture receives its material 
instantiation and its confirmation in the constant production of novelty.  Yet the 
incessance of newness is, at the same time, the rapidity with which what, in one moment 
was the most novel and so the most valuable, becomes outmoded, primitive, and 
dismissed as detritus.  Capitalism requires, for its preservation, the constant production of 
novelty—novel objects and, through them, seemingly novel desires.191  Directly 
proportional to the ever-increasing rate of development is the rate at which existent 
reality is subject to devaluation, the rate at which the commodity “degrades” and is 
subsequently thrown onto the trash-pile of history.
192
  In this acceleration of what 
proposes itself as progress, the objects and architectural structures that give public life its 
definition become relics prematurely, appearing archaic after just a generation.  This 
accelerated rate of innovation thus corresponds to a quickening of temporality itself and 
the disintegration of the capacity to remember even the most immediate past.  History 
that is not subject to remembrance becomes prehistory, becomes nature all over again.   
And so we return to our main theme: within the ruins of civilization, Benjamin 
discovers nature.  Benjamin thus finds himself in the position of the Baroque allegorist: 
in a denatured and fragmented world.  However, between Benjamin and the Baroque is 
the difference of the materialist diagnosis of this disordered state of affairs.  Where the 
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Baroque saw the fatality of human history through a theological lens, ontologizing 
catastrophe, Benjamin sees the workings of capital.  On Benjamin’s reading, the Baroque 
playwrights, unable to escape the deadlock of the formal antinomy of the allegorical 
abandoned their materialist commitments in favor of a theological resolution.  Benjamin 
describes this formal antinomy in terms of the dialectic of convention and expression 
intrinsic to the allegorical meaning-making of the German Baroque.  The Baroque 
practice of allegory grew out of the Renaissance study of Egyptian hieroglyphs, in which 
these pictograms were treated as a divinely ordained, universal language, the 
decipherment of which would yield the meaning of the created world. 
193
  Yet, the 
Baroque allegorist could not escape the fact that this “theology of writing” was, at the 
same time, thoroughly conventional.  For allegorical signification developed over time 
and, in the course of this development, “Egyptian, Greek, and Christian pictorial 
languages became intertwined.”194  Within the Baroque world, there were multiple, 
competing religious traditions hence multiple, incompatible cosmologies.  The natural 
world to which they looked for divine signs became plurivocal, overladen with a plethora 
of irreducible and contradictory meanings.  The practice of emblematics thus arrived to 
the poets of the Baroque completely over-determined and the individual allegorist was 
left to choose arbitrarily which convention to follow, which meaning to adopt for a given 
natural image.  Thus the very hermeneutic that promised to unveil the divine intention 
within and through the objects of the profane world resulted in a profusion of meaning: a 
condition of “demonic” ambiguity.  The allegorists were thus left to “pile up fragments 
ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal, and in the unremitting expectation of a 
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miracle.”195  When no miracle occurred, the allegorists instead opted to read fragmentary, 
transient and death-dealing creation as itself an allegorical signification of its opposite: 
divine resurrection.  In this, they betrayed the materialist insight that served as the basis 
of their philosophical hermeneutics. 
Ultimately in the death-signs of the baroque the direction of allegorical reflection 
is reversed; on the second part of its wide arc it returns, to redeem….For even this 
time of hell is secularized in space, and that world, which abandoned itself to the 
deep spirit of Satan and betrayed itself, is God’s world.  In God’s world the 
allegorist awakens….Allegory, of course, thereby loses everything that was most 
peculiar to it: the secret, privileged knowledge, the arbitrary rule in the realm of 
dead objects, the supposed infinity of a world without hope.  All this vanishes 
with this one about-turn, in which the immersion of allegory has to clear away the 
final phantasmagoria of the objective and, left entirely to its own devices, re-
discovers itself, not playfully in the earthly world of things, but seriously under 
the eyes of heaven.  And this is the essence of melancholy immersion: that its 
ultimate objects, in which it believes it can most fully secure for itself that which 
is vile, turn into allegories, and that these allegories fill out and deny the void in 
which they are represented.
196
 
On Benjamin’s analysis, the Baroque poets thus abandoned their commitment to the 
material world—for committed they were insofar as they mourned the violence of 
history—and dismissed the objective world as itself a phantasmagoric deception to be 
spiritually defeated.  Unable to bear the catastrophe and unable to believe in the human 
capacity for overcoming this violence, they dismissed material suffering as an illusion, 
sealing the melancholic outlook through their denial of loss.  The allegorists retreated 
from the world into the pure subjectivism of faith. 
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To the Baroque allegorists’ “faithless leap to resurrection,” Benjamin juxtaposes 
the interruptive force of the dialectical image, “hold(ing) fast to the ruins.”197  The 
challenge of Benjamin’s philosophy is whether his materialist sensibility is sufficient to 
rescue the allegorical technique from the arbitrariness, subjectivism, and nihilism that 
beset and overcame his predecessors: whether or not allegoresis can serve as a means of 
entering into and undoing from within the phantasmagoric logic of capital.  
At this juncture, I would like to reintroduce Benjamin to Freud.  Here, as in so 
many other places, Benjamin and Freud serve to mutually illuminate one another.  In the 
Arcades, Benjamin set himself the task of reconstructing the dream-life of the nineteenth 
century so as to awaken the collective in and to the present.  In this, Benjamin shows his 
essential affinity with the therapeutic methods and goals of Freud, who sought to 
reconstruct the processes of dream-formation, mirroring its logic, so as to free the 
individual to the waking world.  Furthermore, having returned to the Traumdeutung 
through the Trauerspiel, Freud’s dream hermeneutics, which provides the template for 
the psychoanalytic method as such, is itself legible as a form of allegoresis in which the 
surface structure—the immediate meaning—of a text is approached as both the work of 
desire and the means of desire’s dissimulation.  In his critical re-apprehension of the 
meaning of dream-life, Freud took up a phenomenon that was dismissed by his 
contemporaries as below the level of the attribution of meaning; no more than senseless 
excrescence.  Against this dismissal, Freud redeemed dreaming as a form of emblematics 
in which prehistoric nature was figured in and through the very form of its historical 
denial. 
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The dream-content…is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters 
of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-
thoughts.  If we attempted to read these characters according to their pictorial 
value instead of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into 
error.  Suppose I have a picture-puzzle, a rebus, in front of me.  It depicts a house 
with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running man 
whose head as been conjured away and so on.  Now I might be misled into raising 
objections and declaring that the picture as a whole is nonsensical.  A boat has no 
business to be on a roof of a house, and a headless man cannot run.  Moreover, the 
man is bigger than the house; and if the whole picture is intended to represent a 
landscape, letters of the alphabet are out of place in it since such objects do not 
occur in nature. But obviously we can only form a proper judgment of the rebus if 
we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts and if, 
instead, we try to replace each separate element by a word that can be represented 
for that element in some way or other.  The words which are put together in this 
way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest 
beauty and significance.  A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort.
198
 
Freud approaches the dream as though it were a medieval emblem, a syncretic image of 
pictorial and linguistic symbols, the decipherment of which requires that each element be 
read independently and in conjunction with the whole.  As Benjamin ultimately 
concluded that what lay behind the phantasmagoric work of allegory was the impulse to 
simultaneously express and deny historical catastrophe, so too Freud determines the 
dream to be an attempt to express repudiated infantile desire.  The individual, withdrawn 
from the demands of the everyday, takes up, in her dreams, the stuff of the world, 
specifically the immediate past, and creates, through the motley material of the “day’s 
residues,” a picture puzzle of desire.  Whatever apparent coherence abides between the 
dream-thoughts is the effect of secondary revision; thus the dream must be divested of the 
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false unity that consciousness retrospectively imposes upon it, each element sundered 
from the context of the whole—cited—and allowed to signify independently of it.199  
Through this process of decontextualization, Freud discovered “that the child and the 
child’s impulses still live on in the dream;”200 unfulfilled, the desires of the past remain 
and continue, in secret, to shape the patient’s present.  Foreclosed, primitive desire—
read: nature—unconquered yet unfigurable gives rise to the phantasmagorias of sleep, 
secreting itself in the very matrices of the dream.  For “thought is after all nothing but a 
substitute for a hallucinatory wish; and it is self-evident that dreams must be wish-
fulfillments, since nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work.”201  It is here 
important to keep in mind that what was decisive for Freud was not the discovery that the 
dream had a secret meaning—the latent content that hid behind its manifest imagery.  
Rather the major theoretical discovery of the Traumdeutung was the secret of the dream-
work (displacement, condensation, and secondary revision).  It was this secret of the 
primary processes that gave rise to psychoanalysis proper, i.e., to psychoanalysis as a 
critical mode of reading through which allegorical significance is not produced, but 
undone, the phantasmagoric structure of desire dissolved. 
How does this bear on the Arcades Project and its dialectic of ruination and 
redemption?  Benjamin discovered in the nineteenth century a graveyard replete with 
fossilized remains that serve him as the material to allegorically represent and, in so 
representing, undo the phantasmagoric spell under which his own era languished.  As 
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Freud performed this work in the analytic scenario, exposing the present as but the 
repetition of the failed past for the sake of putting the patient’s love freely at her disposal, 
Benjamin constructs a text that mimetically reflects the phantasmagoric structure of 19
th
 
century Paris so that the truth of these wish-images could be seen and, through them, the 
truth of our own time.  For the present is but the dream of the past—not in the sense of its 
fulfillment, but of its repetition.
202
  As Benjamin remarks, citing Michelet, “each époque 
dreams the one to follow it.”203  Benjamin’s philosophy of history transposes, from the 
individual to the collective, Freud’s theory of dreaming as a fantastic form of recollection 
in which the immediate and mundane past serves as the vehicle for the secret 
communication of primal, utopian desire. 
Corresponding to the form of the new means of production, which in the 
beginning is still ruled by the form of the old (Marx), are images in the collective 
consciousness in which the new is permeated with the old.  These images are 
wish-images; in them the collective seeks both to overcome and to transfigure the 
immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social organization of 
production.  At the same time, what emerges in the wish images is the resolute 
effort to distance oneself from all that is antiquated—which includes, however, 
the recent past.  These tendencies deflect the imagination (which is given impetus 
by the new) back upon the primal past.  In the dream in which each epoch 
entertains images of its successor, the latter appears wedded to the elements of 
primal history <Urgeschichte>--that is, to elements of a classless society.  And 
the experiences of such a society—as stored in the unconscious of the 
collective—engender through interpenetration with what is new, the utopia that 
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has left its traces in a thousand configurations of life, from enduring edifices to 
passing fashions.
204
 
Benjamin here describes the same nachträglich temporality of the dream as understood 
by Freud, the present existing as the short-circuit between the primal past and the utopian 
future.  According to Freud, a desire in the present, in awakening an unconscious (primal) 
wish, instigates the dream, which takes up the day’s residues, i.e., what of the immediate 
past was undeserving of attention, as the innocuous vehicle that can carry the affective 
charge of the repudiated wish.  It is such disregarded, meaningless material that is 
available to represent that which cannot, in itself, be represented and, in so doing, to 
provide the veiled, hallucinatory gratification of repressed desire so that sleep may 
continue, undisturbed.  Freud sees, in dreaming, the work of natural history and thus the 
need for a critical form of allegorical reading.  So, too, Benjamin reads the dream-state of 
capitalism in which its novel commodities promise the overcoming of the “immaturity of 
the social product,” the failure of the immediate past to yield the promised utopian 
gratification.  Through the re-presentation of obsolescent commodities as the wish-
images that they once were, Benjamin sought to wrest these imaginative productions 
from the totalizing context of capital, constructing through them an alarm-clock by which 
to awaken the contemporary and as-yet dreaming collective.
205
  
And here, at last, we arrive at the Benjaminian resolution of the second prong of 
Freud’s bipartite prohibition on cultural psychoanalysis: that erected in light of the 
paradox of authority that defines modern community.  The psychoanalytic encounter is 
designed to navigate this paradox of authority as it occurs at the ontogenetic level.  The 
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therapeutic space, liminal—exempted from the everyday and thus protected from its 
practical pressures—consists of the synthetically generated pathology of neurosis, i.e., in 
the transferential/counter-transferential relation between analyst and analysand.  This 
relation is re-activated within the hermetic space of analysis only so that it can become 
the topic of critical self-questioning and that through which the unending project of self-
authorization finds its initiation.  The success of this undertaking requires the analyst to 
embody prehistoric authority only to systematically cede upon it, the analysand’s 
expectations, in their frustration, becoming visible.  My contention is that, in his 
Traumdeutung, Benjamin set himself the task of constituting a therapeutic space in which 
the reader, i.e., the individual in her public role as a consumer of culture, meets, not with 
the authority of the author, but with that of the cultural treasure itself.  As Benjamin 
writes in an entry in the N Convolute: “Method of this project: literary montage.  I 
needn’t say anything.  Merely show.  I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no 
ingenious formulations.  But the rags, the refuse—these I will not inventory but allow, in 
the only way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them.”206  This desire of 
Benjamin’s to “merely show” through the ceaseless accumulation of fragments stems 
from his conviction that the impositions of subjectivity upon the matter of history could 
but result in the pacification of its unruly and heterogeneous elements.  And, what’s 
more, in the pacification of the reader. 
Thus, with the ultimate failure of Baroque allegory in mind, Benjamin sought to 
cede entirely upon his subjectivity, arranging the ruins of the nineteenth century in such a 
way that the reader would be able to see through this material the “invisible ink” of the 
present.  Benjamin, in a critical appropriation of the model of the World Exhibition, puts 
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the commodity on display, reproducing it linguistically in the text, a space reflective of 
but excepted from the everyday.  Where the World Exhibitions constituted a space in 
which the alienation of the use-value of the commodity (“do not touch”) instills within 
the masses the attitude of consumption to the Benjaminian text “falls the Sisyphean task 
of divesting things of their commodity character.”207  Within the Arcades Project, the 
reader confronts the authoritative cultural treasure only to stand witness to its 
disintegration.  I so interpret the oft-remarked upon “objectivity,” the seeming absence of 
theoretical subjectivity, of Benjamin’s texts as his strategy for avoiding the danger to 
which Freud alerted us in his ban on cultural psychoanalysis.  Benjamin refuses the 
exertions of theoretical subjectivity, attempting to create a context in which the reader 
can herself undertake the interpretive labor necessary to the disclosure of the truth of her 
own political era.
208
  Cast in this light, I can restate my earlier assertion that the challenge 
of Benjamin’s philosophy is whether his materialist sensibility is sufficient to rescue the 
allegorical technique from the arbitrariness, subjectivism, and nihilism that beset and 
overcame his predecessors: Benjamin’s ambition was to re-cast allegorical expression 
such that it gained a self-critical form in and as allegoresis.  Benjamin sought to 
reproduce the material of the nineteenth century in such a way that it became visible to 
the reader as a phantasmagoria, as a hieroglyphic code requiring deconstruction, 
authorizing the individual in the work of critical interpretation. 
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The Limits of Benjamin’s Weak Messianism for the Purposes of Democratic Theory 
 Through the process of secularization, solidarity is rendered vagabond and it is 
the task of the redemptive critic to discover it secretly lodged in the discarded and 
discounted images of the past.  Only in hearing the command to “read what was never 
written”209 can the power of the past arrive to the present in the dimension of its rightful 
authority.  That solidarity depends upon a critical practice of remembrance means that the 
problem of democracy descends to Benjamin as one of inheritance: how to receive the 
past such that its “true picture…which flashes up its final farewell in the moment of its 
recognizability” can be “held fast” in and against the totalizing context of capital.210  
Central to thinking through the prospect of justice in secularized social space is the fate 
of tradition qua living medium, i.e., a material collective form of remembrance in which 
the transmission of the shared past is at stake.   
 It is such a mode of myth-making—of collective storytelling—that, according to 
Freud, has lost what was its heretofore central place and, according to Benjamin, the 
redemption of which represents the fundamental task of secularized modernity. 
The loss of tradition is, for Benjamin as well as for Freud, simultaneously liberatory and 
melancholic.  Emancipation is necessarily emancipation from authority in its traditional, 
patriarchal form, that of church and family, but, at the same time, its disappearance leaves 
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us with no other binding authority upon which to rely.  In the breakdown of the social 
matrix through which objectivity is formed and its stability guaranteed, we are left on our 
own with no certain criterion of judgment and no secure basis by which to connect to the 
world and those within it.  Thus, in being liberated from tradition, we appear to be 
abandoned to private fantasy.  Correlative to the process of disenchantment and the 
transformation of material conditions, which are both its precondition and its result, is a 
ferocious resurgence of myth. “The momentum of primal history in the past is no longer 
masked, as it used to be, by the tradition of the church and family—this at once the 
condition and consequence of technology.  The old prehistoric dread already envelops the 
world of our parents because we ourselves are no longer bound to this world by tradition.  
The perceptual worlds break apart more rapidly; what they contain of the mythic comes 
more quickly and more brutally to the fore.”211  Secularization does not dissolve mythic 
consciousness; rather it institutes the era of its solitary sufferance.   
 As Freud saw it, modern individuality was defined by this task of privatized 
meaning-making.  Lacking intersubjective support but still under the onus to find 
fulfillment in the renunciations requisite to sociability, desires for which there is no scene 
of acknowledgment are, insofar as they are incapable of being heard, inexpressible and, 
per Freud, the unconscious fantasies and compulsive behaviors they produce as a result 
represent the secret afterlife of myth and religious ritual.  “The neuroses are social 
structures; they accomplish what is effected in society by other means.”212  Yet, Freud 
rejects the idea that what is thus called for is the reinstitution or rediscovery of a public 
practice of myth-making.  For Freud, there is no form of collective cognition and 
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experience that would not be oppressive.  The right to think for oneself and find one’s 
own way to salvation remains unimpeachable for Freud, and the rest is religion, which, 
“by forcibly fixing (individuals) in a state of psychic infantilism and by drawing them 
into a mass-delusion…succeeds in sparing many people an individual neurosis.  But 
hardly anything more.”213  Confronted with this bind between the unjustified and 
infantilizing authority of tradition and the plight of modern isolated individuality, Freud 
concluded that the only solution lay in the direction of the development of internal 
resources adequate to the burden of privatized myth-making and to the sustainment of the 
individual against the public sphere of anonymous—indifferent or hostile—others. 
It is thus on the question of who or what is the subject of emancipatory memory, 
which is, at the same time, the question of how to properly conceive of individuation, that 
Benjamin diverges most markedly from Freud.  For Benjamin, the individual capacity for 
critical remembrance cannot be sustained in a form of life in which collective practices of 
storytelling are threatened with extinction.  In the increasing withdrawal of the individual 
into the private interior and capital’s increasing domination of public space, what 
disappears is a habitat hospitable to the integrative discursive process in and through 
which communities are created, sustained, and transformed.  The result is an 
impoverishment of experience.
214
  As he writes, in the first entry of the K convolute of 
The Arcades Project: “Whereas the education of earlier generations explained (their) 
dreams for them in terms of tradition, of religious doctrine, present-day education simply 
amounts to the distraction of children.  Proust could emerge as an unprecedented 
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phenomenon only in a generation that had lost all bodily and natural aids to remembrance 
and that, poorer than before, was left to itself to take possession of the worlds of 
childhood in a merely isolated and pathological way.”215   
For Benjamin, tradition is not to be overcome, but to be redeemed: to be realized 
in a new form consonant with the normative demands of non-absolutist social space in 
which the fragments of tradition can be made to dance.  For tradition nominates, at the 
most general level, an intergenerational social education: “who would trust a cane 
wielder who proclaimed the mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education?  
Is not education, above all, the indispensable ordering of the relationship between 
generations and therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that relationship and not 
of children?”216  Only through the self-conscious and collective uptake of the conditions 
of injustice that are our inheritance does there abide the possibility of the renewal of 
experience and, with it, the promise of a world worthy of human inhabitation.  
Thus, it would appear that, for Benjamin, there is no salvation from the powers of 
prehistory that would not be social in nature.  The “weak messianic force” of which the 
present is in possession is a form of social praxis and only by attenuation can it be said to 
be possible for the private individual.  Yet, if this is, in fact, correct, how then are we to 
understand Benjamin’s own critical enterprise, which has as its avowed ambition the 
actualization of the forgotten futures of the oppressed past?  What is the relationship 
between the “immediate messianic intensity of the heart of the inner man in isolation”217 
and the collective reception and realization of the good tidings that emerge from out of 
the catastrophic past?  What makes the difference between private conviction and 
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prophecy?  To state this elsewise: when does private fantasy rightfully attain to public 
acknowledgment?  When does it achieve the condition of philosophy? 
 With these questions, we reach the limit of Benjamin’s brand of redemptive 
criticism, which uses the tools of private experience for the sake of its overcoming.  Let 
me return to the performative effort of the Arcades.  The Arcades is not itself a piece of 
philosophy; rather, as I have argued, it is an attempt to preserve its promise, establishing 
the conditions under which thinking might become possible once again.  As Cavell puts it 
in his little essay, “Remains to be Seen,” the piece through which I introduced this 
dissertation: “if Benjamin is here staking his claim to a certain afterlife of philosophizing, 
his Arcades Project may be taken as establishing the conditions (of memory as thinking, 
of thinking as explosion, of perception as allegory, of the chances of concurrence in Poe’s 
crowd) under which philosophy is still possible.”218  Or rather, we should say, might yet 
be possible.  For the Arcades Project calls for conditions that it cannot itself produce.  
Benjamin’s subject is and remains the anonymous reader to whom he addresses himself 
in his texts, sending his missives—his good tidings—out into the void. 219  As he writes in 
the opening lines of “The Storyteller,” in the death of the oral tradition dealt by the rise of 
modern print technology, it is “as if a capability that seemed inalienable to us, the 
securest among our possessions, has been taken from us: the ability to share 
experiences.”220  Benjamin’s therapeutic philosophy is an attempt to renew this capacity 
in and through the very medium that destroyed it.  The ambition of his work is, in part, to 
be described as that of transforming the privacy of literary consumption into a basis of 
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shared social practice through inducing, in the individual, a mood of critical self-
reflection and cultivating the hermeneutic sensibility necessary to community formation 
in post-absolutist social space.   
   That said, there is one place, in Benjamin’s corpus, where he ventures an image of 
solidarity amongst the living: the Artwork essay.  In his attempt to identify the conditions 
under which industrial modernity might be redeemed—the conditions of private fantasy 
transformed into those of collective perception—Benjamin alights, cautiously but 
hopefully, upon the movies because they have all the essential elements for which he is 
searching: mechanization; the proletarian mass; shared experience; the critical 
allegorization of the mundane world.  Yet, it is precisely in this attempt to specify a 
properly modern form of community, that the limits of his weak messianism as socio-
political theory are cast into relief. 
Benjamin writes in the second thesis of the final version of the Artwork essay: 
What withers in the age of the technological reproducibility of the work of art is 
the latter’s aura.  The process is symptomatic; its significance extends far beyond 
the realm of art.  It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of 
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition.  By 
replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique 
existence.  And in permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her 
own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced.  These two processes lead to 
a massive upheaval in the domain of objects handed down from the past—a 
shattering of tradition which is the reverse side of the present crisis and renewal of 
humanity.  Both processes are intimately related to the mass movements of our 
day.  Their most powerful agent is film.  The social significance of film, even—
 166 
and especially—in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, 
cathartic side: the liquidation of the value of tradition in cultural heritage.
221
 
Here we see the dialectical dynamic with which, at this point, we should be thoroughly 
familiar.  The commodification of culture and the decay of the aura is for Benjamin, an 
entirely ambivalent development.  For while auratic experience in which nature returns 
the gaze
222
 is precisely the kind of experience the loss of which Benjamin mourns, at the 
same time, this revolution in the domain of objects is liberatory.  For the withering of the 
aura signifies the loss of tradition’s de facto authority.  Whether or not the shattering of 
tradition will be incapacitating or enabling is a matter, for Benjamin, of the fate of the 
now liquidated value of cultural heritage: whether it will be simply invested in and 
consumed as the commodity or whether it will be used to fund the project of 
emancipation.   
The Artwork essay is written in service of the latter, attempting the redemption of 
the movies, which Benjamin’s essay treats as the mass culture commodity par excellence.  
In it, Benjamin develops new concepts of art criticism, concepts both called for 
specifically by the new medium and that break decisively with the Romantic tradition, 
which, with its central concepts of “creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery,” is 
not just implicitly anti-democratic, but complicit with fascism.
223
  While technological 
reproducibility is what allows for the privatized consumption of cultural products, in the 
form of the movies, this same technology extends the possibility of a reconstitution of 
public experience and, as well, a democratic—or at least populist—aesthetic 
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experience.
224
  The disaggregated proletarian mass comes together, in the movie-theater, 
for an event of public reception.  Furthermore, this collective reception is of the 
mundane.  Before the silverscreen, the collective is offered an allegorical (fragmentary) 
re-presentation of the naturo-social landscape: the matter of our shared lives.  “Our bars 
and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories 
seemed to close relentlessly around us.  Then came film and exploded this prison-world 
with the dynamite of the split second, so that now we can set off calmly on journeys of 
adventure among its far-flung debris…It is through the camera that we first discover the 
optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through 
psychoanalysis.”225  Film, in manufacturing unhinged images of the world and bestowing 
foreign animation upon them, achieves the de-familiarization of the everyday.  The 
ordinary and the conventional, that which, in its very invisibility, conditions our behavior, 
is suddenly rendered an object of interest, imbued unexpectedly with significance. 
Benjamin, in the twelfth thesis, goes so far as liken the movies to epic poetry, 
which is to say to storytelling in its Ur-form: 
The technological reproducibility of the artwork changes the relation of the 
masses to art.  The extremely backward attitude toward a Picasso paining 
changes into a highly progressive reaction to a Chaplin film…With regard to the 
cinema, the critical and uncritical attitudes of the public coincide.  The decisive 
reason for this is that nowhere more than in the cinema are the reactions of 
individuals, which together make up the massive reaction of the audience, 
determined by the imminent concentration of reactions into a mass.  No sooner 
are these reactions manifest than they regulate one another…Painting, by its 
nature, cannot provide an object of simultaneous collective reception, as 
                                                        
224
 “It is inherent in the technology of film, as of sports, that everyone who witnesses these performances 
does so as a quasi-expert,” (262). 
225
 Ibid, 265-6 
 168 
architecture has always been able to do, as the epic poem could do at one time, 
and as film is able to do today…While efforts have been made to present 
paintings to the masses in galleries and salons, this mode of reception gives the 
masses no means of organizing and regulating their response.  Thus, the same 
public which reacts progressively to a slapstick comedy inevitably display a 
backward attitude toward Surrealism.
226
 
Benjamin identifies film as solidaristic, maintaining that a genuinely collective 
experience occurs in that individual reactions are pre-determined by the mass reaction 
that they are about to produce and that, at the same time, control one another.  Benjamin 
is not only willing to consider, but embraces the idea of pre-discursive “communication,” 
a “conversation” of sorts that occurs wordlessly in the theater before and about what 
unfolds onscreen. 
While Benjamin’s analysis suggests that film is in possession of all the necessary 
constituents for revolutionary class-consciousness, he nonetheless remains agnostic.  
“The audience is an examiner, but a distracted one.”227  As I see it, the Benjaminian 
audience is posed on the verge; on the one side, there lies the mob, and, on the other, the 
revolutionary collective.  Just as its distractibility holds the audience from a genuine 
consciousness of their shared condition, so too it prevents them from becoming the 
fascistic mass.
228
  Taking Benjamin’s agnosticism up in the sociological register in which 
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it is earned: this is at it should be.  For nothing guarantees that community will, in fact, be 
achieved.  Philosophy’s power is not predictive.  However, it seems to me that Benjamin 
stalled at this sociological assessment, otherwise alien to his aesthetics, because his is an 
insufficiently dialectical conception of community.  Benjamin is unable, at the end of the 
day, to think of modern privacy as anything but the enemy to shared social life.  As is 
indicated by his alarming suggestion that the inarticulate mass reaction represents a form 
of critical reception, his conception of community is one in which privacy is not 
transformed, but rather overcome.  As he writes in the recently published “On 
Foundations of Philosophy: Theses on Brecht:” “thought should be impoverished, it 
should only be permitted in so far as it is socially realizable.  Brecht says: At least once 
people no longer need to think on their own, they are unable to think on their own 
anymore.  But to attain an effective social thought, people must give up their false and 
complicating wealth, namely the wealth of private assessments, standpoints, world-views, 
in short the wealth of opinions.”229  For Benjamin, community is not experience shared, 
but experience that is non-private.   
Benjamin thus asks the movies “to do, or prove, what can only be done 
socially,”230 i.e., in conversation and through the development of reflectively endorsable 
secular norms.  In this indistinction between horde psychology, as Freud would call it, 
and revolutionary class-consciousness in the cinematic audience, we reach the limits of 
Benjamin’s cultural psychoanalysis.  The redemption of privacy is, for Benjamin, its 
dissolution. Thus, there remains something about privacy and its role and relevance to 
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modern secularized society that is neither exhausted in Freud’s treatment of it nor fully 
comprehended by Benjaminian cultural psychoanalysis.   
What then remains?  I would like to suggest that, in “The Storyteller” essay, 
Benjamin articulates a partial answer to this question even if it remains ultimately 
unelaborated in his work.  In providing a melancholic self-portrait of sorts via the figure 
of the novelist, Benjamin writes that  
[The novel] neither comes from oral tradition nor enters into it.  This distinguishes 
it from storytelling in particular.  The storyteller takes what he tells from 
experience—his own or that reported by others.  And he in turn makes it the 
experience of those who are listening to his tale.  The novelist has secluded 
himself.  The birthplace of the novel is the individual in his isolation, the 
individual who can no longer speak of his concerns in exemplary fashion, who 
himself lacks counsel and can give none.
231
 
Benjamin’s work is motivated by, expresses the need for, and attempts to make possible a 
new self-critical practice of myth-making, a solidaristic practice by which private 
experience can stake its claim on public life.  In other words, it is precisely a concern 
over, as Benjamin says, exemplarity: the ability to embody one’s private conviction in a 
publically shareable form—open to all and thus potentially criticizable by all.232  It is 
here, at this juncture, that we must turn from Benjamin to Cavell, who supplies that 
which is both extruded from and which grounds Benjamin’s work: the hope for a 
solidaristic practice of critical meaning-making.  Or, to put this in terms mutual to 
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Benjamin and Cavell: an image of solidarity capable of overcoming the isolation or 
skepticism of modern experience.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DIALECTIC OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN THE WRITING OF STANLEY 
CAVELL AND THE CRITICAL REDEMPTION OF THE MOVIES 
 
The epistemological problem is the first problem of justice: when we know our position 
we will know what ought to happen, whether or not we then choose to find out what may 
forward it or what may not, decide that it is worth trying or that it is not.  Rousseau’s 
discovery is less a discovery of new knowledge than a discovery of a new mode of 
knowledge, a way to use the self as access to the self’s society.  It is consequently the 
discovery of a new mode of ignorance.  Marx and Freud will call this ignorance 
unconsciousness, the former of our social present, the latter of our private pasts; but these 
will prove not to be so different.  (Both speak of this ignorance as the result of 
repression.)233 
 
I turn now to Cavell and the project of acknowledgment.  The aim of this chapter 
is to demonstrate not only that Cavell stands as the inheritor of the modernisms of Freud 
and Benjamin, but moreover that his work represents the dialectical marriage of their 
respective redemptive enterprises.  Where Freud activated private fantasy so that its 
power could redeem the world as one deserving of desire and Benjamin activated public 
fantasy in the form of the commodity in order to release its utopian dimension, Cavell’s 
uptake of ordinary language philosophy renders thematic this division of labor.  Freud 
and Benjamin directed their critical efforts at the resolution of the rift between private 
desire and public life, but could only stop short at this divide, running up against the 
limits of their own projects.  These limits are the explicit subject of Cavell’s work, which 
charts the intertwinement and the irresolution of the autobiographical (or private) and the 
representative (or public) dimensions of speech. 
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For Cavell, “the relation between self and community (because they are composed 
of one another) is an undying dialectic;”234 hence they provide mutual access to one 
another.  That our position is not already known, but always to be discovered and that this 
discovery depends on the capacity to make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and so to 
others means that the identification and articulation of the private self is, at the same 
time, the pronouncement of what one takes to hold as a general truth; it is to arrogate the 
authority to speak for all and to prescribe for all, an authority based on nothing but trust 
in one’s own experience and one’s ability to give this experience its proper weight.  
Speech is, per Cavell, necessarily representative and philosophical speech, in particular, 
proclaims overtly its right to speak in a universal voice.  Simultaneously, in speaking 
authoritatively—on behalf of and for the sake of all—the condition that I ultimately point 
to is myself: the experiences that I have had and so the ways in which things matter to 
me.  In other words, philosophy implicates itself in autobiography and autobiography, the 
undertaking of self-representation hence the cultivation of self-knowledge, is thoroughly 
imbricated in philosophy’s attempt to draw the measurements of the human as such.  
“The autobiographical dimension of philosophy is internal to the claim that philosophy 
speaks for the human, for all; that is its necessary arrogance.  The philosophical 
dimension of autobiography is that the human is representative, say, imitative, that each 
life is exemplary of all, a parable of each; that is humanity’s commonness, which is 
internal to its endless denials of commonness.”235 
Thus we see that, in treating the public and the private not as isolable spheres, but 
rather as voices that we use, Cavell establishes an essential convergence between 
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philosophy and democratic politics.  On Cavell’s “philosophy of language,” if it can so be 
called, the private and the public cannot be categorically distinguished from one another 
and it is at the site of their indistinction that politics arises.
236
  Cavell maintains that 
secularized culture must become, in a certain qualified sense, philosophical if the 
aspiration to democracy is to be preserved.  I will argue that this is a sense of philosophy 
as redemptive criticism, Cavell’s uptake of ordinary language philosophy providing the 
foundation for the allegorical practice of meaning-making that we have seen at work in 
the texts of Benjamin and Freud.  Cavell thus stands as our American redemptive critic, 
which is to say a critic of democracy where democracy is understood as egalitarian and 
secular. In this, the argument of this dissertation finds its summation, showing that 
democracy is the proper scene of redemptive criticism and that redemptive criticism 
names the culture capable of bearing a genuinely democratic politics. 
The argument of this chapter proceeds in four stages.  I begin by way of Cavell’s 
redemptive re-casting of the problem of skepticism.  In his signature essay, “Knowing 
and Acknowledging,” Cavell re-apprehends the meaning of the anti/skeptical debate 
beyond its epistemological confinement.  In so doing, he develops the central normative 
concept of his work: that of acknowledgment, in which mutual intelligibility is shown to 
be, not an epistemic problem, but rather a matter of solidarity.  This initial foray into 
Cavell’s distinctive conception of skepticism will serve to align the project of 
acknowledgment with the redemptive hermeneutics of Freud and Benjamin.  After this 
preliminary establishment of Cavell’s methodological affinity with his two predecessors, 
I then make the case that, in his conception of the ordinary, i.e., the everyday formed in 
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and through the skeptical denial of it, Cavell reveals himself as a dialectical materialist in 
the sense in which, following Benjamin and Freud, I have been using the term.  Cavell’s 
insistence on the “conventionality of human society,” that the tenuous bonds of 
community are based on nothing but our agreement with one another, is met equally by 
his insistence on the “conventionality of human nature itself,”237 that our nature is 
produced in and through historical practices.  It is in this oscillation between the 
conventional and the natural that Cavell’s dialectical materialism—his “anthropological, 
or anthropomorphic, view of necessity”238—abides.  Through my examination of Cavell’s 
conception of convention as the form of second nature, I am able to go on to demonstrate 
that Cavell’s activity of philosophizing is undergirded by the same philosophy of history 
that supports the critical-redemptive efforts of Freud and Benjamin.  Finally, I will turn to 
the exposition of acknowledgment as it occurs within the context of the Cavellian 
cinema.  Cavell discovers, in the movies, modernity’s pre-eminent form of allegorical 
meaning-making, what Benjamin glimpsed, but remained unable to grasp.  The 
redemption of history must become social practice and the movies, as the site of the 
public’s gathering before the re-collected material of historical experience, represents just 
such a practice. 
 
Skepticism, Anti-skepticism, & the Dialectic of Privacy and Publicity 
Cavell’s methodological kinship with Benjamin and Freud and hence his 
membership in the hermeneutical tradition of redemptive criticism can be established 
through the elaboration of the ethic that defines their work.  In speaking of an “ethic,” I 
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intend the general comportment that all three bring to bear on the subjects of their 
respective studies and the telos that determines the character of their hermeneutical 
procedures, namely the re-apprehension of the quotidian.  I have already sketched the 
significance of this attunement as it is at play in Freud’s redemption of dreaming as a 
graphic art and Benjamin’s redemption of mass culture as the expression (and denial) of 
the utopian desires of the collective.  Undertaken on these terms, I defined the approach 
of this interpretive practice as the predisposition to the everyday as the site of 
awakening—what Cavell would describe as the return of—or the turn to—the ordinary, 
where the mundane exists in and as a state of unknownness, fallenness, or neglect.   
Within Cavell’s work, as in Freud’s and Benjamin’s, redemption has many 
occasions and hence the “ordinary,” the Cavellian object of critical-redemptive scrutiny, 
has many forms.  Yet, even in its multiplicity, the ordinary is always defined in relation 
to skepticism.  As Cavell remarks, referring to the originality of Wittgenstein but equally 
providing a characterization of the guiding insight of his own work: “he takes the drift 
toward skepticism as the discovery of the everyday, a discovery of exactly what it is that 
skepticism would deny.”239  The ordinary is a discovery of the skeptic, the one who either 
willfully suspends or suffers the interruption of her natural relation to the world, what 
“under normal circumstances” she would say or do.  It can be inferred on the basis of 
Cavell’s articulation of skepticism as “a place, perhaps the central secular place, in which 
the human wish to deny the condition of human existence is expressed,” as a discovery of 
modernity more generally.  What Cavell knows as skepticism is autochthonous to 
modernity and essential to his concept of it.  Cavell’s philosophizing arises from out of 
the insight that secularized social space has no assurance of integrity other than 
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convention, i.e., our coming together as a public, and that, while the groundlessness of 
these practices is not something of which we are constantly or necessarily aware, it is a 
fact that can, at any moment, become available.  In this light, the skeptic stands as the 
emblematic figure through whom the ground (and groundlessness) of a specifically 
secular modernity articulates itself. 
That the ordinary is so easily missed and then, when it appears, so readily 
questionable, means that the quotidian is oddly both powerful (nothing is stronger, 
anyway) and yet entirely fragile.
240
  Skepticism is, we could say, the permanent price—
and promise—of a secular form of life in which there is no transcendent authority to 
which to make appeal.  Whatever good reasons that we have for acting, those will have to 
be discovered immediately before us, but, for the claim of the quotidian to be rightly 
heard, it must first be subject to re-apprehension.  The everyday, the matter that we find 
immediately before us, is already authoritative in the sense of appearing as self-evident 
and, in this mute obviousness, not liable to further interrogation.  But to find oneself 
before a de facto authority such as this, however, is to be confronted with one wholly 
anathematic to secular, democratic politics in which no authority can be taken for 
granted, i.e., on faith alone.  Hence, each person must prove in each instance her right to 
our recognition, each assertion its validity, each object its interest.  In this, the notion of 
the secular intersects with the profane in which a world abandoned by God is one in 
which nothing is sacred, each thing as meaningful (or meaningless) as the next.   
My three redemptive critics undertake the work of cultural interpretation in the 
thorough-going awareness of what secularity demands and it is from out of this 
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knowledge that arises their shared affinity for the marginal, the obsolescent, and the 
overlooked: those phenomena that are reflexively dismissed by scientific or philosophic 
authority as having no claim to our attention.
 241
  In his handling of skepticism, Cavell 
takes up a discourse that is criticized by his fellow ordinary language critics as senseless 
or unintelligible and shows it as not only deserving of, but requiring specifically 
philosophical address even if the redress of this condition might lie significantly beyond 
the capacities of the discipline.
242
  As Cavell sees it, the repudiation of the skeptic on the 
grounds that her position is unintelligible or obviously insincere represents an explicit 
betrayal of the ethos of this philosophy, which advances “a new claim to philosophy’s old 
authority, one whose power reside(s) in a certain systematic abdication of authority.”243  
That ordinary language philosophy maintains that disputes over meaning, i.e., 
philosophical disputes, are to be resolved in terms of recalling actual criteria for 
intelligibility, i.e., what we ordinarily say and do in specific circumstances, means that, in 
these socio-linguistic matters, the only recourse is “autobiographical;” one must, in trying 
to substantiate one’s sense of how word and world find their alignment, call upon one’s 
own experience.  In this, all native speakers are equally ordinary speakers.  Hence the 
ordinary language philosopher who reflexively condemns the skeptic as incapable of 
meaning what she says exerts a claim to expertise to which she has no right, her 
repudiation no more than a piece of abuse.  Moreover, she undercuts the ground of any 
authority she might have, which can rest on nothing other than the identification and 
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publicization of her private sensibility—her capacity to take stock in and master in an 
exemplary way the experience that she has at her disposal. 
Because the way you must rely upon yourself as a source of what is said when 
demands that you grant full title to others as sources of that data—not out of 
politeness, but because the nature of the claim you make for yourself is repudiated 
without that acknowledgment: it is a claim that no one knows better than you 
whether and when a thing is said, and if this is not to be taken as a claim to 
expertise (a way of taking it which repudiates it) then it must be understood to 
mean that you know no better than others what you claim to know.  With respect 
to the data of philosophy our positions are the same.  This is scarcely a discovery 
of ordinary language philosophy; it is the latest confirmation of what the oracle 
said to Socrates.  The virtue of proceeding from ordinary language is that it makes 
(or ought to make) this message inescapably present to us.
244
 
Thus, according to Cavell, the procedures of this new philosophy are democratic, in the 
sense that no one is or can be granted authority over anyone else, and egalitarian, in the 
sense that all have an equal right to speak and be heard, upon which follows the equal 
obligation to listen.  Not only is this the ethos of Cavell’s philosophy, but, moreover, this 
philosophy aims to enable such conversation.  It takes, as its therapeutic task, the 
recovery of the human voice, the sense of the self as authorized to speak which is at the 
same time the hope that it can be heard.  Accordingly, Cavell is able to see that the 
ordinary (typical) ordinary language philosopher’s dismissal of the skeptic is illegitimate, 
a performative contradiction that undoes the ethic upon which this philosophy is 
grounded. 
 It is Cavell’s position that “philosophy’s task is not so much to defeat the 
skeptical argument as to preserve it, as though the philosophical profit of the argument 
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would be to show not how it might end but why it must begin and why it must have no 
end, at least none within philosophy, or what we think of as philosophy.”245  For Cavell, 
skepticism gives distorted expression to a genuine insight and hence what this discourse 
requires is not philosophical refutation, but rather elaboration or working-through, the re-
comprehension of the meaning of the skeptic’s terms and the point in her using them 
thus.  The insight that abides in the skeptic’s position is that, when it comes to knowledge 
of another, certainty is not enough; rather knowledge of another is bound up 
fundamentally with the acknowledgment of the other’s freedom.  What I can know of the 
other depends upon the freedom of her expression, what she is able or willing to disclose 
to me, and upon the extent and limits of my responsiveness to her.  Skepticism, in this 
way, secretly rehearses the modern tragedy of the disarticulation between the public and 
the private.  According to Cavell, the skeptic’s insight into the limits of intelligibility is 
the insight from which secular philosophy must begin and to which it must always 
recur.246  Skepticism thus holds the same position in Cavell’s thinking as dreams do in the 
work of Freud and the Trauerspiel in the late work of Benjamin.  As Freud and Benjamin 
redeemed these phenomena for the purpose of gaining new critical access to the present, 
Cavell treats the discourse of skepticism on the model of the elaboration of a fantasy, 
transfiguring its meaning in such a way that a narrowly epistemological problem shows 
itself as a reflection of the diremption between the public and private spheres. 
Cavell’s redemptive reading of skepticism is predicated upon and evinces his anti-
criterial reading of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the significance of “agreement in 
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judgments.”247  When Cavell advanced this anti-criterial reading in his doctoral 
dissertation, which was to become the Claim of Reason, this was in contrast to the 
foundationalism that had dominated Wittgenstein studies and that read Wittgenstein as 
advancing the view that criteria constituted a highly systemized set of specifications for 
the use of terms.  On the, let us call it, flatly anti-skeptical reading, the possession of a 
native tongue consists in the mastery of abstract principles of grammar and mutual 
intelligibility is assured insofar as individuals speak and listen from within this 
grammatical framework.  This is to say that their use of words in a given instance must 
conform, if they are to be intelligible, to a pre-existing linguistic structure conceived of as 
a neutral middle term of sorts.
248
  Read in this way, Wittgenstein’s interpretation of 
criteria constitutes his decisive and certain refutation of skepticism.  As Cavell sees it, 
however, the entire pathos of Wittgenstein’s text is set against just such a view in which 
language, of itself, takes care of meaning.  Such a reading not only suppresses the critical 
insight of the Philosophical Investigations into the necessary opacity of language, but 
further, in so doing, countermands the therapeutic labors of the text.
 249
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As is relentlessly played out through the pages of the Philosophical 
Investigations, the learning of a word does not consists in the mastery of a set of rules for 
the condition of its use; rather mastery is demonstrated in the language learner’s ability to 
use a word in unanticipated contexts.  Involved in mutual intelligibility is an ineliminable 
element of individual judgment.  In being able to carry on with a word, to see how far it 
will take us, we must rely upon our own sense of what is appropriate and trust that what 
is for us a natural extension will be a usage intelligible to others: one to which they can 
give their consent.  Mutual intelligibility depends, on the one hand, upon our capacity for 
self-authorization and our ability and/or willingness to find the words capable of bearing 
our meaning and, on the other, on the flexibility to follow others in their linguistic 
ventures down paths of significance as yet unexplored.  Cavell captures the former 
requirement in his concept of “voice.”250  Voice registers the fact that, in speaking, if I 
am to make sense, I must take or reveal a specific position and my ability to do this can 
be lost or stolen, stifled in doubt.  The significance of our speech is not merely an effect 
of the words that we speak; rather “what they mean, and whether they mean anything, 
depends solely upon whether I am using them so as to make my meaning.”251  Cavell, 
rather than maintaining that the specificity and normativity of our language is the effect 
of a framework of rules, holds that the intelligibility of what we say depends upon 
whether or not we, in that saying, achieve the articulation of that which conditions our 
speech where those conditions are understood as what counts for us, why we say what we 
do when.  The challenge of speaking, of having or finding one’s voice, is to discover 
whether or not we can mean what we say.  Intending our words—making a point with 
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them and so projecting the ground of our speech into the language that we use—means 
that we take responsibility for them—are willing to make ourselves understood—which 
means, further, that we are willing to go on, to elaborate our meaning.  Intelligibility is 
incompletely thought as simply an issue of what one says, i.e., the intelligibility of an 
assertion.  Rather, integral to the intelligibility of what one says is the point of saying it: 
why these words here and now?—To what end?  “To know what a person has said you 
have to know that he or she has asserted something, and know what he or she has 
asserted.  What difficulty is there in that?  No difficulty, nothing is easier.  But what is 
easy, then is to understand the point of his words; for that is essential to knowing that he 
has asserted something and knowing what he has asserted.”252  In other words, mutual 
intelligibility concerns the way in which we are attuned to one another: the specificity of 
the positions that we hold vis-à-vis one another and the context of this particular 
interaction within, perhaps, the greater context of our relationships.  In attempting to 
make sense of what the other says, we are always compelled to go beyond what is merely 
asserted and, conversely, in our own efforts at self-expression, our words always go 
further than intended.  This imaginative dimension—this openness in the face of the 
other’s opacity—is what Cavell means to capture in the idea of acknowledging another.  
In acknowledging another person, we accept her independence from us and this 
acceptance is the basis upon which mutual understanding is not guaranteed, but through 
which it unfolds.  
Through developing mutual intelligibility in terms of voice and acknowledgment, 
Cavell means to de-emphasize criteria, demonstrating that criteria do not prospectively 
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determine the full range of a word’s application; they cannot.253  A word would not be a 
symbolic token if it could not be projected into new circumstances and find application in 
a variety of distinct instances.  Its meaning is therefore general enough to allow this 
projection, but this generality cannot be exhaustively articulated in advance as a strict 
rule of usage.  The definition of a word, the range of what it comprehends, is to be 
discovered through its unfolding in and across diverse contexts, its center of gravity 
(re)discovered in and through the on-going examination of the particular instances in 
which it finds meaningful employ.  This flexibility—a word’s identity constituted 
through its iterablity or self-othering—is as fundamental to meaning as the stability of 
language.  As Cavell writes, we must “keep in balance two fundamental facts about 
human forms of life, and about the concepts formed in those forms: that any form of life 
and every concept integral to it has an indefinite number of instances and directions of 
projection; and that this variation is not arbitrary.  Both the ‘outer’ variance and the 
‘inner’ constancy are necessary if a concept is to accomplish its tasks.”254  So, while 
Cavell rejects the reading of criteria as impersonal norms that strictly govern linguistic 
exchange, neither does he subscribe to a voluntarism in which meaning is arbitrary, 
significance secured upon nothing other than mutual consent.  For while criteria cannot 
determine all the circumstances in which a concept might find application—“though 
language—what we call language—is tolerant, allows projection, not just any projection 
will be acceptable, i.e., will communicate.”255  Rather “an object or activity or event onto 
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or into which a concept is projected must invite or allow that projection.”256  How do we 
know when a projection is invited or authorized?  All we can do is see how a word means 
or fails to mean. And our senses here may differ—and are free to do so.  As Cavell 
writes, “the only source of confirmation here is ourselves.  And each of us is fully 
authoritative in this struggle.  An initial disagreement may be overcome…but if the 
disagreement persists, there is no appeal beyond us, or if beyond us two, then not beyond 
some eventual us.  There is a thing such as intellectual tragedy.  It is not a matter of 
saying something false.”257 
As Cavell sees it, while criteria serve as the potential means of negotiating such 
disagreements, they do not negate the openness of our linguistic practices.  This 
constitutive incompletion of language is from whence the threat or fantasy of a private 
language.  While skepticism and anti-skepticism appear as opposed positions, Cavell’s 
analysis in “Knowing and Acknowledging” shows that both express the fantasy of a 
condition of intelligibility that occurs independent of my investment in these words and 
my sense of the world that is at stake in communicating them—or hearing them—here 
and now. 
[Skepticism] begins with a full appreciation of the decisively significant facts that 
I may be suffering when no one else is, and that (no one) else may know (or 
care?); and that others may be suffering and I not know it, which is equally 
appalling.  But then something happens, and instead of pursuing the significance 
of these facts, he is enmeshed so it may seem—in questions of whether we can 
have the same suffering, one another’s suffering. But whether or not one senses 
that the issue has become deflected in the course of his investigation, his 
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motivation in it is still stronger, even more comprehensible, than that of the anti-
skeptic.
258
 
Cavell treats skepticism not as a purely epistemological problem, then, but as a plight of 
mind that is primarily existential or ethical in nature.  Cavell characterizes the skeptical 
problematic as a concern over the way in which my existence is implicated in the 
existence of others and yet how our lives, nonetheless, may pass one another by.  This is 
why other-minds skepticism takes as its natural topic the concept of pain, since the 
concern of the skeptic is the helplessness that passes for privacy.  Cavell reads other-
minds skepticism as a response to the frightening yet undeniable fact of our dependence 
upon one another and the world and the difficulty of properly honoring, acceding to, that 
vulnerability. What the skeptic maintains is that, when it comes to knowledge of another, 
certainty is not enough and, in this, the skeptic is right.  Knowledge of another cannot be 
secured by means of the objectivating attitude.
259
  Knowing another requires that I put 
myself in relation to her and actively engage with her.  It is a matter of self-revelation and 
responsiveness.  Hence what is decisive in so-called “knowledge of other minds” is not 
what I know, but what I do in the presence of the other and what she does in mine.  Our 
knowledge of one another is ultimately relational, fundamentally a matter of praxis.  It is 
this practical dimension of mutual intelligibility to which Cavell means to draw our 
attention in shifting the emphasis from knowledge to acknowledgment.
260
 
                                                        
258
 Ibid, 247 
259
 “There are special problems about our knowledge of another; exactly the problems the skeptic sees.  And 
these problems can be said to invoke a special concept of knowledge, or region of the concept of 
knowledge, one which is not a function of certainty,” (MWMW, 258). 
260
 “But why is sympathy expressed in this way? Because your suffering makes a claim on me.  It is not 
enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer--I must do or reveal something (whatever can be done).  In 
a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what “(your or his) being in pain means.  Is.  (This 
is the “acknowledging it to you.”  There is also something to be called ‘acknowledging it to you,” 
(MWMW, 263). 
 
 187 
According to Cavell, the skeptic is right to recognize and insist upon the 
possibility of our unknownness and our unknowingness inasmuch as this is a possibility 
internal to the workings of human language and communication.  But then, as he says, 
something happens and this ethical line of inquiry into the meaning and consequences of 
human separateness finds itself derailed, framed as a narrowly epistemological quandary.  
Cavell diagnoses the philosophical position of skepticism as a defense against the facts of 
human solidarity, facts that should be read simultaneously in terms of the ungraspability 
of our dependence and the depth of our separateness and which mean that, in our dealings 
with others, nothing assures that mutuality will be achieved.  Because we are independent 
from one another, we may remain alone, unable to make ourselves understood or lacking 
the company that would care to help us discover what we mean.  This is a possibility that 
cannot be foreclosed, separateness standing as both the condition of isolation and the 
ground of our mutuality.  Yet the skeptic continues to insist on certainty and, in so doing, 
produces a criterion for knowing another that cannot be fulfilled.  In her insistence that 
nothing less than feeling what another feels constitutes genuine knowledge of them, she 
recuses herself from the responsibility (and the peril) of actively engaging with the other.  
This means that, according to Cavell, anti-skepticism, which counters the 
skeptic’s claim of strict privacy with the insistence upon full publicity, does not represent 
a solution to the skeptical problematic.  Rather, it cements the narrowly epistemological 
form in which the philosophical problem of privacy is trapped and condemns the 
skeptic’s insight into the ground(lessness) of community to go unrecorded.  As Cavell 
indicates, this is even more perverse than skepticism in that it not only maintains the 
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wrong-headed criterion of unmediated access to the other’s inner life—knowledge of the 
other as if despite her otherness—but further claims that this criterion can, in fact, be met. 
The head on effort to defeat skepticism allows us to think that we have 
explanations where in fact we lack them.  More important, in fighting the skeptic 
too close in, as it were, the anti-skeptic takes over—or encourages—the major 
condition of the skeptic’s argument, viz., that the problem of knowledge about 
other minds is the problem of certainty.  At the same time, he neglects the 
fundamental insight of the skeptic by trying to single-mindedly prove its non-
existence—the insight, as I wish to put it, that certainty is not enough.261  
The skeptic sees that language cannot, of itself, assure mutuality yet refuses the 
responsibility that thereby devolves upon her to project herself into her words.  She frees 
herself from this obligation by rendering privacy an absolute barrier to intimacy rather 
than acknowledging it as the condition of mutuality.  The anti-skeptic, on the other hand, 
insists that, with respect to the other, there is nothing that I cannot be said to know or fail 
to know.  Provoked by the skeptic’s “scary conclusion” that we can never know what 
another undergoes,
262
 the anti-skeptic insists that the “descriptive identity” of our pain 
represents sufficient ground to assert that we do indeed feel the same thing and hence that 
we can be certain.  In so doing, he effaces the specificity of the other.  Through the 
fantasy of language as a grammatical framework that mechanically assures our alignment 
with one another, the anti-skeptic denies the difference that renders mutuality and my 
own powers of self-representation intrinsically fragile.  Such a fantasy amounts to an 
instrumentalization of language and effectively prevents us from recognizing the fact that 
intelligibility requires our giving ourselves to our words and trusting that they will be 
able to bear the specificity of our meaning.   
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Skepticism, which interprets the uniqueness of my existence as its 
incommunicability, and anti-skepticism, which effaces the personal dimension of speech 
in claiming that intelligibility depends upon the conformity of our talk to an abstract set 
of linguistic rules, are, per Cavell, of a piece. Through their polarization of the personal 
(the autobiographical) and the representative (the philosophic) dimensions of speech, 
they constitute a framework that effectively forecloses the possibility of acknowledging 
that it is precisely the depth of our separateness that constitutes the unity of our condition.  
Only through acknowledging the individuality of others can I turn to face them, allow 
them to reveal themselves, and, in turn reveal my own position.  Both skepticism and 
anti-skepticism evince a desire for pure intelligibility, for a language free from the 
contaminating effect of particularity and the responsibilities of both honoring and 
broaching our distance from one another. 
 The discourses of skepticism and anti-skepticism are internally related and they 
incite and sustain one another, standing equally as hysterical denials of the mundane fact 
that it is only in our attunement to one another, our willingness to make ourselves known 
and our wish to know the other, that community abides.
263
  Thus, while Cavell develops 
the figure of the anti-skeptic from out of his engagement with the writings of Malcolm 
and Cook, the “skeptic” and the “anti-skeptic” are, at the end of the day, to be read not as 
referring to specific persons or positions.  Rather, as in Wittgenstein, the anti/skeptical 
debate represents the internal, animating argument of modernity with and over itself.  As 
Cavell remarks, “it is not as if the problem is for opposed positions to be reconciled, but 
for the halves of the mind to go back together.  This ambition frequently comes to grief.  
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But it provides the particular satisfaction as well as the particular anguish, of a particular 
activity of philosophizing.”264  In other words, the goal of Cavell’s therapeutic endeavor 
is not to synthesize these antitheses nor to expose either as baseless, but rather to restore 
awareness of the dialectical interrelation (or involution) between the public and the 
private. 
 
Skepticism as fantastic discourse 
What is actively repressed by the anti/skeptical framework is that mutual 
understanding requires, on the one hand, voice, and, on the other, acknowledgment.  The 
retrieval of voice and the possibility of acknowledgment require the redemption of the 
skeptical insight from out of which this dilemma arises and which provokes the reactive 
anti-skeptical stance.  Whereas the anti-skeptical picture of language arises in the denial 
of the need for individual judgment in language-use, the skeptical view acknowledges the 
personal dimension of speech yet takes it as proof of the arbitrariness of meaning as 
though individuality were no more than idiosyncrasy.  Hence, Cavell sees the skeptical 
impulse as deeper: arising from a more honest assessment of the straits upon which 
interrelationality is founded.  On Cavell’s reading, the skeptic’s absolutization of privacy 
as incommunicability both expresses and denies a “wish for a response to my 
expressions.”265  The other-minds skeptic, worried over the basis of her connection to 
others, is motivated by the want of community.  Yet, in her attempt to discover the 
certain ground of mutuality, what she finds is that no such ground exists: that what we 
can know of others always depends upon their expressiveness and our willingness and 
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ability to read the meaning of these equivocal expressions.  Cavell’s skeptic is appalled 
by her insight that our privacy is, at the same time, potentially our sentence to 
unknowness and unknowingness.
266
  The skeptic thereby transforms the always tenuous 
basis of community into the impossibility of publicity, inoculating herself from the threat 
of isolation through her preemptive withdrawal.  For Cavell, this amounts to an ethical 
recusal, a flight from the responsibility of actively revealing oneself through speech.  
Cavell claims that what motivates the skeptical stance, in which human finitude is 
transformed into an irredeemable epistemic failure, is a fear of inarticulateness.  But this 
desire for a response to one’s separateness must, insofar as it results from the repressed 
knowledge that the significance of one’s expressions and experience is not wholly a 
matter of one’s intentions but dependent upon its reception and uptake by others, 
simultaneously be read as a terror of unmitigated exposure: that my voice will not be 
heard, my meanings remain unacknowledged . 
“The fantasy of a private language, underlying the wish to deny the publicness of 
language, turns out…to be a fantasy, or fear, either of inexpressiveness, one in 
which I am not merely unknown, but in which I am powerless to make myself 
known; or one in which what I express is beyond my control”—so a fantasy of 
suffocation or of exposure…Accordingly, I am led to stress the condition that I 
find to precede, to ground the possibility and the necessity of, ‘the desire to 
express at all,’ namely the terror of absolute inexpressiveness, suffocation, which 
at the same time reveals itself as a terror of absolute expressiveness, 
unconditioned exposure; they are the extreme states of voicelessness.
267
 
On the one hand, the idea of the privacy of language expresses a sense of incapacitation, 
as though the instrument of language, the medium in which we are granted intimacy, 
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were what rendered us lame and prevented us from ever reaching one another.  On the 
other hand, the insistence on privacy as unknowability stands as an attempt to deny the 
fact of human vulnerability, that I am exposed the world in ways that are beyond my 
control.  Privacy is transformed into a confinement that is simultaneously protective and 
suffocating.  Skepticism, taken up from the side of this aspect, appears as a fear of 
exposure to the other’s penetrating, objectifying gaze, as though my subjectivity were not 
my own to be mastered and expressed, but something that escaped me entirely.  Taken 
“positively” then, skepticism is a fantasy of self-sufficiency (that only I can know what I 
mean) and so of assured authority.  Individuality here is not something to be discovered 
in relation to others, but rather safeguarded, the inexpressible singularity of one’s 
existence the only proof that one can have of its worth.  At the same time, this fantasy 
solves the problem of self-knowledge, as though the exclusive ownership of sensations 
amounted to their intelligibility.  The fantasy of a private language is of the inner life of 
the individual as transparent to that individual and so of the lack of need for the 
mediating and interpretive work of language. 
 Cavell reads skepticism as a compromise-formation of sorts—as Benjamin read 
the commodity—which is to say as a text that expresses and partially satisfies a 
repudiated desire as it simultaneously constitutes a defense against it.  Motivated by a 
deep ambivalence, which must itself be denied, the skeptic’s words are “the only words 
(they are the right) words for meeting the situation he has found himself in.”268  
Skepticism, as Cavell sees it, is a rationalization of an all too common disappointment 
with human relations, a fear of my own inscrutability to myself, and an attempt to 
inoculate myself against the anxiety over the ways in which we are unintentionally and 
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indeterminately expressively linked to one another in our daily life.  Cavell, in 
acknowledging the skeptic (and the anti-skeptic) in himself, transcribes this philosophical 
dilemma such that it becomes legible as a plight of mind that is latent to the structure of 
modern selfhood understood as the site or product of a post-theological loss of 
authorization (god, too, was a solution to the problem of the insufficiency of criteria to 
settle meaning).  Against resolute Wittgensteinians who would treat the skeptic as one 
enslaved to philosophical emptiness, Cavell reveals the skeptic’s position as expressing 
anxiety over the inescapable fact that, in our efforts to make ourselves known and to 
know others, there is and ought to be no guarantee.  In other words, Cavell redeems 
skepticism, transforming the negation of the concept of community into an occasion for 
its re-formation. 
 
Criteria & Convention—or, Cavell’s Natural History 
For me the uncanniness of the ordinary is epitomized by the possibility or threat of 
what philosophy has called skepticism, understood (as in my studies of Austin and of 
the latter Wittgenstein I have come to understand it) as the capacity, even desire, of 
ordinary language to repudiate itself, specifically to repudiate its power to word the 
world, to apply to the things we have in common, or to pass them by.  (By ‘the desire 
of ordinary language to repudiate itself’ I mean—doesn’t it go without saying?—a 
desire on the part of speakers of a native or mastered tongue who desire to assert 
themselves, and despair of it…(My conception of the ordinary) responds to the 
fantastic in what human beings will accustom themselves to, call this the surrealism of 
the habitual—as if to be human is forever to be prey to turning your corner of the 
human race, hence perhaps all of it, into some new species of the genus of humanity, 
for the better or for the worst.  I might describe my philosophical task as one of 
outlining the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human as 
inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic…269 
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 While the skeptic endorses a grammatical anarchism, viewing language-use as 
ungoverned and ungovernable and so any appearance of intersubjective order or 
coherence to be but an illusion, the anti-skeptic takes up Wittgenstein’s conception of 
criteria as a cudgel by which to beat back the skeptic, disallowing her insight into the 
essential indeterminacy of language hence further repressing the fact that mutuality is not 
prospectively assured but must be achieved from out of our respective privacies.  In 
opposition to the skeptic’s insistence that the rules of language do not suffice for the task 
of knowing other minds, the anti-skeptic conceptualizes criteria as a framework 
regulating linguistic exchange that constitutes a prior contract of understanding to which 
we can refer back to definitively settle disputes over meaning.
270
  On Cavell’s reading, 
while criterial elaboration may have the power to restore us to our natural habituation of 
the everyday, this ability is not vindicatory.  It is, as I will show, redemptive.   
In this section, I step back from Cavell’s engagement with skepticism as it 
appears in the essay “Knowing and Acknowledging” so as to re-traverse his reading of 
our “agreement in judgments” in terms of the conventionality of criteria.  In re-treading 
this ground, I aim to show that, despite his seeming a-historicism, Cavell’s philosophical 
practice is undergirded by the same philosophy of history that serves as the theoretical 
basis of the redemptive operations of Benjamin and Freud.  In this section, I will argue 
that Cavell should himself be read as a dialectical materialist, i.e., as one who writes from 
and aims to make available the perspective of natural history.  Cavell’s non-historicist 
understanding of the power of history leads him to view convention mythically, which is 
to say, as simultaneously conservative and revolutionary. As we have seen, there is no 
fact of the matter that grounds our mutuality. Rather, the harmony of our collective 
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practices, what Cavell calls “the ordinary,” only emerges as some identifiable thing in the 
breakdown of the (seemingly) intersubjective weave of everyday communication. In 
establishing this, I will, as well, begin to more decisively develop the claim that Cavell’s 
uptake of Wittgenstein’s “philosophy of language” offers itself to be read as a critical 
allegorization of the myth of contract and that, in general, Cavell’s conception of 
acknowledgment offers an alternative interpretation of the possibility and promise of 
democracy, an argument that will find its completion in my reading of Cavell’s anarchic 
cinema. 
In his reading of Wittgenstein, Cavell places central emphasis upon the notion 
that community depends upon an agreement that is immemorial in character.  While, 
according to Cavell, communication is only possible because there is “agreement in 
judgments” and this agreement is prior to linguistic exchange, he nonetheless maintains 
that criteria do not pre-date the semantic emergency that calls them forth.  Rather criteria 
arise in and through a moment of crisis and their evocation is meant to restore the sense 
of the everyday that has been thrown into skeptical disorder or suffered philosophical 
derangement.  Hence the ordinary field of understanding to which we are returned only 
ever emerges in a moment of crisis; our pre-reflective “agreement” showing itself in its 
failure to obtain.  The ordinary receives retrospective constitution and community is 
discovered belatedly, if at all.  This means that what is taken as Cavell’s conservatism as 
a thinker or, in an extreme instance as his totalitarianism, is a mistaking.
271
  Cavell’s 
emphasis on the ordinary does not represent a plea for or defense of the way we do things 
around here, as though the evocation of the ordinary represented the end rather than the 
beginning of the conversation over the shared matter of our lives.  Nor does the solution 
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come in the form of a Romantic individualism, the problem of meaning transcended 
through the will alone.  Rather, Cavell forwards a view of convention as second nature—
neither arbitrary nor absolute, but rather a matter of historical settlement and so available 
for excavation and re-building. 
   In his idea of the “ordinary,” Cavell registers the harmony of our collective 
practices, i.e., what we all say and do, and simultaneously that there is no additional fact 
of the matter that anchors this world of shared meanings and activities.  A form of life is 
only held together insofar as there exists a pre-reflective trust that we do, in fact, occupy 
the same community and so are comprehensible to one another, this confidence both 
shored up by and preserving the stability of our share practices.  As in our preliminary 
discussion of the concepts of voice and acknowledgment, it is nothing more—and 
nothing less—than our willingness for conversation that assures human intercourse.  
Fundamental to mutual intelligibility is the desire to practically engage with one another.  
This is the insight that Cavell retrieves from the skeptic that “our fundamental relation to 
the world is not one of knowing.”  Rather knowledge is itself predicated on and shaped in 
terms of on-the-ground practical engagements—everydayness—a tacit form of 
knowledge that is a “knowing-how” rather than a “knowing that.”  Such is the radicality 
and dialectical nature of Cavell’s materialism: on his assessment, we are only given a 
world in and through language, the withdrawn foundation of human communication 
nothing other than this mutual attunement, this fellow feeling or accord, without which 
neither agreement nor disagreement would be possible.  The nature of this agreement, 
how deep it runs and how far it can take us, is not subject to direct scrutiny and so cannot 
be known beforehand.  Rather it is expressed and open to discovery in the intercourse of 
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daily life.  In a gloss on Wittgenstein’s suggestion that individuals who occupy the same 
linguistic community share “agreements in judgments,” Cavell writes 
The idea of agreement here is not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement on 
a given occasion, but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like 
pitches or tones or clocks, or weighing scales, or columns of figures…It is meant 
to question whether a philosophical explanation is needed, or wanted, for the fact 
of agreement in the language human beings use together, an explanation, say, in 
terms of meanings or conventions or basic terms or propositions which are to 
provide the foundation of our agreements.  For nothing is deeper than the fact, or 
the extent, of agreement itself.
272
 
To say that “nothing is deeper” is to bestow upon Wittgensteinian grammatical 
investigations and the criteria elicited thereby, i.e., the “schematism of a word,”273 a 
quasi-transcendental status in which asking what we call a thing and querying the 
modalities and implications of such a calling (establishing the nature or parameters of the 
language-game in which such a calling is at home) is the discovery of the conditions of 
possibility of said phenomena.
274
 
Simply put: we are agreed (or not) in the language that we use.  The intelligibility 
of the world hangs upon our customs and concepts, the investigation of our linguistic 
practices aimed at uncovering the specific attunements tacitly at play in our discursive 
shaping of phenomena.  This is to say that, while it is the case that, for Cavell, the limits 
of the known and knowable world are drawn by the limits of our grammar, criteria are 
not invariant.  Rather this primal orientation is gained through our habituation into a form 
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of life, which is to say, into a particular culture.  That our grammar is as it is—that we 
call a thing what we do and, in so calling it, delimit its nature—is a matter of convention.  
It could have been elsewise.  To say that our a priori is purely a matter of convention is 
not to say that it is merely conventional as though, because of human devising, it is less 
complete than that which is by nature.  “What I take as a matter of course is not itself a 
matter of course.  It is a matter of history, a matter of what arrives at and departs from a 
present human interest.  I cannot decide what I take as a matter of course, any more than I 
can decide what interests me.  I have to find out.”275  To speak of what occurs without 
human decision—what is beyond our control—is to invoke necessity, but, according to 
Cavell, what is beyond our control is what we, you and I, take or have as self-evident, as 
obviously—inarguably—an instance of something.  This acceptance of or acquiescence 
to the self-evident—the obviousness of the obvious, as Althusser would call it—upon 
which the effectiveness of our conventions is secured must be recognized as a historical 
precipitate.  Cavell treats this bedrock of thinking as a form of inheritance, the present 
moment as the incurrence of the accumulated effect of the temporal unfolding and 
accretion of human interest.  Because this pre-reflective acceptance of the everyday 
represents the sedimentation of history, convention is not to be understood as arbitrary, as 
having no rightful claim to our recognition, nor is its compulsory nature tyrannical, as 
though convention’s power were not a consequence of our complicity. 
What Cavell discovers in his examination of Wittgensteinian criteria is “the depth 
of convention in human life; a discovery which insists not only on the conventionality of 
human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself, on what 
Pascal meant when he said “custom is our nature” (Pensees, 89); perhaps on what an 
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existentialist means by saying that man has no nature.”276  And, one could add, what 
Marx meant, in a passage significant to Benjamin, in claiming that “the labor-process… 
is the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is 
independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such 
phase.”277  The question of human nature is, for Cavell as for Marx, properly taken up as 
the question of human capacity, our needs realized through and hence interpreted by the 
means—the customs and technologies—of their fulfillment and their representation.  The 
social practices that constitute the basic phenomenological fabric of the everyday are 
established and continue to develop through the way in which individuals come together 
(and come apart) in the attempt to realize and/or fulfill their need.  In this way, the 
appearance of our own nature is contingent upon the historical development of our 
capacities.  For Cavell and for Marx, what is at stake in the issue of convention—the 
questioning of our conventions—is the discovery of where and how those capacities 
stand in a given moment and this is methodologically fundamental to them both.  Cavell 
and Marx maintain that nature is discoverable only indirectly through the way in which it 
finds expression in the projects and projections of culture.  In a striking passage on 
baseball that exemplifies the conservative-revolutionary nature of his thinking, Cavell 
writes that 
Very little of what goes on among human beings, very little of what goes on in so 
limited an activity as a game, is merely conventional (done solely for 
convenience).  In baseball, it is merely conventional for the home team to take the 
field first or for an umpire to stand behind the catcher rather than behind the 
pitcher (which might be safer). In the former instance it is convenient to have 
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such a matter routinely settled one way or the other; in the latter instance it must 
have been found more convenient for the task at hand, i.e., it permits greater 
accuracy in calling pitches, and positions an official so that he is on top of plays at 
home plate and faces him so that his line of sight crosses those of the other 
umpires.  More or less analogous advantages will recommend, say, the Gerber 
convention in bridge.  But it can seem that really all the rules of a game, each act 
it consists of, is conventional.  There is no necessity in permitting three strikes 
instead of two or four; in dealing thirteen cards rather than twelve or fifteen.  –
What would one have in mind here?  That two or four are just as good?  Meaning 
what?  That it would not alter the essence of the game to have it so?  But from 
what position is this supposed to be claimed?  By someone who does or does not 
know what ‘the essence of the game’ is?—e.g., that it contains passages which are 
duels between pitcher and batter, that ‘getting hit’, ‘drawing a walk’, and ‘striking 
a batter out’ must have certain ranges of difficulty.  It is such matters that the 
‘convention’ of permitting three strikes is in service of.  So a justification for 
saying that a different practice is ‘just as good’ or ‘better’ is that it is found just as 
good or better (by those who know and care about the activity).   
The “depth of convention” is to be read not just in terms of the profundity of our need for 
it as though it were merely a function of our helplessness and vulnerability.  Rather 
convention is deep in that the nature of the agreement upon which it is established is not 
such that it can simply be withdrawn or given in a moment.  We find or recognize certain 
things as necessary: as having to be the case.  Furthermore, while it is undeniable that our 
practices are contingent in the sense that not every species of humanity will employ or 
even have a need of these particular practices, the conventions or rules that give shape to 
and govern these practices have an internal necessity called on by the very nature of the 
activity, which is to say the way in which that activity reveals or cultivates human nature: 
But is the whole game in service of anything?  I think one may say: It is in service 
of the human capacity, or necessity, for play; because what can be played, and 
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what play can be watched with that avidity, while not determinable a priori, is 
contingent upon the capacities for human play, and for avidity.  (It should not be 
surprising that what is necessary is contingent upon something.  Necessaries are 
means.)  It is perhaps not derivable from the measurements of a baseball diamond 
and of the average velocities of batted baseballs and of the average times human 
beings can run various short distances, that 90 feet is the best distance for setting 
up an essential recurrent crisis in the structure of a baseball game, e.g., at which 
the run and the throw to first take long enough to be followed lucidly, and are 
often completed within a familiar split second of one another, but seeing what 
happens at just these distances will sometimes strike one as a discovery of the a 
priori.  But also of the utterly contingent.  There is no necessity that human 
capacities should train to just these proportions; but just these proportions reveal 
the limits of those capacities.  Without those limits, we would not have known the 
possibilities.
278
 
In short: conventions, the means by which human nature manifests itself as self-made yet 
unknown, are contingent but not arbitrary.  Conventions exist in service to human need 
hence articulate and fulfill human nature.  And, if they do not, then that is a fact to be 
established and the conventions in question subject to change.  They are open to such 
change because they are open to interrogation.  From whence Marx’s call for the radical 
reformation of our conventions, having discovered that our practices represent but vested 
interests.  “It is worth saying that conventions can be changed because it is essential to a 
convention that it be in service of some project, and you do not know a priori which set 
of procedures is better than others for that project.  That is, it is internal to convention 
that it be open to change in convention, in the behavior of those subject to it, in whose 
behavior it lives.”279 
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 Necessity, as conceptualized by Cavell, is then anthropomorphic in the sense that 
(1) it represents the sedimentation of history and so human interest and (2) our 
acceptance can always come under scrutiny and so its terms are open to re-negotiation, 
potentially subject to our future choice.  Cavell treats convention as the form of second 
nature and, as nature reveals itself in and through the history of convention, also treats 
culture as the hieroglyphic code off of which we may read and undertake to transform the 
human character.  In a passage that emphasizes that the forgetting of the history of our 
conventions is the condition by which we are granted a home within them, Cavell writes: 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria is meant, one might say, exactly to call to 
consciousness the astonishing fact of the astonishing extent to which we do agree 
in judgment; eliciting criteria goes to show therefore that our judgments are 
public, that is, shared.  What makes this astonishing, what partly motivates 
philosophizing on the subject, is that the extent of agreement is so intimate and 
pervasive; that we communicate in language as rapidly and completely as we do; 
and that since we cannot assume that the words we are given have their meaning 
by nature, we are led to assume they take it from convention; and yet no current 
idea of ‘convention’ could seem to do the work that words do—there would have 
to be, we could say, too many conventions in play, one for each shade of each 
word in each context.  We cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be 
necessary.
280
  
The efficacy and extent of our linguistic procedures cannot be by nature but neither can 
we think of them as secured through a deliberate consensus.  “We cannot have agreed 
beforehand;” nonetheless, we find ourselves in just such a state of accord—as having 
always already consented to these particular terms.  In this sense, my relationship to the 
conventions that I embody, linguistic and otherwise, is mythic: this history antedates my 
lived experience and orients it.  The language that I speak and the logic of the world that I 
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inhabit precede me radically and, moreover, precede my own agreement, my acceptance 
and discovery of a native tongue.  Language devolves upon me as a form of inheritance, 
not so much willed by me—something to which I have pledged my consent—as willed to 
me.  For Cavell then, our state of agreement in regards to the terms that we use and the 
way in which we use them is not primarily or not immediately an enactment of freedom; 
rather, as Benjamin knew, hiding within our easy acceptance of the everyday is the 
burden of inheritance. 
 Cavell maintains the prehistorical status of attunement both at the anthropological 
level and at the level of the private individual.  We find him, accordingly, concerned with 
the burden of inheritance in the double-sense that was at work in Freud, the 
unconsciousness of history constitutive of the social (primal horde) as well as the 
personal (primal scene) present.  The motivation for Cavell’s claim as to the radical 
priority of convention lies in the simple fact that language is something that human 
beings acquire and that we only gain this capacity for representation—of the self, of the 
world, of the collective past—through being in attunement with particular others.  The 
learning of language hinges, as does its present use, upon mutuality.  The words that a 
child says must be consequential to the adults that have undertaken to teach her (or do so 
despite themselves) and this mattering must be demonstrated in encouragement or 
correction.  In turn, the words of her elders must count for her, the responses to which her 
linguistic ventures give rise making a difference in how she goes on.   
 If I am to have a native tongue, I have to accept what ‘my elders’ say and do as 
consequential; and they have to accept, even applaud, what I say and do as what they say 
and do.  We do not know in advance what the content of our mutual acceptance is, how 
far we may be in agreement.  I do not know in advance how deep my agreement with 
myself is, how far my responsibility for the language may run.  But if I am to have my 
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own voice in it, I must be speaking for others and allow others to speak for me.  The 
alternative to speaking for myself representatively (for someone else’s consent) is not 
speaking for myself privately.  The alternative is having nothing to say, being voiceless, 
not even mute.
281
 
The mutuality of language—its ability, which is to say, our ability to communicate—only 
comes in the form of appeal and acceptance.  In speaking, I am asking for or assuming 
your consent not to any particular proposition but to the relevance of my speech.  I am 
asking for you to accept my use of words as exemplary—an instance of what you would 
say—and hence for recognition as a member of the same linguistic community.  I do not 
ask you to accept what I say as true, but I expect that you will see my speech as faithful 
to and hence representative of our shared linguistic constitution.  This goes the other way, 
too.  For, in my efforts to understand what it is that you have to say, I imagine the words 
as if they were my own; as though you took the words right out of my mouth and I accept 
or reject them on this basis.  While this appeal and acceptance is not in lieu of nothing, as 
Cavell says, we do not know prospectively what the content of our agreement is.  For 
there is no exhaustive set of criteria to be given or to be taken up.  There is only the 
mutual authorization of one another as embodiments of what it is that we say and do.  
In this way, the initiation into language does not represent the overcoming of 
privacy, but rather the stage upon which it gets played out.  For we only ever come to 
learn a language through being in agreement with particular others and this private 
history will inevitably come to bear upon our sense of what words are to be used when.  
Hence, the ineluctable claim to publicity is always at the same time a confession of our 
private past.  Criteria do not exist independently of the history of usage, a history of 
successful and failed attempts where success and failure are contextualized by our 
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relationship to others.  This is the basis upon which Cavell builds his claim that the 
representative and autobiographical dimensions of speech are inextricably intertwined 
and further that, when a contradiction between me and my society occurs, it cannot be 
known a priori whether or not what is required is a transformation of the self or 
revolutionizing of my community.
282
 
While the intimacy of speech is undeniable and the necessity of this intimacy, if 
we are to have a native tongue, unsurpassable, in allowing myself to be responsive to 
you, I do not know ahead of time what responsibilities this might entail and to what fate 
this might sentence my words.  For Cavell, to assume a place within language is to 
undertake a position of fragile authority—a position as powerful as it is vulnerable.  For 
communication is only possible through implicitly staking what one says as exemplary of 
what others would say or do and hence always involves exposing oneself to the risk of 
rebuff.  We are in agreement, but we do not know beforehand its extent: if and where it 
will reach its end. 
 
Secularity and its Discontents 
That the content of our agreement, i.e., what exactly is entailed in our acceptance 
of a term, is not known prospectively means that the insistence upon the ordinary does 
not amount to a claim to know the foundations of community and hence to have 
untrammeled access to the meaning and value of our practices.  Whatever the consent 
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here, it is not contractual.  Rather the demonstration that convention constitutes a second 
nature is a way of urging us to discover to what it is that we are unwittingly beholden.
283
  
Cavell understands Wittgenstein to be writing from precisely this “presumption which 
asks us to look to ourselves to find whether we share (one) another’s secret 
consciousness….voic(ing) our secrets, secrets we did not know were known, or did not 
know we shared.”284  As with psychoanalysis, it is not that ordinary language philosophy 
aims to provide evidence for our beliefs as if the burden were one of proof.  Rather it is a 
matter of making them evident—discovering what ground they occupy and so “learn(ing) 
our position in what we take to be necessaries, to see in what service they are 
necessary.”285  We may find ourselves lacking the capacity to undertake this course of 
study on our own or lacking, as Freud’s patients, the proper society in which such an 
investigation could occur.  Cavell’s philosophical methodology is developed precisely in 
view of the fact that such society is so often lacking and that we do not yet know how to 
find a version of it within ourselves.  The aim of his work, like Wittgenstein before him, 
is to constitute a therapeutic space of critical self-questioning.  Only through such “an 
examination that exposes one’s conviction, one’s sense of what must and what cannot be 
the case…[could there be] a breaking up of one’s sense of necessity, to discover truer 
necessities.”286  
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When a society has the conversation or contestation over necessities this is the 
conversation of justice.  Yet, as Cavell presents it, the turn towards justice is one taken 
within the linguistic-moral self.
287
  For, as a native speaker, I have taken on the linguistic 
constitution and values of my culture and staked myself, wittingly or not, as the 
embodiment of its conventions.  Thus I am responsible for what in them appears as 
necessary and what judgments they have rendered for me necessary.  I am not fit for the 
conversation of justice unless I know, hence have taken responsibility for, the terms of 
my investment in it.  On Cavell’s view, this conversation is on-going and, inasmuch as 
the road to “truer necessities” involves the breaking up of one’s sense of necessity and 
hence is a pathway of doubt, skepticism emerges both as that which threatens and from 
which there arises the possibility of life lived in solidarity with others.  Cavell then could 
be read as inverting Wittgenstein and his avowed goal of bringing philosophy peace as 
though Cavell were concerned for philosophy not to end, but to finally begin.
288
   
To redefine the meaning of criteria from the perspective of natural history and to 
bring the conservative-revolutionary nature of Cavell’s practice more starkly into relief: 
because we have “agreement in judgments,” an inference from the fact that our linguistic 
practices work by themselves, criteria are not something of which we are ordinarily in 
need.  This means that (1) their elicitation occurs in a moment of crisis.  The character 
and content of criterial elaboration is always specific to the semantic emergency that calls 
them forth.  What kind of remark will count as criterial is determined by the context in 
                                                        
287
 See Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: the Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism 
288
 In Contesting Tears, Cavell writes, invoking Benjamin (wittingly or not) that “for Derrida the land of 
thought is fully occupied, as it were, by the finished edifice of philosophy, one that has genuinely been built 
by the impulse to philosophy, so that room for thought must be made, say by a process of reading or 
writing or following on by the pedagogy called deconstruction; whereas for an American the question 
persists whether the land of thought has as yet been discovered, whether it will be today, and whether it is 
at best occupied by fragments, heaped in emergency, an anthology of rumor,” (65). 
 208 
which we find ourselves asking after the legitimacy of a given usage.  Criteria do not 
predetermine the logic of language, but rather (2) elaborate the structure of our talk and 
hence exist on the same level as everyday language.  Criteria are part and parcel of 
linguistic exchange. This means further that (3) produced in and by a moment of crisis 
caused by an extraordinary claiming, criteria are an attempt to recreate or to discover the 
common.  In other words, the evocation of criteria is redemptive—an attempt to re-work 
and re-establish the terms of our relation to one another.  This re-attunement in the 
present moment is a discovery of the implications and unintended consequences of our 
own words; for what we have, unknowingly, rendered ourselves responsible.  The 
meaning of words we have already spoken is divined in the present moment and it is from 
out of this retroactive constitution that the future life of our language opens.  The 
ordinary that we discover is both radically prehistoric and eminently futural. 
Cavell thus interprets the purposes and techniques of ordinary language 
philosophy such that its “procedures present themselves as returning us to the ordinary, a 
place we have never been.”289  The “ordinary,” the eruption into consciousness of the 
groundlessness of our mutuality, makes its appearance in the disruption of the 
intersubjective weave of the everyday as the condition from which we have been 
estranged and the re-establishment of which is a responsibility that devolves upon each 
one of us, alone and all together.  Here we see the reprise of the dialectic of devaluation 
and elevation that we reviewed in the context of the work of Benjamin and Freud.  For 
only in the loss of prereflective (natural) meaning do our conventions come to appear as 
problematic or enigmatic hence not only open themselves to but demand interpretation. 
Emergent in the ordinary, this central Cavellian concept, is the same temporal structure of 
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impossible belatedness—of origination in belatedness—that stood as the theoretical basis 
for Freud and Benjamin’s respective hermeneutics.  The ordinary, retrospectively 
constituted, appears only under the augur of its disappearance and so always too late: as 
already lost.  It is only in our dislocation from the natural habitation of the everyday that 
the condition of mutuality gets constituted as some place from which we have been 
exiled and to which we may aspire to return.  The ordinary is a dialectical image, in the 
Benjaminian sense: 
The return of what we accept as the world will then present itself as a return of the 
familiar, which is to say, exactly under the concept of what Freud names the 
uncanny.  That the familiar is a product of a sense of the unfamiliar and of the 
sense of a return means that what returns after skepticism is never (just) the same.  
(A tempting picture here could be expressed by the feeling that “there is no way 
back.”  Does this imply that there is a way ahead?  Perhaps there are some 
“back’s” or “once’s” or pasts the presence to which requires no “way.”  Then that 
might mean that we have not found the way away, have not departed, have not 
entered history.  What is to be developed here is the idea of difference so perfect 
that there is no way or feature in which the difference consists [I describe this by 
saying that in such a case there is no difference in criteria]—as in the difference 
between waking world and the world of dreams, or between natural things and 
mechanical things, or between the masculine and the feminine, or the past and the 
present.  A difference in which everything and nothing differs is uncanny.)
290
 
What occurs after the recuperation from the skeptical dissolution of the shared world is 
not simply the re-establishment of an old state of affairs; rather the return of the ordinary, 
that which skepticism represses, is repetition as alteration: the emergence of the new from 
out of the ever self-same.  For any significant enactment of our social practices, i.e., any 
worth noting, will be, at the same time, their re-configuration and so our attempts to 
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preserve our conventions will inevitably induce their breakdown: their conservation 
indistinguishable from their overcoming.  In this, Cavell’s conception of modern 
experience coincides with that of Freud and Benjamin.  In the introduction of this 
essential instability into the distinction between the natural and the social, the public and 
the private, a new form of bewitchment befalls us.  Modernity is not the end of myth, but 
rather the era when even the most quotidian aspects of our lives can become, at a 
moment’s notice, fantastic.  
The return to the ordinary does not represent the permanent dissolution of the 
skeptical nightmare, but rather its abeyance.  Because criteria do not constitute the 
prehistorical foundation of everyday speech, but rather are set and re-set in language—
hence drag prehistory along with them; hence belie the thought of (progressive) history 
itself—every re-establishment of the native tongue gives rise to further 
misunderstandings.  This reiterative movement is captured in the heap-of-fragments form 
of the Investigations, what sometimes feels like its aimlessness, its inconclusiveness, and 
its rhetoricalness, and, at other times, its inexplicable poignancy.  The Investigations goes 
nowhere; its digressive method bespeaks the ambition to teach us how to begin again 
after finding only false-starts.  This is a philosophy, as Cavell remarks, which does not 
assume publicness, but rather strives for it, which is “like having sanity as one’s goal.  
Then what state would one take oneself to be in?
”291
 
 Cavell takes this state, in which one is incurably (albeit inconstantly) exposed to 
the madness of skepticism, to be that of secularity.  This is where we find ourselves when 
we awaken, divested—once again—of the forms of religious and post-religious authority 
capable of preempting skepticism.  While Cavell’s investment in modernism is 
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unavoidable and his concern over democracy clear, at least to those capable of 
countenancing its Emersonian and Thoreauvian derivation, what remains largely 
unacknowledged in the literature is this preoccupation with secularism, which, on my 
reading, is central to his understanding of the former two concepts.  This is unsurprising 
insofar as the topic of secularization is, for the most part, only indirectly broached in his 
writing.  An interesting exception to this rule is the Endgame essay as well as the—
perhaps not widely read, but—more widely read “Avoidance of Love,” in which an 
analysis of the tragedy of King Lear becomes a reflection upon the crisis in national 
sovereignty that was the Vietnam War.  This essay “modernizes” tragedy and does so 
precisely in terms of secularization.  As Cavell remarks in the final pages of the latter 
essay, “it does not look, after the death of kings and out of the ironies of revolutions and 
in the putrefactions of God, as if our trouble is that there used to be answers and now 
there are not.  The case is rather that there used not to be an unlimited question and now 
there is.  ‘Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is 
burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not 
able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is not able to answer.’ (Preface 
to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, opening sentence).”292  Cavell treats 
the problem of modern skepticism as a socio-political problem, the cataclysmic loss of 
divine guarantee as both a historical and a mythic event.  Obtaining only in and through 
this loss, secularized society is a condition of freedom and equality, but, equally, one of 
anarchy.  For obedience, when it is to be given, is now to be freely given and so each 
principle or person or phenomenon must, in each instance, prove its right to our 
recognition.  Yet, having nothing to go on, we do not know in what such proof would 
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consist: how and when our allegiance is rightly bestowed.  Of this, we must remain 
permanently in doubt.  Hence there is something irredeemably a-lawful—inherently 
disordered—about the secular condition in which nothing can rightly claim us a priori.  
The efforts of the secularized collective to discover or achieve or assure the normativity 
of its social and juridical practices remain permanently shadowed by the anarchism latent 
in its own concept of legitimate authority.  Such is the ungodly lesson that Cavell 
discovers in the skeptic’s profanation of the ordinary: that the re-grounding of my 
conviction is not in the cards and I am left to lay claim to community without any 
ultimate basis upon which to do so. 
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the 
basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community.  And the claim to 
community is always a search for the basis upon which it can or has been 
established.  I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, my sense that I 
make sense.  It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction 
isolates me, from all others, from myself.  That will not be the same as the 
discovery that I am dogmatic or egomaniacal.  The wish and search for 
community are the wish and search for reason.
293
 
In my attempts to gain acknowledgment from others, which are attempts to speak not just 
to heterogeneous others, but to speak for them representatively, my claim can go wrong 
in any number of unanticipated ways.  I do not know how my appeal will be heard or if it 
will be heard at all.  I have nothing more to go on than “my sense that I make sense:” that 
my experience, while private and particular, is nonetheless exemplary, hence that I am 
authorized in my claim to community.  That my conviction is all that I have—“nothing 
more…than”—suggests that I have been left bereft of something that I once had or that I 
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can rightly expect and that there is no guarantee that my claim to community will be 
recognized means that what has gone missing will not be restored.   
This passage, in which Cavell acknowledges the permanent instability of 
secularized society, sounds as a lamentation or a complaint.  Its pathos is elegiac.  It is at 
this juncture, in which the stakes of secularism emerge, that I find myself in disagreement 
with Stephen Mulhall, who attempts to read Cavell resolutely even in the 
acknowledgment that he cannot consistently do so, and Robert Pippin, who renders 
acknowledgment a reconciliatory concept of the order of Hegelian recognition.  Both 
Mulhall and Pippin maintain that, in the acknowledgment of finitude, the idea that what 
we have is insufficient can no longer get traction: there is no thing from which we are 
barred.  As Mulhall puts it: there is “nothing genuinely substantial in the sceptic’s fantasy 
of a position in or from which genuine knowledge of another would be possible.  Hence 
we cannot say to him ‘That would not be knowledge,’ because there is no ‘that’ to which 
to refer.”294  Pippin, for his part, writes:  
So, Cavell says, what we have in this concern with knowing others is not 
frustration at the limitations of knowledge (an assumption that implies there is 
some limitation that can be overcome…), but unavoidable, constant 
disappointment with what we do have available from the other, disappointment 
with what is available (all that is available), once we have disabused ourselves of 
the fantasy of “breaking into” the other’s world.  However, once we have given 
up that fantasy, the idea that what we are left with is “insufficient,” or a 
frustrating result of an in principle overcomeable finitude, can no longer get a 
grip.
295
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On the view forwarded by Mulhall and Pippin, mourning and mournfulness come to an 
end, corrected by reason; accordingly, they would locate Cavell within a Wittgensteinian 
tradition where the therapeutic aims of that tradition are understood as quietist.  Yet, as is 
indicated in Cavell’s deferral to Kant at the conclusion of “Avoidance of Love,” Cavell’s 
position is that reason still wants what it cannot have.  The fantasy from which we suffer 
is not a mere dream, but a metaphysical illusion produced by reason itself, internal to its 
own operations.  Mulhall and Pippin present acknowledgment as dissolving the relevance 
of skepticism, exposing it as meaningless, but acknowledgment is a project.  It does not 
take the form of finality or resolution and it cannot bring the drama of skepticism to a 
permanent close.  In acknowledgment, the melancholia of skepticism opens onto an 
interminable mourning yet, as Freud discovered, mourning and melancholia cannot, in 
the end, be parsed.  Structurally, here, there is no difference.  Rather, as with Benjamin 
(and Freud), the possibility of redemption (Cavell will use, in the Lear and Endgame 
essays, the word “salvation”) consists in an attunement to that which is irrecuperably lost.  
Acknowledgment is not itself redemption, but it performs its work in that, in 
acknowledgment, we travel down “the path of accepting the loss of the world (you might 
say, accepting its loss of presence), accepting it as something which exists for us only in 
its loss (you might say its absence), or what presents itself as loss….Since I lose the 
world in every impulse to philosophy…the world must be regained every day, in 
repetition, regained as gone.”296  I must accept the world’s independence from me as the 
condition of its objectivity and hence the possibility of my wholesome habitation of it just 
as I must acknowledge the other’s independence from me if I am to attain to know her. 
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Post-absolutist society exists in a condition of bereavement for which Cavell 
offers acknowledgment as the therapeutic balm.
297
  What is to be acknowledged—taken 
to heart, once again—is the condition of secularity: that the limits of reason and human 
agency needn’t be a condition of despair but rather the opportunity for the a renewed 
search for community.  It is on this basis that Cavell offers, in allegorical form, his 
critique of the myth of contract.  It is to this critique and to his 1971 The World Viewed 
that I now turn. 
 
The Power and Limits of Acknowledgment in Cavell’s Anarchic Cinema 
We have to ask whether there is something in the light of film that is inherently (not, of 
course, inveterately) maddening.  Here I think of my emphasis, in speaking of 
photography, of photography’s metaphysically hallucinatory character, its causing us to 
see things that are absent: it makes things present to us to which we are not 
present.  Hence I call film a moving image of skepticism.  In viewing film we know 
ourselves to be in Paula’s condition of victimization, in need of ratification, if so far 
without her bad luck—as if to be human is to be subject to the madness of skepticism.298 
 
All three of my redemptive critics regard madness as internal to secularized 
experience in which the private and the public are separated yet inextricably intertwined.  
As Freud sees it, there is no means by which to transcend or transform the mutual 
indifference or outright antipathy of the post-religious multitude, hence no means by 
which render its madness livable with others.
299
  Rather, the best for which one can hope 
is private salvation, finding in love and work the resources to sustain oneself in and 
                                                        
297
 “In acknowledgment, I am called upon to do something--to say specific things that will add up to an 
explicit revelation?  Because what is to be acknowledged is always something specifically done or not 
done; the exact instance of my denial of you.  The particular hurt or crudity or selfishness or needfulness or 
hatred or longing that separates us must be given leave to declare our separateness, hence the possibility of 
our connection.  It is balm, but it must still touch the wound” (WV, 128). 
298
 CT, 69 
299
 Kristeva’s re-reading of the primal horde, offered in The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, exemplifies 
psychoanalysis’ inability to offer a political solution to political problems. 
 216 
against the anonymous crowd.  On Benjamin’s terms, by contrast, redemption lies in the 
direction of a social practice capable of overcoming the anonymity and isolation by 
which this madness is produced, which would be, at the same time, the overcoming of the 
capitalist form of life.  For Cavell, the disorder internal to secularized experience cannot 
be overcome if the aspiration to democracy is to be preserved; hence the hope is that such 
madness is livable with others in solidarity.  For Cavell, our separateness is both the 
problem and the promise. 
In this section, I turn to look more closely at acknowledgment—how it works and 
what political promise it extends—and why, on Cavell’s analysis, the movies are not 
simply one scene of acknowledgment but rather represent an exemplary instance of it.  
Cavell presents movie-going as capable of embodying or satisfying my conviction, 
however ungrounded it remains and, in giving my conviction form, rendering it shareable 
with others.  The movies (1) as myth, treat the fantasy of skepticism on its own terms and 
(2), as a common possession, signal the turn from the anarchic and uncanny condition of 
secularity to the collective self-conscious myth-making of democracy.
300
  The 
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deprived of (a public) voice: whose remaining mute is the condition of upon which the social order 
establishes itself.  Film provides proof of the soul in that, in its preoccupation with the fate of the freed 
sisters, it is the site at which is demonstrated that there exists an “inner agenda of culture” hence that 
American, which as yet “conceives Utopian longings and commitments for itself” (PH,17) still has a soul to 
be lost or redeemed even as it seems to have staked itself by and on inequality and injustice. 
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relationship between (1) and (2) is complex and will have to be teased out over the course 
of the remainder of this chapter.  Suffice it to say for now: an essential feature of myth is 
its status as held in common—as that which brings us together, here and now, in its 
revival by the community that it simultaneously creates.  Myth is social practice.  
However, according to Cavell, the way in which movies achieve the condition of myth 
renders questionable the thought that they could be possessed at all; hence serve as the 
basis for a unified community.  Cavell presents the movies both as myth and as its 
overcoming just as Freud presented his scientific myth of the primal horde and as 
Benjamin presented his allegorization of commodity culture in the Arcades.  And just as 
Freud’s treatment of ethnography generated a mythic image that registered the impasse of 
post-absolutist solidarity, The World Viewed produces the same yield.  In the World 
Viewed, Cavell presents the movies as a scene of acknowledgment, cinematic experience 
as the pivot upon which the position of skepticism turns potentially to conviction, the raw 
material of democracy—that of the disaggregated crowd—into community.  Yet, he 
simultaneously maintains that the movies are inherently anarchic and that this anarchism 
is their unique achievement. 
Let me begin by way of (2) and the clarification of Cavell’s claim that, in film, 
Americans have a common possession.  On the face of it, this claim is too broad.  Which 
films?  All of them?  At all times?  Possessed by whom?  Everyone?  Given the 
proliferation of “new media” and new privatized formats for viewing, starting with but 
not restricted to broadcast television, and given the division within American film into 
Hollywood, independent movies, and the avant-garde (which once was called ‘The New 
American Cinema’), it is doubtful that there is a singular cinematic audience anymore.  
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What’s more, it appears that film, as a material basis, no longer even defines “the 
movies.”  That such a claim—made then or now—about the medium per se is inherently 
dubious is not lost on Cavell.  It is suspect for straightforwardly empirical reasons and for 
reasons that concern the very nature of the medium.  As he writes, “it is not clear that we 
do have films in common, or, not clear what it is to ‘have’ them.”301  The second deeper 
formulation in which Cavell suggests that there is something about the movies that 
renders questionable the thought that they could be possessed is, as I have already 
indicated, to be broached in and through an examination of the way in which movies 
represent the last refuge—hence transformation—of myth in secular modernity.  Taking 
up the first formulation in preparation for our confrontation with the second: given that 
Cavell countenances that we do not know the extent to which or even if film is commonly 
possessed, then we must take his writings on movies to be experiments: attempts to 
discover them as commonly possessed.  It is a hypothesis to which Cavell is driven in 
consideration of the inherent pluralism of American culture and the necessary 
heterogeneity of democratic experience.
302
  Where Benjamin was faced with the 
challenge of “brushing history against the grain” and discovering a critical mode through 
which to inherit and transmit the past, Cavell is faced with the problem that America has 
no such tradition to inherit, hence our democracy is asked to assure itself in the absence 
of a coherent culture or, more precisely put, the absence of the philosophical foundation 
upon which the edifice of a(n) (American) culture could be established. 
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 “To speak now of modernism as the activity of an avant-garde is as empty as it is in thinking about 
modern politics or war, and as comforting: it implies a conflict between a coherent culture and a declared 
and massed enemy; when in fact the case is more like an effort, along blocked paths and hysterical 
turnings, to hang on to a thread that leads from a lost center to a world lost” (WV, 110). 
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For Cavell, American film comes to be in the space that an American philosophy 
might otherwise have occupied.
303
  As he remarks, in the introductory pages to Pursuits 
of Happiness, explaining why, when asked to deliver a symposium paper on the limits 
and presuppositions of intellectual inquiry, he offered an essay the structure of which was 
defined in and by the indecorous juxtaposition of Kant and Capra: 
Kant is not a part of the common cultural inheritance of American intellectuals.  
(Perhaps this just means that we are not Germans or Central Europeans.)  But if 
one of the indisputably most important philosophical achievements of the modern 
era of Western civilization is not a piece of our inheritance, what is?  The ensuing 
discussion of a Hollywood film might stand in the place of an answer, or as a 
certain emblem of an answer.  It must be an ambiguous place.
304
 
Why must it be ambiguous?  It must be ambiguous because the question of what is 
common—what America means and hence in what community consists—must remain 
open if the aspiration to a democracy responsive to irreducible plurality is to be 
preserved.  In this consists the bind of American democracy.  Democracy, inasmuch as it 
consists in more than institutions, requires a common culture in which members of a 
society are synchronically and diachronically connected with one another and through 
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 “I assume that movies have played a role in American culture different from their role in other cultures, 
and more particularly that this difference is a function of the absence in America of the European edifice of 
philosophy.  And since I assume that American culture has been no less ambitious, craved no less to think 
about itself, than the most ambitious European culture, I assume further still that the difference everyone 
recognizes as existing between American and European literature is a function of the brunt of thought that 
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handy and portable.  Finally, I assume that American film at its best participates in this Western cultural 
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philosophy, so that on these shores film has the following peculiar economy; it has the space, and the 
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publicly; but its public lacks the means to grasp this thought as such for the very reason that it naturally or 
historically lacks that edifice of philosophy within which to grasp it” (CT, 72). 
304
 9.  Cavell explains that he initially made this comparison between Kant and Capra when asked to 
prepare a paper for a conference on the limits and presupposition of intellectual inquiry.  His intention in 
such an unseemly pairing of the epitome of high culture with an instance of the low was indeed to 
scandalize—to provoke us to test our own sensibility in response to this violation of the boundary between 
philosophy and what does not even appear as art; hence to make us curious about the presuppositions that 
we must have about what the intellect is and in what its inquiries consist and what their merit is. 
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which the terms of that interconnection can be negotiated; a medium through which our 
collective and varying desires can find expression hence open themselves to 
interrogation.  This is to say that democracy cannot dispense with tradition.  Yet, at the 
same time, tradition inasmuch as it names the sanctification of convention, i.e., the 
authority of culture, is anathematic to democratic conceptions of authority—not to 
mention with Cavell’s own conception of convention.  For us, an homogeneous, self-
assured culture will not do.  Culture—Kultur—cannot come to fill the place of vacated 
authority and so any culture befitting democracy must be one that is self-critical, which is 
to say one that achieves the condition of philosophy even in the absence of a sustained 
and sustainable philosophical tradition.  Philosophical criticism, after all, is the need of 
societies that lack traditional authority and hence the traditional means of settling 
disagreement. Furthermore, defined, as Cavell so defines it, as the “world of a particular 
culture brought to consciousness of itself,”305 philosophy names as well the opening of 
the space of culture’s self-criticism.  This is the implied problematic to which Cavell’s 
uptake of Hollywood movies provides an emblem of an answer. 
As is signaled by the name Capra, Cavell’s focus is on the “talkies,” i.e., pieces of 
popular culture.  These Hollywood movies from the “long decade” of the thirties306 that 
achieved, in their time, public standing are movies that “some people treasure and others 
despise, ones which many on both sides or on no side bear in their experience as 
memorable public events, segments of the experiences, the memories, of a common life.  
So that the difficulty of assessing everyday experience, the difficulty of expressing 
oneself satisfactorily, of making oneself find the words for what one is specifically 
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interested to say, which comes to the difficulty, as I put it, of finding the right to so be 
interested.”307 These movies are the proper tutors in a democratic education because they 
forgo cultural authority in the sense of Kultur.  Their subject is the everyday; wholly 
exoteric, open to and criticizable by all, whatever power that they have to command our 
attention depending upon our own willingness to take an interest in, hence notice the 
details of the everyday, seeing the ordinary as the extraordinary.  These films run the risk 
of triviality, but that is a condition and measure of their achievement—their 
exemplification of the medium’s unavoidable commitment to the mundane.  For film is of 
the world and, in its claim that the scene of the everyday is worthy of attention, film 
undertakes the redemption of the everyday at the same time as it leaves itself open to the 
accusation of insignificance.  Such is the danger internal to the affirmation of the 
ordinary. 
All this is to say that: while Cavell cites the popularity of these films as evidence 
for his claim that they represent the “shared fantasies”308 of the nation, this claim is not 
ultimately to be evaluated empirically.  His approach is not sociological.  Rather, the 
films upon which he focuses are ones that show us what film, in general, is; epitomizing 
hence disclosing the conditions of the medium’s meaning-making, conditions that must 
be, if Cavell’s thesis is to go through, those that obtain in the democratic conversation 
and which necessitate a self-conscious practice of emblematics: as he says “a certain 
emblem of an answer” for an indefeasibly “ambiguous place.” 
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By Cavell’s lights, the “talkies” concretize and externalize the “inner agenda of a 
culture,”309 thus continue to exist as a potential site of culture’s self-examination 
inasmuch as these are films preoccupied with questions of voice, separateness, privacy, 
representativeness, intimacy, community, self-denial, education, equality, and self-
authorization; acknowledgment and skepticism—issues that are both totally ordinary and 
those upon which the individual human life is staked in relation to another hence that 
upon which the life of the community depends.  In other words, “talkies” are films that 
are literally about conversation or its failure.  Furthermore, these are films featuring the 
conversations and quarrels of women and men over the meaning of marriage and gender; 
films that question the possibility of the state of a union between equals and, as Cavell 
sees it, films that demonstrate that neither a happy union nor genuine equality consist in 
the erasure of difference.  The genres of the Comedy of Remarriage and the Melodrama 
of the Unknown Woman take up the prohibition on conversation between women, whose 
public voice has been denied or stolen, and men.  As such, they are part of the ongoing 
conversation and quarrel of American democracy (with) itself and over the divide 
between the public and the private. As Freud showed us in Totem and Taboo, there can 
be no free public sphere when patriarchy is preserved in the private realm and these films 
continue the investigation of the fate of the “freed” sisters; the critique of the state of the 
society that erects itself on the basis of female exclusion and silencing; and the possibility 
of redeeming a tradition and a culture to which historical injustice is fundamental.
310
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 Indeed, while Cavell’s debt to Freud is weighty, it is not until the Melodrama book that he feels 
compelled to give an account of his psychoanalytic inheritance.  As he writes, “I have suggested that some 
internal connection between the discoveries of psychoanalysis and the means of film narrative is argued in 
their each originating, in the closing years of nineteenth century, in the study of the suffering of women,” 
(52). 
 223 
As Cavell sees it, the movies in general and these movies in particular have been 
denied their rightful position in American culture’s self-interrogation. For even though 
“films persist as natural topics of conversation…(and) remain events, as few books or 
plays now do,”311 this conversation is not yet “as good as its topics deserve.”312  While 
movies are a part of daily interchange, Cavell maintains that they remain unclaimed 
hence unpossessed insofar as the depth of our attraction to them, the logic of their appeal, 
is unexplored. I take it that, in the unseemly pairing of Kant, a sure candidate of high 
culture if ever there was one, and Capra, a classic instance of the American popular or 
low, Cavell means to scandalize and to provoke us to ask why this is felt as an 
indiscretion.  What must our presuppositions be such that we find this blurring of the 
boundaries between philosophy and what appears as mere entertainment, i.e., as empty or 
trivial hence unworthy of philosophical attention, so unbearable?  The suggestion is not 
that the distinction between Kant and Capra, one valued as edifying and the other 
unreflectively enjoyed or reflexively dismissed, is arbitrary, but that it is in need of an 
account.  For, as Cavell sees it, we seem to have become incurious about in what our 
intelligence consists, what needs or purposes serves, and at whose pleasure.  Cavell 
consistently characterizes this trend as one of repression, i.e., as a denial definitive of the 
American life of the mind.
313
  By Cavell’s lights, the failure to recognize these films as an 
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 “My fantasy here is of conversations about It Happened One Night—or, for that matter, about Kramer 
vs. Kramer—that demand the sort of attention and the sort of command of relevant facts that we expect of 
one another in evaluating a team’s season of play; conversations into which, my fantasy continues, a 
remark of mine will enter and be pressed and disputed until some agreement over its truth or falsity, some 
assessment of its depth or superficiality, has been reached…If the conversation, the culture I fantasize, is 
technically at hand, something further, something inner, untechnical, keeps it from our grasp,” (PH, 39).  
As on Benjamin’s assessment, we have all that we need at our disposal. 
313
 “If indeed the conviction in Hollywood’s metaphysical or magical ignorance is a fixed idea, then 
nothing would count as evidence for or against it.  One would have instead to locate some spiritual trauma 
that has caused the fixation.  It must be a late version of the trauma sustaining the idea that Emerson cannot 
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American cultural achievement hence a worthy inheritance is a repetition of the failure to 
hear, in the writing of Emerson, a distinctively American philosophical voice and a call to 
democratic conversation.
314
 The charge of anti-intellectualism lobbied against Hollywood 
movies or against Emerson and by which we refuse them as worthy interlocutors is 
interpretable in two ways.  It reads either as the prejudicial claim that Hollywood movies 
are unserious or lacking in self-consciousness; that they produce meaning unwittingly 
and are unaware of the desires that they raise.  Or it can be read as the preemptory claim 
that pleasure is not to be taken seriously; that we needn’t be thoughtful and have 
intelligence about the pleasure (or displeasure) we take in such films because, here, there 
is nothing upon which to reflect.  These films are just for fun and, as entertainment, to be 
consumed as commodities.  (Recently a friend remarked to me that the concept of a guilty 
pleasure was inherently misguided: that no pleasure was guilty.  I took this declamation 
of the insignificance of his own sensibility—that what pleased him was no-account—as a 
sure sign of a guilty conscience.) 
Yet, in democratic social space, in which we have no authority upon which to rely 
other than the everyday, the distinction between private pleasure and public value, 
between my conviction and what I ask for my society, cannot be drawn in any absolute 
and stable way.  We have no other ground for the conversation over the good life, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
know what he does, that to know his work just cannot be his work.  It is a point on which America’s 
admirers and its detractors eagerly agree,” (CT, 78). 
314
 These films represented in the melodrama of the unknown woman are among those films known to our 
culture, from the time of their making until the present, as ‘women’s films’ or ‘tear jerkers’.  And even in 
recent years, when they are receiving more attention, particularly from feminist theorists of film, they are 
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ones that do not know their effect, the desire that is in them, and do not possess the means for theorizing 
this desire, as it were, for entering into the conversation over themselves…I regard [these melodramas] as 
full companions of the remarriage comedies from which I take them to derive, hence among the high 
achievements of the art of the film—worthy companions in intelligence, in seriousness of artistic purpose, 
in moral imagination, and even in a sense in wit,” (CT, 7). 
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arrangement of just society, then the question of what respectively commands our interest 
and esteem: why I take pleasure in what I do—why I value what I do and why there is 
happiness for you there as well: why you should value it, too.  It is the attempt to 
discover, from out of our respective privacies, what is common.  There can be no shared 
life without the capacity to tolerate and acknowledge one another’s fantasies and so 
without the capacity to give voice to our own.  Accordingly, Cavell presents his re-
writing of these films as the fulfillment of a social-political obligation—his attempt to 
“find the words for what (he) is specifically interested to say” as the “finding (of) the 
right to thus be interested,”315 which amounts to concretizing his conviction and pleasure 
in a form that is publically criticizable, available for either acceptance or rejection: “I 
would like to say that what I am doing in reading a film is performing it (if you wish, 
performing it inside myself).  (I welcome here the sense in the idea of performance that it 
is the meeting of a responsibility.)”316  As the drama (or melodrama) of the films in 
which Cavell is interested hinges upon the characters’ ability to give voice to their 
condition and subsequently on the promise of acknowledgment or threat of denial by 
others, which they must learn either to accept or to withstand (the former at times as 
difficult as the latter), the gambit of Cavell’s method is to embody film’s provocation—
the desires that it elicits in him.  The attempt to establish accord over meaning and 
meaningfulness begins in the hope of agreement—it begins in solidarity—and it 
continues in the attempt to find the words capable of expressing the source and 
significance of one’s pleasure.  This is why, as Cavell writes in “Aesthetic Problems of 
Modern Philosophy,” “art and the criticism of art….have their special importance (and) 
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elicit their own forms of distrust and gratitude.  The problem of the critic, as of the artist, 
is not to discount his subjectivity, but to include it; not to overcome it in agreement, but 
to master it in exemplary ways.”317 
Accordingly, I can further specify my thesis that Cavell’s writings on film are 
experiments.  In the exemplification of what it would mean to take seriously the position 
of cinematic spectatorship and its pleasures (or displeasures), Cavell aims to provide a 
model by which we might be enabled to take seriously our own standing responses to the 
movies, hence enter into conversation over them.  His work thus consists in the 
redemption—the democratization—of the mass culture commodity, film “everything a 
commodity should be: equal instances available to all, regardless of position.”318 
 
Cavell and Benjamin on audience-formation 
To re-state this exposition of Cavell’s democratization of film in terms of 
Benjamin’s politicization of the medium as discussed in Chapter Two: where Benjamin 
was interested in what movies could, of themselves, accomplish, Cavell is interested in 
what talking about movies might do.  This does not mean that Cavell is unconscious of 
the fact that movie-making, movie-viewing, and talking about movies are historically 
determined practices.  Cavell’s (quasi) transcendental business is to lay bare the 
conditions of possible cinematic experience and to do by means of “think(ing) the causes 
of (his own) consciousness of film as it stands,” presenting himself as exemplary.319  For, 
“the nature of the audience of an art, its particular mode of participation and perception, 
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is internal to the nature of that art.”320  This aspect of his philosophy of film, de-
emphasized in his genre books, is central to the structure of the World Viewed, which, 
despite its subtitle and its profession of an aspiration to ontology, writes movie-viewing 
in and through a moment of its historical transformation.  If there is an ontology to be had 
here it is thoroughly dialectical and thoroughly materialist.  Like Benjamin before him, 
Cavell assesses the movies belatedly in a moment in which a new regime is consolidating 
itself hence a prior practice is, in its pastness, available for scrutiny.
321
  Benjamin, in the 
face of the fascistic appropriation of film, wishes to mark the betrayed promises and 
unrealized potential of film in its earlier and now forever lost form.
322
  We find Cavell, in 
the World Viewed, equally melancholy in the loss of his natural practice of movie-
viewing.  Yet, despite the distaste that he expresses for this new regime of cinematic 
consumption, the suggestion of the book as a whole is that it is only now—or only in 
1971—that cinematic experience truly comes into its own socio-politically speaking.  
Cavell writes, in his introductory chapter, “An Autobiography of Companions” 
I have mentioned my increasing difficulty over the past several years to get 
myself to go to new movies.  This has to do partly with an anxiousness in my 
response to new films I have seen (I don’t at all mean I think they are bad), but 
equally with my anxiousness in what I feel to be new audiences for movies (not 
necessarily new people, but people with new reasons for being there), as though I 
cannot locate or remain together with my companions among them.  I take this as 
something of more than clinical interest. 
 One could say that movie showings have begun for the first time to be 
habitually attended by an audience, I mean by people who arrive and depart at the 
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same time, as at a play.  When moviegoing was casual and we entered at no 
matter what point in the proceedings…we took our fantasies and companions and 
anonymity inside and left with them intact.  Now there is an audience, a claim is 
made upon my privacy; so it matters to me that our responses to the film are not 
really shared.  At the same time that the mere fact of an audience makes this claim 
upon me, it feels as if the old casualness of moviegoing has been replaced by a 
casualness of movie-viewing, which I interpret as an inability to tolerate our own 
fantasies, let alone those of others—an attitude that equally I cannot share.323 
On the cusp of a new regime of movie-making and movie-viewing, Cavell looks back at 
what appears, from the perspective of 1971, as American film’s pre-social period in 
which the movie-theater was filled with but a “crowd of scattered souls.”324  In other 
words, in the past, Cavell sees an uncompromised hence unreflective privacy and, 
inspecting his present, he sees an equally unreflective gathering, which is to say: nothing 
but a mass.  What is crucial here is that, while Cavell rejects the Benjaminian thesis that 
the audience’s murmuring in the dark constitutes a communicative act, hence that, within 
the movie-house, shared experience obtains, it is only when “the movie” becomes a 
public event that the question of community-formation within the theater can be sensibly 
posed.  For with the establishment of the audience, there arises the expectation of shared 
experience, which means further that there is, for the first time, the threat of remaining 
alone; the promise of community unfulfilled. 
Cavell is drawn to the movies because he sees in them all the elements that 
Benjamin saw: the promise of shared experience; the allegorical recycling of the 
mundane; the mass gathered together.  And, like Benjamin before him, Cavell is highly 
ambivalent about the movie-going crowd.  For the movie-theater, as a site of public 
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gathering, extends the promise of community-formation, but, at the same time and for 
precisely the same reasons, it threatens the mob.  Benjamin’s ultimate verdict was that the 
movie-going audience was an absent-minded examiner,
325
 having before it all the tools 
needed to form revolutionary class-consciousness, but still unable to take them up.  On 
my reading of the Artwork essay, while Benjamin brushes the cinematic audience against 
the grain, he still develops it in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish from the 
fascistic mass.  Cavell, for his part, describes the movies as both “anarchic” and “illicit,” 
interestingly dispensing with the all-too-common film-theoretic accusation that the 
pleasure of moviegoing is perverse—a case of onanistic voyeurism—and presenting the 
movies instead as unlawful, i.e., as a crime against the community and, what’s more, a 
crime of the community against itself.  For, in the darkened space of the movie-theater, 
anonymity reigns, anonymity being but the private face of the public concept of anarchy.  
“The anarchism of movies is already contained in the condition of viewing unseen.  For 
the polis can be affirmed only in the present speech, the members live for one another, 
each explicit, the city gathered within earshot of itself.”326   
The cinematic audience does not constitute “a public,” a community, at all.  As 
Cavell sees it, the participants in the cinematic event are immersed in their private 
experience and this is not a failure, but the very condition of possible experience.  
Nonetheless, it is a gathering in public and so, even as we sit ignorant of one another, “a 
claim is made on (our respective) privacy, so it matters…that our experiences are not 
really shared.”327  Perhaps we should say rather that we do not know if our experiences 
are shared and so the possibility of publicity shadows the condition of private viewing.  
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What we fail to know, during this “hundred minutes of speculative solitude,”328 is with 
whom we are (or are not) in community.  To know this would require that we reveal 
ourselves and make known what it is that we have undergone, but “the audience (of film) 
is not a gathering of citizens for honest confession and acceptance of one another.”329  
This is something that can only happen after the cinematic gathering is concluded.  
Whatever community is to be had here, it occurs after the lights go up, secured on the 
basis of the very depth of our privacy within the theater.  In other words, the audience of 
a film is formed retrospectively in conversation or not at all. 
Hence Cavell maintains that there is something intrinsically (formally) illicit—
unlawful—in taking up this private position in the dark, in public, amongst strangers. 
This unruliness is the condition of the cinematic redemption of privacy, but without 
confession and acceptance—without conversation—the cinematic gathering is no more 
than a rabble.  Where Benjamin’s Artwork essay claims that an earlier instantiation of 
movie-viewing was defined by the mass’ “organizing and regulating their response,”330 
hence that revolutionary class consciousness could be realized therein, Cavell’s theory of 
communication is such that the question of whether or not the audience is indeed a 
community can only be established retrospectively in conversation and on the basis of 
our respective privacies. 
Here we turn to face directly the non-empirical version of the question of film’s 
possess-ability, the question with which we began, and thus towards the question, as well, 
of how it is that film achieves—as it overcomes—the condition of myth.  As Cavell sees 
it, cinematic experience is so “deep,” let us say, as to render dubious the supposition that 
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it could be possessed at all.   Cavell rather maintains that it is we who are possessed by it.  
As Benjamin weirdly compared movie-viewing to the “consumption” of architecture, 
characterizing the experience as haptic, Cavell admits to some hesitancy over the 
question of whether or not the movies are even to be regarded as an artform because “its 
effects (are) too powerful or immediate to count as the effects of art.”331  “The impact of 
movies is too massive, too out of proportion with the individual worth of ordinary 
movies, to speak politely of involvement.  We involve the movies in us.  They become 
further fragments of what happens to me, further cards in the shuffle of my memory, with 
no telling what place in the future.”332  Freud and Benjamin maintained that we do not 
possess our past so much as it possess us (a sense of modernity that Cavell shares) and 
that the solution to this problem lies not in the development of a new form of mastery, but 
rather in the cultivation of the capacity to acknowledge the permanence of our 
dispossession and be acknowledged in it.  If a genuinely democratic community is to be 
formed, this acknowledgment must gain a properly public form.  In the movies, Cavell 
believes himself to have discovered just such a social practice.   
 
Photogenesis as allegoresis: the cinematic redemption of skepticism 
In the movies, the matter of history is offered up, in its derangement before its 
public.  Cavell offers an ontological definition of film as a “succession of automatic 
world projections.”  Movies mechanically (“automatically,” without the intervention of 
the human) preserve reality (“world”) by means of its fragmentation (“succession”) and 
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its re-collection in and by way of its displacement (“projection”).333  That Cavell can so 
define the essential nature of film establishes, perhaps paradoxically, that the law of 
cinema is its lawlessness.  For this definition of the representative powers of film via 
mechanical fragmentation and displacement entails that cinema’s unique achievement is 
disconnection: that film gives us the world through disembodying it, severing it from its 
spatio-temporal origins, and reassembling its pieces by way of juxtaposition. 
“That which the [camera] has fixed upon is sundered from the customary contexts 
of life: it is at once shattered and preserved.”334  The World Viewed presents photogenesis 
as a species of allegoresis, the process by which unhinged images of the world are 
produced.  Decontextualization is achieved through the mechanism of the camera, which, 
inasmuch as it is perfectly “dumb,” cannot but access the mundane as the profane, 
reducing the stuff of the world to a state of pure equality.  In this profanation of the 
landscape, the human being is no exception.  For “photographs are of the world, in which 
human beings are not ontologically favored over the rest of nature.”335  The world 
pictured on film is one freed from the hierarchy of the natural and the social.  In the 
destruction of this distinction proper to commonsense, film suggests that we ourselves do 
not know in what the difference consists—or if indeed there is one.336  It so renders the 
ordinary extraordinary.  As Cavell says “we have forgotten how mysterious these things 
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are, and in general how different different things are from one another, as though we had 
forgotten how to value them.  This is in fact something movies teach us.”337 
The camera’s operations are mortifying, wresting objects from their natural 
sequences and locales.  Yet, in this divorcement from the context of the everyday and 
through their celluloid resurrection, these reassembled pieces of the world take on a new 
significance.  Cavell develops the power of film in terms of the same dialectic of 
devaluation and elevation that Benjamin and Freud identified as the essential feature of 
allegorical meaning-making and by which Cavell himself typified the uncanniness of the 
ordinary.  Indeed, the uncanniness latent in the everyday “is the normal experience of 
film,”338 in which the mundane world is subject to a foreign animation.  And just as Freud 
and Benjamin described the task of the one who would decipher dreamlife, Cavell 
maintains that the “discontinuities are those of attention.  You are given bits of the world, 
and you must put them together into (the) lives (of those onscreen), one way or another, 
as you have yours.”339  In other words, cinematic spectatorship is a practice of 
physiognomic reading in which the meaningfulness of a film depends upon its 
(re)construction by the individual through the interpretation of its images singly and 
together.   
Even as Cavell resists the notion that cinematic experience is properly 
encapsulated through the metaphor of dreaming (or, let’s say, dreaming, as spoken of 
here, remains too metaphorical to do the job; it needs to become psychoanalytical or 
mythological), he is of the mind that, as with the Freudian dream, we may be fooled by 
the veneer of coherence that the Hollywood film imposes upon the material of history.  
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Or, better put, we deceive ourselves when we believe that the linear narrative, decried as 
a betrayal of the subversiveness of the medium by Adorno,
340
 is the whole story.  Cavell 
is in agreement that film qua medium is essentially montage.  Thus he argues that even 
when storytelling is “imposed” upon it, it nonetheless remains allegorical.341  To put this 
otherwise, in terms of one of the central themes of this dissertation: film is able to tell 
stories—to become historical—without becoming historicist.  It is up to us to read 
between the lines and we can only do this if we believe in these films’ intelligence just as 
mutual intelligibility with another person depends upon our imagination and thus our 
goodwill: our willingness to see them as having something to say and something that is 
worth hearing.  As Cavell remarks in the context of discussing Stella Dallas, amongst the 
“womens’ film” or “tear-jerkers” that are “treated [by intellectuals] as works to be 
somewhat condescended to:”342 “‘Can’t you read between those pitiful lines?’  [Mrs. 
Morrison] is in the narrative referring to Stella’s letter to Laurel….But I cannot doubt that 
Mrs. Morrison, or someone, is…referring to the lines of this film as such, hence asking 
their addressee—us—to read, to interpret, for example, her own line, and not alone as 
warning us to get beyond the film’s lines to its silences and its images, which are equally 
to be contended with; but as asking us to get quite beyond an interpretation of the pitiful 
as pathos for the film’s lines and its silences as its images more generally.”343  
For Benjamin and for Freud, such an allegorical recreation of the world was 
dialectically bound up with the subjective condition of melancholia in which one was 
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dispossessed of one’s past and thus equally unconscious to one’s present.  As I have 
argued, Cavellian skepticism is a variant on the Freudo-Benjaminian theme of 
melancholia.  It should thus come as no surprise that, in the movies, the skepticism latent 
in modern selfhood finds the scene of its realization and thus a proper forum for its 
working-through.  The economy of cinematic experience is such that it “establishes the 
connection [with reality] only at the price of establishing our absolute distance and 
isolation.  And this is exactly the price of skepticism.”344  In viewing a film, we both 
assume the skeptical position and undergo its redemption.  The skeptic, desirous to 
discover the ground—if any—of her connection to the world and those within it, 
undertakes a posture of withdrawal.  But, in this abstention from her practical relation to 
the world for the sake of realizing its epistemological presentness, what she discovers is 
that the world’s presence cannot be re-gained on the basis of the senses alone. She finds 
herself isolated, wholly outside—displaced from—the world whose reality she would 
assure.  Movies do not simply countenance the skeptical assertion that, when it comes to 
knowledge of the world’s existence, experience does not suffice. Within the movie-
theater, “not only is there a reasonable possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses 
are satisfied of reality while reality does not exist—even, alarmingly, because it does not 
exist, because viewing it is all it takes.”345   
The epistemological anarchism of skepticism finds its aesthetic correlate in the 
ontological anarchism—if I may be permitted this absurdity—of film.  For, as I have 
already suggested, Cavell’s ontological definition of the material basis of movies as a 
succession of automatic world projections fails to provide the photographic image with 
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its ontological place.  As Cavell sees it, there is no such place.
346
  For, while film is 
obviously of the world—reality is its subject—there nonetheless remains something 
unthinkable about the connection, which is to say, as well, the difference, between a 
photograph and what it is a photograph of.  Cavell denies that this connection is properly 
thought, as Bazin tries to think it, as one of reproduction either in the sense of a visual 
impression, as if photogenesis were a process of mold-making, or in the sense of a visual 
transcription, as if film reproduced the sights of objects as, say, a record reproduces the 
sounds of instruments.   For “objects don’t make sights, or have sights…Objects are too 
close to their sights to give them up for reproducing.”347 Yet, while Cavell makes 
argument with Bazin’s formulation of photogenesis as the visual transcription of reality, 
he nonetheless preserves a version of the rejected thought in his emphasis on film’s 
spectral—its metaphysically hallucinatory—character. As Cavell develops it, the question 
of whether or not what we see onscreen is real or illusory admits of no direct or 
consistent answer and the unresolvability of this question saturates cinematic experience.  
Again, the uncanny is the normal experience of film and the uncanny is precisely what 
characterizes the skeptical mood or predisposition in which one is overcome by the 
indistinction between reality and fantasy. 
Yet film, in making things present to us to which we are not present, represents 
the success of the skeptical posture of withdrawal, disclosing a world complete in itself, 
i.e., one whose revelation is independent of my engagement with it.  It is precisely on the 
condition of my radical exclusion—my utter displacement—from this world that it is 
fully present to me.  “A screen is a barrier.  What does the silver screen screen?  It 
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screens me from the world it holds—that is, it makes me invisible.  And it screens that 
world from me—that is, screens its existence from me.”348  Cavell attributes to the screen 
a protective quality; in mechanically guaranteeing my absence, it absents me from 
responsibility for this world, renders my passivity necessary.  Outside the space of the 
movie-theater, my disinclination or inability to effect change in the world—to act in the 
face of injustice, to prevent the suffering of others or to share in their pleasures—is a 
failure that I must accept as my own.  In viewing a film, I am relieved of this burden 
insofar as my powerlessness is automatically assured.
349
  My absence, incapacitation, and 
ineffectiveness—this condition of dispossession—in the darkened theater is not only 
excusable; it is a condition of experience, necessary to any serious attendance to what 
occurs therein. 
So, while Cavell resists the idea that “film is the modern art, the one to which 
modern man naturally responds” and does so on the grounds that “if there is anything 
seriously to be called ‘modern man,’ one fact about him is that what is natural to him is 
not natural, that naturalness for him has become a stupendous achievement,”350 he 
confirms its special status as the art that naturalizes our denatured condition in and 
through rendering our condition of displacement necessary: 
Viewing a movie makes this condition automatic, takes the responsibility for it 
out of our hands.  Hence movies seem more natural than reality.  Not because 
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they are escapes into fantasy but because they are reliefs from private fantasy and 
its responsibilities; from the fact that the world is already drawn by fantasy.  And 
not because they are dreams, but because they permit the self to be wakened, so 
that we may stop withdrawing our longings further inside ourselves.  Movies 
convince us of the world’s reality in the only way we have to be convinced, 
without learning to bring the world closer to the heart’s desire (which in practice 
now means learning to stop altering it illegitimately, against itself): by taking 
views of it.
351
  
In the epigraph by which I initiated this section, Cavell suggests that secular society 
exists in a condition of victimization, hence requires something more than mere politics 
can provide but without which politics cannot occur.  The World Viewed as a whole 
argues that the experience of film provides this something.  My absolute distance from 
reality projected and screened is the basis on which this reality makes a claim on me, the 
scene of the everyday revealed to me as extraordinary and so redeemed from its state of 
fallenness, its disenchantment for me.
352
  Within the space of the movie-theater, our 
privacy is not transcended, but nor is it left untouched.  Rather the meaning of privacy is 
transformed, the fact of individuality not experienced as fatedness to isolation and so a 
cause for despair but realized as the basis of our intimacy with the world and to those 
within it.
353
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In other words, the movies do not transcend the anarchism of secularized social 
space, but they perform the work of redemption insofar as, within the space of the theater, 
we find this madness to be not merely livable with others but worth living.  “The movies 
promise us happiness…because we can tolerate individuality, separateness…in particular, 
because we can maintain a connection to reality despite our condemnation to viewing it 
in private…The myth of film is that nature survives our treatment of it and its loss of 
enchantment for us, and that community remains possible even when the authority of 
society is denied us.”354   Whatever the society of cinema, it is one the principle of which 
has yet to be discovered—if in fact there is any shared experience here at all.  Within the 
movie-theater, we do not know whether or not community is, in fact, achieved or if we 
simply happen to occupy the same time and place, consuming the same commodity.  But 
this is the further fact that movies allow us to acknowledge: that since we cannot know a 
priori with whom we are in community and on what basis, the secular constitution is one 
as yet in need of ratification.   
For the movies are inherently anarchic.  Their unappeasable appetite for stories of 
love is for stories in which love, to be found, must find its own community, apart 
from, but with luck still within, society at large; an enclave within it; stories in 
which society as a whole, and its laws, can no longer provide or deny love.  The 
myth of movies tells not of the founding of society but of a human gathering 
without natural or divine backing; of society before its securing (as in the 
Western) or after its collapse (as in the musical or the thirties’ comedy, in which 
the principals of romance are left on their own to supply the legitimacy of their 
love).  It shares with any myth the wish for origins and comprehension which lies 
behind the grasp of human history and arbitration.  In myth the past is called 
before us, reenacted, and in its presence we are rededicated.  On film, the past 
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which is present is pastness or presentness itself, time itself, visually preserved in 
endless repetition, an eternal return, but thereby removed from the power to 
preserve us; in particular, powerless to bring us together.   
As Cavell sees it, the movies give refuge to myth in modernity, but only on the condition 
of myth’s self-overcoming.  Myth is the force that founds community and consecrates it.  
Myth creates and preserves a community through the provision of a shared past and 
purpose and thus provides the way into the future.  At the same time, the survival of the 
mythic past depends upon the members of a society coming together and, through the 
convention of collective storytelling, reanimating this past in the present.  In the movies, 
the new site of the mythic convention, the past is presented to us, automatically, without 
our having to do anything.  The past on film is independent of us, which is to say, 
complete without us, and hence, we are without it.  In the movies, we know our union to 
be unsponsored, illegitimate—say, theologically illegal: lacking both the certain story of 
our past and hence the knowledge of our proper future. 
 Yet, in both the myths that it tells and the mythological experience that it affords, 
the movies renew the hope that, even as politics and the laws that it puts forth can no 
longer provide or deny love—ensure a happy state of the union—solidarity yet remains 
possible.  Cavell continues: 
The myth of movies replaces the myth according to which obedience to law, 
being obedience to laws I have consented to and thus established, is obedience to 
the best of myself, hence constitutes my freedom—the myth of democracy.  In 
replacing this myth, it suggests that democracy itself, the sacred image of secular 
politics, is unliveable.
355
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To what myth does Cavell refer?  Democracy, taken as a form of self-government in 
which I obey the government that I have given myself, is a structure subtended by the 
myth of consent.  It is an explanatory myth in that we discover ourselves acting freely in 
complicity with the conventions of our society.  Agreement is an inference from this 
current state of accord.  To put this otherwise: we must consent to the myth of consent if 
we are to regard our existence here as chosen and hence know ourselves as free.  In 
accepting this myth, we both consent to political equality and recognize that we are both 
answerable to and for our government hence our society.  The myth is not intended 
simply to secure our compliance, but to authorize us as members of the polis.
356
 
But can the myth of consent do this?  Can it authorize us?—this is the question 
that remains unasked but which undergirds the passage from the World Viewed in which 
Cavell contends that the ideal of democracy generated by the myth of contract is 
unlivable.  For when I try to implement the political education afforded by the myth and 
inspect the state of my society, I both feel that I cannot have consented to this and that, if 
I am responsible for it, I do not know in what rectification would consist or if anybody 
else knows of the state of injustice—or cares.357  The hegemonic myth of democracy, on 
the interpretation of the World Viewed, serves but to perpetuate our incapacitation. 
                                                        
356
  As Cavell writes in the Claim of Reason: “What I consent to, in consenting to the contract, is not mere 
obedience, but membership in a polis, which implies two things: First, that I recognize the principle of 
consent itself; which means that I recognize others to have consent with me, and hence that I consent to 
political equality.  Second, that I recognize the society and its government, so constituted, as mine; which 
means that I am answerable not merely to it, but for it.  So far, then, as I recognize myself to be exercising 
my responsibility for it, my obedience to it is obedience to my own laws; citizenship in that case is the 
same as my autonomy; the polis is the field within which I can work out my personal identify and it is the 
creation of (political) freedom,” (23). 
357
 Here, I mean to put my reader in mind of Cavell’s essay “The Avoidance of Love” in which his reading 
of the tragedy of King Lear turns into a mournful meditation on the crisis of American national sovereignty 
during the era of Vietnam. 
 242 
But the movies, as myth, treat our incapacitation—our skepticism and non-knowledge—
on its own terms and the acknowledgement that cinematic experience, as mythological, 
potentially affords is that, while the principle of our connection is as yet unknown, we 
might nonetheless find community with one another.
358
  In generating through the movies 
a mythic image of democratic solidarity, Cavell seeks to preserve and open, beyond the 
hegemonic myth of contract, the promise of democracy, giving voice to a politics of 
consent without consensus.  Community yet might be confirmed, retroactively, in 
conversation; the secular constitution might still be ratified.  For when the lights go up, 
“our hiddenness, our silence, and our placement,” having been acknowledged, “are now 
our choices.”359 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: REDEMPTIVE CRITICISM AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
Over the course of this dissertation, I have argued that the texts of Sigmund 
Freud, Walter Benjamin, and Stanley Cavell are productively read alongside of and in 
terms of one another.  Specifically: reading them thus has enabled me to develop the 
concept of a hermeneutical tradition that I have designated “redemptive criticism,” a form 
of critique—a “therapy of disillusion”—that aims not to leave us in a state of 
disillusionment, but rather to awaken us once again to the claim of the quotidian.
360
  I 
have sketched the meaning of redemptive criticism and made the case for the essential 
homology between these three thinkers primarily through emphasizing the historico-
political dimension that fundamentally dictates the logic of their endeavors.  Once this 
dimension is identified, it becomes clear how necessary it is to take up the texts of Freud, 
Benjamin, and Cavell in terms of the implicit theory of secularity that undergirds them.  
For only in the provision of the historico-political backdrop of their thinking is one able 
to get ahold of the normative impulse that shapes their texts.  In this, I take myself to 
have provided the context within which the writings of Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell are 
legible as philosophy, specifically legible as the attempt to inherit philosophy within 
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secularized social space and, moreover, for the sake of renewing the secular aspiration to 
life lived beyond absolute authority. 
In unfolding the inner life of the post-absolutist collective through the work of 
Freud, Benjamin, and Cavell, I have theorized secularity as an ethos of intolerable 
authority, calling as it does for an authority that it cannot stand, and, accordingly, 
presented democratic experience as inherently, which is not to say inveterately, 
maddening.  For Freud, who regarded the social order as fundamentally religious, 
anonymous individuals bound together through the force of illusion (or, in the much 
stronger terms of the later Freud, mass delusion), the only redemption from this madness 
was individual in nature, the project of self-authorization to be privately pursued through 
the cultivation of the inner resources requisite to sustaining oneself in the otherwise 
uninhabitable sphere of anonymous others.  Freud developed the mythic substructure of 
post-absolutist society in the psychological terms of private life, terms ultimately 
orthogonal to the normative drives of democracy, and, accordingly, remained unable to 
redeem myth for post-absolutist politics despite his having shown its significance. 
Yet, as Benjamin recognized, the psychoanalytic project of self-authorization 
cannot be sustained or accomplished by the individual alone in isolation inasmuch as the 
madness of modernity, the phantasmagoria of secularized experience, arises in the gap 
between the public and the private and the concomitant fragmentation of culture.  Only in 
the communal re-collection and re-animation of these fragments might there be 
discovered a form of myth-making adequate to the needs and aspirations of secularized 
society.  It is hence, in Benjamin’s thinking, that redemptive criticism achieves a 
communal character as a new self-critical form of tradition, i.e., a material practice of 
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remembrance.  However, while Benjamin knew that the project of self-authorization 
required a public stage and, conversely, that private experience offered the tools by which 
to get a grip within the ideological terrain of the present, he nonetheless remained unable 
to conceive of solidarity beyond a Hegelian reconciliatory model.  In this, he was at odds 
with himself.  For the secular realization of tradition and the emancipatory politics that 
might follow therefrom obtains not in the defeat of private life, but rather requires its 
renewal inasmuch as the private is that which is excessive or other to the social totality 
and, as such, that which has the power to critical contest it.  
It is in the work of Cavell, with its recognition that because “the relation between 
self and community (because they are composed of one another) is an undying 
dialectic…you cannot know beforehand whether a given contradiction requires a 
revolution of self or an adaptation of community,”361 that the concept of redemptive 
criticism comes to fruition in and as a solidaristic practice of meaning-making.  In his 
treatment of skepticism and the concept of acknowledgment that arises therefrom, Cavell 
offers a thoroughly dialectical, which is to say, a thoroughly democratic, conception of 
solidarity as achieved, not despite, but in virtue of privacy where that privacy serves as 
the ground of communication and interrelation.  Cavell shares Freud and Benjamin’s 
diagnosis that the madness of modernity is due to the simultaneous separation and 
ungraspable intertwinement of the private and the public spheres.  Yet, on his account, 
the hope for a life lived in freedom and equality with others does not abide in the image 
of this madness overcome, but rather in the thought that it might be redeemed, discovered 
as livable with others.   
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In sum: in identifying, tracing, and developing this concept of redemptive 
criticism through Freud and Benjamin and, finding, in Cavell, the dialectical realization, 
of their respective critico-redemptive enterprises, I have shown that democratic solidarity 
is misunderstood when it is thought to consist in the expulsion of the private and that 
privacy, while it names, in part, that which is excessive to conceptualization or 
codification, is misunderstood when it is treated as the purely particular, the irrational, or 
the incomprehensible.  Mutuality obtains only in virtue of this excess.  In having 
presented redemptive criticism as such an interpretation of democratic mutuality and as a 
means of its practical realization, I cannot evade the further political dimension of my 
dissertation by asking the question of whether and how the practice of redemptive 
criticism, through which the permanent crisis of democratic solidarity is addressed, could 
find an institutionalized form.  Moreover, I take it as incumbent upon me to acknowledge 
and, if not contend with this question here, at the limits of this project, at least to point in 
the direction of a possible answer as I have implicitly developed redemptive criticism as 
vision of solidaristic meaning-making alternative to the proceduralist accounts offered by 
thinkers such as Habermas and Rawls and presented redemptive criticism explicitly as a 
vision of democratic life alternative to that offered in the liberal myth of contract. 
It is my sense that such an inquiry would begin through posing the question of 
what it is that we mean by “political institutions.”  This issue, while not the focal point of 
my current inquiry and thus not directly prosecuted in these pages, has nonetheless been 
broached and negotiated throughout this dissertation.  Freud, in his disclosure of the 
dialectical relation between private patriarchal authority and public order, politicized the 
institution of the family, which, in turn, gave rise to the institution of psychoanalysis.  
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Thus, although Freud assiduously guarded psychoanalysis from any particular political 
affiliations, the practice of the talking-cure emerges as a supplement to or means of 
negotiating our standing institutions: or, alternatively, the meaning of our own standing 
within and amidst these institutions, private and public.  This need for a liminal space, for 
a space of privacy that does not coincide with the domestic interior, could be read as a 
sign of institutional failure: that our institutions do not allow for the kind of educative 
society of which we, as secular citizens, are in need.  However, implicit to what I have 
argued throughout this dissertation and what I wish to emphasize here is that the 
withdrawal into the space of psychoanalysis need not be read as a rejection of private 
relations nor as a refusal of social and political responsibilities.  For potentially, we 
withdraw from these institutions for the sake of these institutions, i.e., for the sake of 
cultivating the capacity to operate within, contribute to, radically remake, and, if need be, 
to reject these institutions. 
While Benjamin’s politicization of mass culture called for a political praxis, an 
“institution,” that it could not itself supply, his texts, as I have argued, nonetheless 
contribute to the provision of this secular education—are themselves contributions to the 
tradition of cultural critique, an institution whose effectiveness we might question, but an 
institution nonetheless.  But, with Cavell, I find myself hesitant to assert that his 
treatment of movies or his analysis of linguistic conventions represent the immediate or 
direct politicization of these respective phenomena.  Cavell’s democratization of the mass 
culture commodity of film and his democratization of criteria should rather be described 
as offering an image of solidarity through which to reimagine the purpose and shape of 
political institutions through destabilization the divide between the private and the public, 
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opening the meaning of both to a radical reinterpretation.  Cavell’s analysis of the 
cinematic audience is, as I have argued, the analysis of a certain kind of conversation and 
his analysis of our conventions presents these social institutions not as structures that 
forestalls or eliminates semantic/intersubjective crises, but as a structure defined by the 
perpetual possibility of crisis and, at the same time, the site at which we negotiate these 
crises and potentially take advantage of them.  Viewed this way, we could say that 
Cavell’s critical allegorization(s) of the myth of contract emblematically envisions 
proceduralist politics as dialectical politics.  This “proceduralism,” which presents open-
ended conversation as the medium of politics, radically alternative to that advanced by 
either Rawls or Habermas inasmuch as the conversation of justice does not depend upon 
the expulsion of the private.  Rather, political discourse, theorized in terms of Cavellian 
acknowledgment, arises in the very indistinction between the private and the public, 
where this indistinction is both spatial (as mythically imaged in Cavell’s anarchic-
democratic cinema) and internal to claim-making: a matter of voice. 
 In arguing that the private is not opposed to the communal and, as such, to be 
ignored, extruded, or surmounted, but rather secured as the condition of the possibility of 
communal life and in further positing that the divide between the private and the public is 
not one resolved before politics proper but the very stuff of democratic political life, I am 
not alone.  There are many theorists and philosophers engaged in the effort to reimagine 
political institutions accordingly (e.g., Iris Marion Young, Bonnie Honig, Chantal 
Mouffe, to name a few).  Here, I would like to consider two such politico-philosophic 
projects, those advanced by Judith Butler in Precarious Life and José Medina in his 
recent publication The Epistemology of Resistance.  In marking the limits of the current 
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project and the direction of further research, the efforts of Butler and Medina are the right 
ones to consider insofar as they share my conviction that democratic solidarity attains in 
the recognition of the excess that is nonetheless internal to it and that the question for 
political theory is whether or not this excess can, indeed, be democratized through the 
identification and development of the kinds of institutions that could properly house and 
nourish such solidarity. 
 In Precarious Life, Butler develops her politics of acknowledgment in terms of a 
missed opportunity.  This is redolent of Cavell, for whom acknowledgment is always 
acknowledgment of some specific instance of ethical failure.  Specifically: Precarious 
Life finds its occasion in the aftermath of 9/11.  Butler proposes that the retaliatory 
violence undertaken by the U.S. is rooted in our inability to grieve; that rather than 
mourning the sense of sovereignty that was lost, the myth of sovereignty was resuscitated 
through the invasion of foreign soil and the internal invasion of the private sphere by U.S. 
government surveillance.  While Butler does not outline specific institutions through 
which such solidarity might be realized in the future—nor does she indicate what kind of 
political institutions might have allowed us to respond differently to the crisis of 9/11—
she does designate “the media” and the capitalist interests that control it as the primary 
institutions that facilitated and supported the gross ethico-political failing of the United 
States.
362
  What was revealed and immediately repressed in the wake of 9/11, she 
contends, was the ontological fact of our “fundamental dependency on anonymous 
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legislation for which has been, predictably, contested on Capitol Hill.  We think of these interests as 
controlling the rights of ownership, but they are also, simultaneously, deciding what will and will not be 
publicly recognizable as reality.  They do not show violence, but there is a violence in the frame in what is 
shown.  That latter violence is the mechanism through which certain lives and deaths either once again) by 
the war effort.  The first is an effacement through occlusion; the second is an effacement through 
representation itself,” (147). 
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others.”363  Had we been able to acknowledge and, in acknowledging, to accept our 
shared condition of finitude and vulnerability, the crisis of 9/11 could have become the 
occasion, not for further trespass, extra-national and domestic, but rather the basis for a 
reconstitution and reorientation of political community—and not just the political 
community of the U.S., but rather the discovery of a global political community. Butler 
writes that 
Despite our differences in location and history, my guess is that it is possible to 
appeal to a ‘we,’ for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost 
somebody.  Loss has made a tenuous ‘we’ of us all.  And if we have lost, then it 
follows that we have had, that we have desired and loved, that we have struggled 
to find the conditions for our desire…This means that each of us is constituted 
politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies—as a site of 
desire and physical vulnerability, as a site of a publicity at once assertive and 
exposed.  Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially 
constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that 
exposure.
364
   
Here, there emerges a parallelism between Butlerian mournful solidarity and the elegiac 
pathos which grounds the Cavellian search for community.  That said, where Butlerian 
solidarity is one formed in light of an extra-political truth of human finitude, 
interdependency, exposure, and mortal vulnerability, on my reading of Cavell, the loss 
that might bring us together is one that is already political insofar as it concerns the 
historico-political condition of secularism qua condition of exile, the divestment of 
community always, at the same time, the possibility of its rediscovery.  Where, for 
Cavell, this loss and the incapacitation that it implies serves as the basis of solidarity 
inasmuch as this divestment is, as one name for privacy, also the condition of our 
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freedom and of our capacity to freely encounter one another, for Butler, conversely, the 
acceptance of our own vulnerability is a source of solidarity inasmuch as it re-orients us 
to the other qua desiring, suffering body; as vulnerable to the same violence that threatens 
us and to the violence that we yield.  Butler thus suggests that a Levinasian ethics of 
alterity serves as an important resource for the theorization of democratic solidarity.  
Butler’s Precarious Life, in this way, offers a further means by which to enrich and 
expand the account of solidarity that I have developed here.  
 As I have treated it in this dissertation, acknowledgment does not offer a 
conceptual resolution to a personal, ethical, or political problem, but rather a means of re-
casting the essential problematic of democratic community.  Acknowledgment, in naming 
what remains excessive to public recognition, names the permanent crisis of secular 
community.  In Epistemologies of Resistance, however, José Medina goes further, 
proposing a politics of acknowledgment in which acknowledgment is itself the force of 
democratic legitimation.  While the pedigree of Medina’s concept of acknowledgment 
admits of a relation to the Cavellian concept, he writes from out of a very different 
tradition than that from which this dissertation descends.  Yet his Wittgensteinianism and 
his investment in Castoriadis, specifically in his Freudo-Marxist concept of the social 
imaginary, create additional points of contact between our two studies.  Medina depicts 
the politics of acknowledgment precisely as a proceduralism alternative to those aimed at 
consensus, such as Habermasian discourse ethics, or those that one-sidedly prioritize 
disagreement and seem to sacrifice solidarity, such as the Mouffean agonistic model.  
Medina seeks to re-conceptualize the very privacy, pluralism, and non-knowledge that 
would seem to defy the possibility of community as the foundation of community, 
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arguing that genuine solidarity consists in embracing the limits of our own perspective 
and the ability to engage with perspectives radically other to our own.  He writes that the 
collective imagination 
… must be rendered open to contestation in (an) indefinite and radical way.  A 
society’s sense of itself—of its past, present, and future—must always remain 
radically open to contestation.  And this radical contestability, far from being a 
threat to social cohesion, actually constitutes the basis of a particular kind of 
social relationality that is precisely what pluralistic democracies require.  In this 
radically pluralistic view, democratic solidarity and democratic participation 
revolve around diversity and critical engagement with differences; and they do 
not have to be grounded in or aimed at consensus—whether facilitated by 
common features, a common culture, or shared views.
365
 
Medina’s concept of a politics of acknowledgement is thus meant to countenance, 
highlight, and address many of the same issues that have made up the basic material of 
this dissertation and dictated the terms of its engagement with Freud, Benjamin, and 
Cavell.  Medina presents solidarity in terms of the willingness to discover with whom it is 
that we are in community and acknowledgment as the crucial normative relation by 
which we are able to countenance and appreciate the claims of others whose experiences 
diverge radically from our own.  Moreover, Medina depicts this solidaristic form of 
meaning-making as one in which crises are courted and redeemed, democratic 
community as that which is capable of critically interrogating and challenging its 
fundamental assumptions about its past, the meaning of its present, and the possibility of 
its future.  As Butler offers the opportunity to enrich my account of the affective 
constitution of democratic solidarity, an engagement with Medina’s work affords the 
possibility of the more direct or immediate politicization of redemptive criticism or, to 
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restrict this claim, its specifically Cavellian form of acknowledgment.  I imagine that 
such an engagement would be focused in terms of Medina’s thesis that the acceptance of 
the radical contestability, the provisionality and open-endedness, of every feature that 
defines a political community could itself act as the force through which a community 
coheres.  For, in the terms lain out in this project, the question of community cannot be 
closed with the provision of the concept of acknowledgment. Instead acknowledgment is 
the concept or the act through which that question first (or always) recurs.  Where 
Medina sees the acceptance of pluralism, privacy, and non-knowledge as vindicatory, a 
mechanism through which community could be re-grounded, I see no such possibility of 
ratification.  Rather, on my reading, it is in the very anarchism of secularized social space 
that the hope of democracy obtains, democratic culture but the attempt to redeem the 
unending crisis of secular solidarity. 
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